Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

41. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State¹

Budapest, December 13, 1955—8 p.m.

237. Department pass USIA. Legation believes that current Soviet grandiose and generous economic aid projects for “underdeveloped areas” offer highly exploitable issue for use satellite area and that media, if not already doing so, should concentrate heavy fire on this. Basic facts are that not only have Hungary and other satellites never been recipients such generous aid offers, but their manpower and resources have consistently been exploited for benefit Russians; are they now to be sucked even drier to help finance this venture in Russian imperialism? If this not so, why then:

1. Should satellite regimes literally take bread from mouths their people for shipment Soviet Union? Witness fact that although Hungary this year produced what leaders admit was “good” crop, there already exists shortage bread in countryside.

2. Should Hungarian people work harder and harder for less and less as recent speeches in Parliament and published 1956 plan reveal they expected to do? According regime’s own admissions, Hungarian economy in pitiful state while Hungarian people well know how difficult it is to make ends meet. Why no similar generous Soviet gift to Hungary? Hungarian people can testify to its need.

Such an offensive should not be difficult to mount or buttress with facts and figures. Its immediate value would be its effect in countering propaganda windfall Communists clearly attempting reap from Soviet India–Burma tour² and other Middle East moves.

Legation believes, however that same theme with slight modifications could be developed into longer range project designed meet in part that problem discussed Legtel 224, December 1,³ namely, that of giving Hungarian people good, cogent reason for continuing to resist communism through years ahead rather than giving in to compromise. Danger to West is that Hungarian people might be sold on idea that, if they cooperated, system could be made to work better, and that they would be primary beneficiaries in terms better living standards. If it can be demonstrated to them that fruits of their labors are simply going to finance Soviet economy, imperialistic adventures in East, media would have excellent argument with which to urge maintenance of at least passive economic resistance.

Proper application this theme could also be used to give captive peoples stronger feeling of participating themselves in anti-Soviet struggle. Due West’s possible over-emphasis liberation theme over years, captive peoples, in Hungary at least, have gradually put more and more of their eggs in West’s basket with result that they now rely almost exclusively on West to prevent Soviets from consolidating their position and extending their hegemony and on outside intervention to break Russian grip here. Resistance they have offered has been primarily passive in nature and calculated to hold what could be held until West liberated them. With liberation fading as active factor and as usable theme and with above-cited danger existing, means must be found of upping satellite people’s ante in their own future. As we see it:

(1) Soviets have laid foundation by their recent moves in Middle East. In attempting expand their hegemony over this area Soviets are relying heavily on economic penetration. To gather adequate where-with-all for this effort, Soviets require all of resources of satellites. While the West can and will continue to exert all possible pressure around the periphery, it cannot penetrate the Russian purse. However, captive peoples can. If they fail to produce, if they sabotage the new five-year plans, if they hold out against their regimes and continue to refuse to cooperate in all things, they can indirectly drain the Russian treasury. They can thus not only prevent Soviets from further consolidating their power in Eastern Europe but also exert negative influence on Soviet plans for extending their hegemony. Part which captive peoples can thus play in this new era we are entering is a vital one; picture then becomes one of cooperation, with captive peoples playing increasingly active and vital role in long-range plan force Russians back.

(2) If fruits captive peoples labors remained with them, West could hardly ask them step up resistance and make new sacrifices. Past decade, however, has proved that only Moscow is beneficiary; while captive peoples living standards have constantly deteriorated Moscow’s treasury has expanded, permitting ventures such as those unfolding in the Middle East.

In concert with foregoing, US should develop and have ready for instant use, program under which surplus agricultural commodities can be offered as gifts to captive peoples under international agency supervision whenever conditions appear to so warrant. Clear implication that US is prepared and willing to give concrete expression to its exercise of the golden rule, thus alleviating in some measure effects of captive peoples sacrifices, should be incorporated into above-outlined general theme.

Ravndal

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 864.00/12–1355. Secret. Sent also to Munich.
2. Khrushchev and Bulganin toured India, Burma, and Afghanistan November 18–December 18.
3. Document 39.