Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

39. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State¹

Budapest, December 1, 1955—7 p.m.

224. Department pass USIA. Coming as climax to series such major developments as Soviet Belgrade visit, Austrian state treaty and build-up of decision to air satellite issue, Geneva Summit meeting (Department Circular telegram 357)² found Hungarian people in highly optimistic mood and convinced that meeting, if it would not in fact bring about an immediate favorable change in their status, would, at least, lay groundwork for moving date of eventual liberation forward. Demoralizing effect of actual results, primarily failure West follow through on satellite issue, was considerable and lasting (Legation telegrams 73 and 65).³ Subsequent Foreign Ministers Conference was consequently awaited with much less interest, greater skepticism and with public in rather dejected mood. Hungarians by that time appeared to have lost hope that West would press satellites issue and tendency, therefore, was to link their fate more closely with German issue, apparently in belief that any Soviet retreat re Germany would open new possibilities here. Over-all results meeting were therefore disheartening, demonstrating as far as Hungarians concerned that Iron Curtain still solidly in place and that neighboring Yugoslavia and Austrian events, which gave them much natural encouragement, took place in another world. One positive element from satellite point of view appears to have been fact that sharp and unfriendly atmosphere Foreign Ministers meetings contrasted favorably with smiling, hand-clasping atmosphere of rapprochement which characterized Summit meeting and which Hungarians viewed with trepidation.

To just what extent results Foreign Ministers Conference contributed to actual state of deep depression difficult to judge as series internal developments (November 9 CC meeting, November 14 Parliamentary Session) also unfolded during latter part Geneva meeting which preempted public attention and tended obscure any clear-cut popular reactions to conference itself. However, it abundantly clear that accumulative effects two Geneva Conferences, recent internal developments with their forebodings of tighter screws and greater sacrifices, and lastly, documented Soviet announcement of H-bomb possession,⁴ have plunged Hungarian public into most dejected state of mind observed here in many months. (Curiously, reports indicate that despite claims, et cetera, large segment Hungarian public has until now refused to concede that Soviets actually had or were capable producing an H-bomb. Apparent final acceptance this fact has created even heavier atmosphere of gloom, primarily because it is apparently being interpreted by man in street to mean that regardless West’s diplomatic efforts, status quo will prevail for more years than even before believed possible).

Over-all result all this is that media today face much more skeptical audience in Hungary and one, moreover, whose hopes for liberation from Communist yoke have been badly shattered in recent months. Real danger which faces us now appears to Legation to be that captive peoples will steadily grow more and more resigned to fate of living under Communism and, concomitantly, increasingly of opinion that it would be preferable to put more into their work and into government-sponsored programs in hope that by so doing they can better their own living standards and improve their general lot. In fact [view] this possibility it seems vitally important that we devise a new approach for our media which can supplant that stimulus to resistance based on hope for liberation by one based on current realities. Legation’s views this problem follow separately.⁵ In meantime, however, a vacuum currently exists which badly needs filling; some positive action as opposed to words is believed required which will give succor to Hungarian people now and help lift them out of their current mood. While Secretary’s Brioni statement⁶ could have helped fill this existing gap, subsequent Yugoslav treatment and Hungarian handling have effectively cancelled out any positive effects. Legation suggests therefore that coordinated Western approach on question retention Soviet forces Hungary and Rumania would be appropriate. While recognizing that such action unlikely produce tangible results, it is believed that side effects would be positive here. Not only would it demonstrate that West has no intention permitting issue to go by default, which it is believed Hungarian people are beginning fear is West’s intention, but by smoking out Soviets and Hungarians it would demonstrate inherent weakness Communists internal position here and go far in filling the vacuum which currently exists and in which attitudes deleterious to West’s longer-range objectives are finding favorable climate for growth.

Ravndal

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.68/12–155. Secret; Priority. Sent also to Munich.
2. In circular telegram 357, sent to Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and Bucharest, November 28, the Department requested an appraisal of the impact of the Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, and the Foreign Ministers meeting, October 27–November 16, both held in Geneva, on the views and attitudes of the satellite peoples. (Ibid., 396.1–GE/11–2855)
3. Dated August 17 and 12, neither printed. (Ibid., 320/8–1755 and 660.68/8–1255, respectively)
4. On November 26, Khrushchev and TASS publicly confirmed that the Soviet Union had tested a hydrogen bomb.
5. Not further identified.
6. Reference is to a statement made by Dulles at a press conference while in Brioni, Yugoslavia, November 6, after discussions with President Tito. Dulles said in part: “The final subject of our talk [Dulles and Tito] was the problem of the States of Eastern Europe. We reached common accord on recognizing the importance of independence for these States, noninterference from the outside in their internal affairs, and the right to develop their own social and economic order in the ways of their own choice.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1955, p. 833, footnote 2)