238. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs (Murphy)2
Washington, February 7,
1955.
Dear Mr. Murphy: Department of State telegram to Paris
Tosec 9 of 20 October 19543 advanced certain proposals for the strengthening of
Yugoslav military ties with the West. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have now
given consideration to the military implications of these proposals, and
their comments are forwarded as an enclosure. I concur with their views
in the premises, subject the following comments.
Such a program is important to insure that Yugoslavia’s military
potential will be a positive asset to the United States and its Allies.
It should be pursued, however, slowly and carefully, in order to insure
that Yugoslavia’s forces will not be allowed to become a liability
through growing neutralist tendencies. The coordination of Yugoslav and
Western defense planning cannot be delayed pending an Italo-Yugoslav
rapprochement.
You may recall that representatives of the Departments of State and
Defense reached general agreement on the advisability of a low-level
approach to the question of improvement in Italo-Yugoslav relations at
the informal meeting held on 21 October 1954 in which Admiral Fechteler and Ambassador Riddleberger participated.4
Paragraph 7 of the attached JCS
memorandum is to be read in the light of this general understanding. The
specific steps envisaged for CINCSOUTH constitute an approach on the military level
which would support, in time, diplomatic or political moves to further
Italo-Yugoslav military cooperation.
[Page 612]
Italian officers in the integrated international staff of Commander in
Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, are representatives of NATO, and not of the Italian national
military establishment. In view of this relationship, you will
appreciate that it is within the role of CINCSOUTH, once he is authorized by appropriate NATO agencies to conduct planning
discussions with the Yugoslavs, to foster good will, informally at
first, between Italian officers on his staff and Yugoslav military
officers; and then to judge the timing of the follow-up for encouraging
cooperation through bringing them together in military planning
discussions.
The Department of Defense is convinced that all future discussions on
U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance for Yugoslavia should be undertaken on a
bilateral U.S.-Yugoslav basis. The resumption of the Tripartite-Yugoslav
military talks of 19535 would be pointed inevitably
toward increasing MDAP for Yugoslavia.
In the light of the unfavorable balance between world-wide military
assistance commitments and budgetary limitations, it would be unwise to
give the impression at this time that an increase in MDAP for Yugoslavia is possible.
As you know, the extent of military assistance to non-NATO countries in other strategic areas is
determined on various criteria, including an assessment of how much
initiative the respective countries show in military cooperation with
their neighbors in the general interest of regional defense. The general
objective of military assistance for Yugoslavia is to serve the security
interests both of the U.S. and of other NATO member nations (a) by assisting Yugoslavia to remain
free of Soviet domination, and (b) by militarily orienting Yugoslavia to
the West.
The purpose of any further military assistance discussion with Yugoslavia
would be to reorient the present MDAP
to meet such Yugoslav requirements for regional defense as can be
realistically determined from the prior coordination of NATO and Yugoslav defense plans.
Consequently, such coordination will not lead necessarily to increasing
military aid to Yugoslavia.
You will agree, I am sure, that the steps which the Department of State
and Defense have taken jointly during recent weeks to promote informal
liaison between NATO and Yugoslav
military authorities are in consonance with the above. The Department of
Defense will continue to cooperate with the Department of State in this
program in any way that we can be of effective assistance.
Sincerely yours,
A.C.
Davis
Vice
Admiral, U.S. Navy
[Page 613]
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense (Wilson)6
Washington, January 6,
1955.
SUBJECT
- Military Planning for Yugoslavia
- 1.
- Reference is made to:
- a.
- Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 1 November 1954, subject as
above.
- b.
- Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 5 November 1954, on the above
subject.7
- 2.
- In accordance with the request contained in the memorandum by
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and taking into consideration
the views of the President as forwarded by Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff submit herein their comments and recommendations
concerning the programs proposed by the Department of State to
strengthen Yugoslav military ties to the West.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that early and effective
action should be taken to strengthen Yugoslav military ties to
the West in order to insure that Yugoslavia’s considerable
military potential will be a positive asset to the United States
and its Allies. The recent Trieste settlement should facilitate
such action by the West. The immediate needs in this respect are
to coordinate NATO and Yugoslav
defense plans and to determine the type and magnitude of
operational support which Western military forces will furnish
in event of an attack against Yugoslavia.
- 4.
- In view of recent Yugoslav declarations to the effect that
Yugoslavia does not currently desire a formal military
relationship with NATO, the
development of such a relationship should await a more favorable
political climate. In the meantime, the most desirable
arrangement for the purpose of coordinating NATO and Yugoslav defense plans
and discussing operational support for Yugoslavia is for SACEUR to establish informal
contact with appropriate Yugoslav military authorities through
CINCSOUTH. The
political actions as proposed by the Department of State,
including the provision of the
[Page 614]
necessary authority for SACEUR should precede the
establishment of contact by CINCSOUTH with the Yugoslavs.
- 5.
- CINCSOUTH is considered
to be the appropriate commander to coordinate NATO and Yugoslav defense plans
inasmuch as he is responsible for planning NATO military operations in areas
adjacent to Yugoslavia and is likely to command the bulk of
Western military forces available to assist Yugoslavia. Further,
CINCSOUTH is likely to
have a key role in any formal NATO-Yugoslav military relationship which may
eventuate.
- 6.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a CINCSOUTH approach to the
Chiefs of Staff of Italy and the Balkan Pact Powers, as proposed
by the Department of State would be less desirable than a CINCSOUTH approach directly
to the Yugoslavs. CINCSOUTH has already been delegated the
responsibility of insuring that NATO and Balkan Pact planning are in consonance and
the current problem is one of coordinating NATO and Yugoslav defense plans,
the need for which the Yugoslavs agreed to, in principle, during
the Tripartite-Yugoslav military conversations in August
1953.
- 7.
- Although improvement of Italo-Yugoslav relations is an
important aspect of the over-all problem of strengthening
Yugoslav military ties to the West, the coordination of defense
plans should not be unnecessarily delayed until such improvement
is achieved. If necessary, CINCSOUTH, in his capacity as a NATO commander, should conduct the
early phases of the planning discussions without bringing the
Italians and Yugoslavs together. In the meantime, he should
proceed with the necessary steps to bring about improved
relations between the two in order that the Italians on his
staff might participate directly when it becomes necessary for
them to do so. The views of CINCSOUTH and the Department of State in this
respect appear to be sound. However, the specific steps required
to further Italo-Yugoslav military cooperation and the timing
thereof should be left to the judgment of SACEUR and CINCSOUTH insofar as
possible.
- 8.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that further
Tripartite-Yugoslav military assistance discussions are no
longer necessary from the U.S. military viewpoint. The United
States should undertake military assistance discussions with the
Yugoslavs on a bilateral basis as soon as possible after NATO and Yugoslav defense plans
have been coordinated sufficiently to determine realistic
Yugoslav military force requirements. The purpose of further
military assistance discussions should be to develop a
U.S.-Yugoslav understanding as to the general order of magnitude
and time-phasing of future U.S. military assistance.
- 9.
- It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the initial
bilateral military assistance discussions with the Yugoslavs
following defense planning talks should be the responsibility of
USCINCEUR. Although it
is desirable for the Yugoslavs to take up all military
assistance matters through the American Military Assistance
Staff, Yugoslavia (AMAY), it is
considered that USCINCEUR
is in the best position to conduct discussions relative to the
general magnitude and time-phasing of future U.S. military
assistance. An understanding should be reached with the
Yugoslavs, however, that subsequent to these initial high-level
discussions, they will have to take up all military assistance
matters with AMAY.
- 10.
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the
action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this
memorandum.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N. F.
Twining
8Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force
