Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

200. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Embassy in Germany¹

Berlin, June 1, 1957—5 p.m.

1043. Subject: Berlin access.

1. Today’s lengthy session of political advisers with Kotsiuba produced few surprises and confirmed our previous impression that primary objective of Soviets is to eliminate leave travel by Allied personnel stationed in Western Germany and documented with USAREUR orders for travel to Berlin. Atmosphere of meeting was amiable, but there was clear underlying appreciation that, despite superficial appearance of meeting of minds on many points, essential issue remained unsolved.

2. As chairman political advisers for June, French political adviser Bressier made statement substantially along line of instructions contained Embtel to Berlin 517,² clearly making implication that sample forms to be given Kotsiuba were for his information and not clearance. After receiving samples, Kotsiuba, who throughout was his usual rambling, seldom crystal clear self, replied that he was pleased to note that Western powers had understood that essential objective was to achieve certain uniformities in documentation, lack of which has caused various difficulties since last November. He indicated that, in principle, he agreed with proposals made by Allies, to extent that they seemed to him to derive from proposals which he had previously made. Only problems which remained concerned certain details.

3. After rather cursory examination, Kotsiuba stated that form of travel order presented to him seemed adequate to enable satisfactory checking at control points. However, he believed that orders should likewise contain German translation for reasons which he said he had explained during previous meeting with political advisers (actually he had given no reasons).³ He then expatiated that certain Allied travelers had tendency to leave main Berlin–Helmstedt Autobahn inadvertently, and that these persons inevitably ended up by coming into custody of East German police, who, in order to enable them to recover their bearings and to find way out of GDR, would require German version of travel orders in order to establish their identity as legitimate Allied official travelers. He cited in this connection recent case of American non-com who started off on Autobahn for Helmstedt but ended up at Hof checkpoint en route to Munich. While he was eventually cleared by GDR officials, Kotsiuba pointed out, such clearance could have been more expeditious if they could have immediately established from his travel orders that he was American non-com officer rather than having to enlist services of interpreter to translate orders into German. Kotsiuba gave no other reason for requiring German version of travel orders, but stressed that all he was interested in was welfare of Allied travelers who might thus stray from regular route. Therefore, he requested that Allies study question further to determine whether they could not also provide German translation of travel orders along with three languages already provided on sample forms presented to him.

4. Kotsiuba next asked what purposes of having all three issuing authorities on same travel order form was. When Bressier explained that intention was to cross out inappropriate authorities, leaving designation of issuing authority whose signature and seal actually appeared on travel order in question, Kotsiuba said that, while he could not object in principle to form as it was, he thought it would be desirable if separate form could be used for each issuing authority. Otherwise danger would arise that wrong authority would be crossed out or it would be forgotten to cross out any of issuing authorities; this could only lead to misunderstandings and confusion.

5. It was pointed out to Kotsiuba that it would be simpler to print one form rather than three kinds of forms for each of three Allies, but that his comments would be reported as made.

6. In response to query by Kotsiuba as to whether intention of Allies was to have no more than two persons sign on behalf of Commandant, Ambassador or Commander in Chief, he was told that his understanding was correct.

7. At this point Kotsiuba went off on long digression re Allied personnel stationed in Berlin. He requested that, in addition to sample copies of travel orders which had been given to him, he also be supplied with samples or photostatic reproductions of military identification cards used by military personnel and of passport stamps used by civilians or members of families of military attached to Berlin military government. Kotsiuba also indicated he would like not only sample of Commandant’s stamp but also some indication of page in passports on which it would normally be placed. He then said wished to make personal suggestion which, he recognized, might be administratively expensive and not feasible, but which he wished to make anyway. If Allies could put in Russian language stamp on separate sheet of paper to be attached to back page of passport containing number of ID document, full name of individual traveler, and statement whether such traveler was member of military garrison, of civilian employee of military government or member of family or servants thereof, this would greatly expedite processing at checkpoint by Soviet control officers. However, he did not insist upon this, but merely offered it as suggestion to expedite clearance procedures.

