Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

Washington, May 9, 1956—6:03 p.m.

904. Dept approves your position Embtel 1368.² Although AMAS staffing not vital matter itself, as Yugoslavs well know, it became during Murphy talks symbol and measuring rod US-Yugoslav military relations. Yugoslavs in reneging on their commitment seem deliberately to have posed issue continuation present MDAP. Whether Prica statements are final Yugoslav position or merely trial balloon to facilitate formulation Yugoslav position for Moscow talks (as in Tempo statement on MIG’s last year),³Dept believes frank, firm and swift response essential to clarify respective positions before Tito visit Moscow.⁴ You should accordingly seek interview soonest with Prica and stress you are making following points per instruction:

1. Murphy negotiations established overall framework for US-Yugoslav political, military and economic relations, main points of which embodied in confidential memo of understanding. From review of political situation with Tito, Kardelj and Prica, Murphy satisfied himself on bases for future bilateral cooperation, entered into military discussions, and once these questions resolved (including precondition of Yugoslav agreement to AMAS staff minimum of sixty), he proceeded to work out economic problems.

2. US has adhered to October agreement. MDAP shipments are proceeding normally, dispatch of major undelivered end-items already past planning stage, and approach made on possible future MDAP. Full economic assistance given in various forms and collaboration continues. US has noted discrepancy between increasingly pro-Soviet public stance Yugoslav press and leaders on world issues and private remarks of latter aimed at reassuring West, but has until now accepted Yugoslav assertions that delicate situation in USSR requires such dichotomy in overall interests West.

3. Conversations with Prica present disturbing picture. Terms Murphy agreement on AMAS staff are explicit, as Prica himself has admitted in raising issue to political plane. Since world situation and Yugoslav position have not basically changed since October, we cannot accept Yugoslav justification for refusal adhere their commitment. US has no desire force military equipment on unwilling recipients. If Yugoslavs want program continue, they must comply with their undertakings.

4. Prica must have realized issue in presenting Yugoslav position to you. Presume Yugoslavs aware that any US termination MDAP if forced on US by their action would also be taken as “political manifestation” which bound have wide and unfavorable repercussions in West and specifically in US Congress. Cannot assume Yugoslav decision based on determination abandon military defense efforts since 75 percent 1956 budget still allocated for armed forces and Yugoslavs actively trying to acquire military equipment from Western nations which Yugoslavs need but unable produce domestically. Logical deduction is that Yugoslav govt envisages alternate (Eastern) sources supply.

Presume foregoing démarche to Prica will result in your being summoned by Koca Popovic and/or Tito after their return from Paris, and you should see Tito in any event on issue shortly unless Prica or Popovic backs down. Action is being taken to suspend temporarily two F-86E aircraft scheduled for delivery May 11 until further assessment made by Dept based on your advice whether all deliveries of equipment should be suspended until satisfactory conclusion reached. From terms your approach plus this action should be clear to Yugoslavs US position contains no element bluff. Defense concurs.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/5–756. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for CINCEUR, Knight, and Wallner.
2. In telegram 1368 from Belgrade, May 7, Riddleberger reported on his meeting with Prica, during which Prica stated that Yugoslavia was not willing to increase the AMAS staff, as agreed to in the October 1955 talks with Murphy, or to enter into discussions on future military aid. Prica’s justification was the “policy of Yugoslav Government to promote relaxation of tension, to de-emphasize military programs and to propagandize for non-military cooperation.” Riddleberger concluded that the Yugoslavs were willing to risk not implementing the October agreements in the hope that the United States would continue military aid. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/5–756)
3. Not further identified.
4. Tito was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union in early June.