Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, December 27, 1955—6:27 p.m.

1736. Refs: (A) Bonn’s 2098 rptd Berlin 263. (B) Bonn’s 2097 rptd Berlin 262 Moscow 111. (C) Bonn’s 1774 rptd Berlin 213 Moscow 90, pouched Warsaw London Paris.² State–Defense message.

Following are State–Defense views on various problems re Berlin recognized travel discussed reftels:

1. Note with interest measures in process re vehicle license plates (ref A) and will await report outcome your discussions with USAR-EUR.

2. Recognize introduction uniform system travel orders for military and civilian personnel would present practical difficulties as indicated ref B but suggest Embassy consider in conjunction with appropriate military authorities advisability taking steps to standardize form all orders for Berlin travel as much as possible and to minimize any formal differences in appearance between military and civilian orders which may now exist. Believe would be advisable issue Berlin travel orders in name Ambassador for all personnel traveling on non-military orders and add phrase identifying traveler as official of US (or British French) Government on official business connected with occupation of Berlin. Pushkin was officially notified May 6 (Bonn’s 3441 May 7)³ that Ambassadors succeeded, in matters of common concern, to authority and responsibility of High Commissioners as successors to Military Governors. Ambassadors therefore proper authority identify such personnel and issue such orders.

3. Agree that any Soviet attempt impose requirement that Soviet or GDR visas be obtained as authorization for Allied official travel to and from Berlin (para 1A ref C) would involve clear violation Allied rights. Believe that rather than submit to such requirement, whether or not it limited to civilian personnel, three Allies should suspend recognized travel affected in favor of travel by air pending decision by governments as to further action to be taken in light all circumstances then existing.

4. In event Soviet personnel should be replaced at recognized checkpoints by Volkspolizei (para 1B ref C) believe that in absence actual interference with Berlin access Allied recognized travel by road or rail should not be given up merely to avoid Volkspolizei checking and stamping of Allied documentation on same basis as Soviet personnel now operate. At same time believe three Ambassadors should react promptly to development in question with message to Pushkin (subject Department’s concurrence at time) to effect Allies will continue hold Soviets responsible for continued maintenance free access to Berlin on basis existing agreements and specifically that Soviets will be held responsible for any acts of individuals under Soviet control which in any way affect continued free access. It does not appear important whether Soviets actually accept or reject this theory so long as we enunciate it clearly.

5. Request USCINCEUR designate appropriate military representative to carry on with Embassy discussions envisaged under para 2 above.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–2355. Secret; Priority. Drafted in the Office of German Affairs, cleared with the Department of Defense and Reinstein, and approved by Beam. Also sent to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, and repeated to Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg, London, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 2098 reported that license plates on U.S. military and civilian vehicles were being standardized. (Ibid., 762.0221/12–2355) Telegram 2097 reported on a discussion of travel orders among the three Western Powers in which the United States suggested that it might be advisable to devise documentation for civilians traveling to Berlin that had a more military character. (Ibid., 762.0221/12–2355) Telegram 1774 reported on meetings held in Berlin and Bonn on November 25 and 26. At these meetings the three Western Powers discussed possible reactions to Soviet and/or German Democratic Republic attempts to restrict military and civilian travel to Berlin. The Embassy in Bonn characterized the British position as “soft”, while the French “seemed inclined to somewhat harder line.” (Ibid., 862B.181/11–3055)
3. Telegram 3441 transmitted the text of a letter, dated May 6, informing Pushkin that Ambassador Conant had succeeded to the authority and responsibility of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. (Ibid., 121.62A/5–755)