8. Kotsiuba then went on to say that, as far as travelers documented by Ambassadors or Commanders in Chief in Western Germany were concerned, travel orders could be issued only to persons traveling to Berlin on official duty or coming to Berlin to be stationed here. Therefore, their temporary duty orders should be attached directly to travel orders. Glancing at sample of Embassy stamp, he said that he thought such stamp would satisfy this requirement. However, he added, he could not at all agree with absence of Russian translation of stamp which would lead to great difficulties, and he would therefore have strongly to request that Russian translation of this stamp likewise be provided. Without break, he then went on to summarize his understanding of procedures which would come into effect on new documentation. This would involve first inspection of travel orders by Soviet control officer at checkpoint. This officer would then look at number of ID document indicated on travel order. He would then check this with ID card or passport of traveler to establish if name and number corresponded. If these documents were in order, Soviet control officer would then turn to third document which would be stamped to indicate whether traveler was moving on basis of duty orders or on transfer.

9. When it appeared that Kotsiuba thought that stamp, sample of which presented to him, was intended to be put on separate sheet of paper, it was made clear to him that intention was that this stamp would be placed in passport itself. Kotsiuba then said this would not be convenient for travelers since, if such stamp was to be placed in their passport every time they made trip to Berlin, passports would rapidly be exhausted. He was told that purpose of having expiry date was to enable issuance of stamp for a specific period of time to cover any number of trips to Berlin by traveler which might be required during period of time in question.

10. After receiving translation into Russian of stamp, Kotsiuba reversed himself and stated that it now appeared to him that stamp was not very well worded at all and he was therefore forced to propose that format be changed to permit stamp to show whether traveler was proceeding to Berlin on official business or on appointment to Berlin. Political advisers pointed out that, apart from his remarks on wording of stamp which they were not prepared to discuss but could only report to their principals, they wished to call his attention to fact that stamp in question was intended only to cover travelers documented by Ambassador and not those documented by Commanders in Chief in Western Germany. It was stressed that, apart from Commandants’ stamp in passports of persons stationed in Berlin, Allied passports might also contain stamp showing that traveler was member of Allied forces stationed in Western Germany entitled to travel to Berlin, as well as stamp, sample of which had just been given to him.

12 [sic]. On this point Kotsiuba commented that, as far as travelers originating in Berlin were concerned, position was quite clear. However, Commander in Chief in Western Germany could only issue orders to army personnel if they were coming to Berlin either on temporary duty or on permanent change of station, and such personnel would also have to have a similar separate piece of paper or stamp showing that this was the case. Finally, he stated that he hoped that before any new documentation was introduced, final versions of the forms would be sent to him so [garble—that he?] could study them, and if acceptable in principle, appropriately instruct checkpoint control officers.

13. At this point, prior to breaking off discussion, we stated we wished to bring to his attention threats made by Soviet control officers to our train commanders on last two nights re absence of Soviet translation of USAREUR seal on travel orders. We said we thought it highly inappropriate, while general discussion of changes in documentation was proceeding, for Soviets to make new and unreasonable demands re travelers on military train, and we requested that Kotsiuba take measures to have control officers instructed to cease making such demands. He stated that he was not familiar with cases in question, but he was sure that they had involved misunderstanding and he would make appropriate inquiries.

Comment: While political advisers adhered closely to limits set by instructions received, they were obviously unable to restrain Kotsiuba from commenting freely on various aspects of problem. No commitments were made and he is fully aware that, at most, political advisers will report his views to their principals. While he did not object to new travel order forms as such, it is quite possible that, upon further and more close scrutiny, he may also find them objectionable in that they do not contribute to that control over certain categories of Allied travelers at which Soviets are obviously aiming. Kotsiuba indicated his understanding that there would be no immediate changes in present documenting procedures and did not in any way give impression that during interim period these would be questioned. However, it seems clear we are far from having found any basis for modus vivendi and that today’s conversation merely marked another round in series of difficulties which began last November. However, for what it is worth, it may be noted that Russian manner in general was conciliatory and any implied threats were always delicately veiled.

Gufler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6–157. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Printed as telegram 4439, supra.
3. For a report on the last meeting with Kotsiuba, see Document 191.