27. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rockefeller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)1

SUBJECT

  • Psychological Implications of Geneva for U.S. Information Programs

Reference is made to our conversation regarding the NSC directive (NSC Action 1426b)2 to prepare a study on the psychological implications arising out of the Geneva Conference as they affect U.S. information programs relating to the European Satellites and the International Communist Movement.

Rather than pursue a “watch-and-see” policy in our information programs, I believe we should have a firm plan which we can follow, with specific items which we can emphasize in our programs. With that in mind, I enclose a staff memorandum which outlines a number of such items.

The people of the Satellite countries are experiencing growing uneasiness in the aftermath of the Four Power Conference over the idea that the West may be preparing to “sell them down the river” as part of a general relaxation of tensions with the USSR. We must alleviate this fear and assure the Satellites that:

1.
The U.S. goal remains eventual freedom of the Satellites from Soviet domination.
2.
We have no illusions about the Soviet leaders or the Soviet system.
3.
We will continue to push the Soviets toward relaxing their control over the Satellites.
4.
We know the difference between real freedom and phony freedom, and we won’t let the various tricks and evasions, which the Soviets undoubtedly will come up with, divert us in the pursuit of our objective.
5.
We will continue to push for the lowering of the barriers which now impede the interchange of ideas between peoples and the opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. We also will strive to create conditions which will encourage exchange of peaceful goods. These are means of reducing the Soviet grip on the Satellites.

[Page 66]

I plan to study your and Ted’s memorandum3 over the weekend and look forward to the opportunity of talking further with you next week.

Nelson A. Rockefeller
4

[Enclosure]

Staff Memorandum

SUBJECT

  • The Psychological Implications Arising Out of the Geneva Conference as They Affect U.S. Information Programs Relating to the European Satellites and the International Communist Movements

Preliminary—Relaxing Tensions

External tensions between the Free World and the Soviet orbit can safely relax only when the internal tensions within the Soviet orbit are relaxed.

Outward relaxation, giving the Communists a free hand to consolidate their power over one billion people, would be an utter betrayal of not only the captive nations but of our own children.

Soviet internal tensions are caused by the forcible imposition of Communist tenets on people within the Soviet orbit.

These tenets include consolidation of power to accomplish design of world-wide extension of Communism from the Soviet base.

Such tenets are not mere abstractions as proven by the expansion of the Soviet orbit in the last decade and the continuous integrated subversive activity of Communist Party in the still Free World. This tangible success prompted Molotov to say with satisfaction, eight months ago,

“There is no force in the world strong enough to stop the march of Communism.

“The Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic and the People’s Democracies have such manpower and enjoy such support abroad that there is no force in the world that can arrest our progress along the path we choose.” (From speech of V. Molotov—A.P. Dispatch—Moscow’s Hall of Columns, Dec. 10, 1954)

[Page 67]

The formula for molding their people into obedient instruments of world aggression is a continuous purgation from its society of all anti-Communist elements and intensive indoctrination of the remainder chiefly the young.

Enormity of natural resistance of the people within Soviet orbit to forcible communization can be gauged by the means the Reds find it necessary to use to accomplish their purpose, such as:

1.
Elaborate barbed wire barriers around borders.
2.
Vast police army to permeate, forcibly indoctrinate, and discipline both the military and civilian society.
3.
Unprecedented “corrective” labor camps—an integral part of Soviet economy—the largest, most comprehensive enslavement of innocent people in history.
4.
General saturation of the people with Communist propaganda and virtual exclusion of outside information, with accent on the mandatory political indoctrination integrated throughout the Soviet educational system.

The Free World has a right to insist that the Red regime cease communizing its people with the already demonstrated objective of molding them into instruments of aggression.

Such insistence is nowise an interference in the internal affairs of the people of the Soviet orbit. These people have not the management of their internal affairs. If they had there would be no threat to the Free World arising from the Soviet orbit.

Action vs Communization of Captive Nations

The President’s statements at Geneva contain clearly drawn lines for a powerful political offensive against the threat to Free World security that arises from Communist enslavement of their own people in the U.S.S.R. and in the satellites.

Soviet Geneva statements and attitudes with regard to their own people can be used by way of challenge to perform and, where they contradict the President, they can be exposed as false.

Included in such a political offensive are policy lines for our information programs and a basis for positive deeds which support the restoration of freedom in the Soviet orbit and reduction of the danger of conflict between the peoples of the two worlds.

[Page 68]

Policy Lines for Information Programs

Iron Curtain as Symbol of Captive Nations Enslavement

1.
Geneva Text
a.
“It is time that all curtains, whether of guns or laws or regulations, should begin to come down.” (President Eisenhower, Geneva, July 18)5
b.
“We are in complete agreement . . .6 since lifting of the said barriers would meet both the national interests of the Soviet and American peoples and the interests of universal peace.” (Bulganin, Geneva, July 18)7
c.
Text of President Eisenhower’s statement on lifting curtain, Geneva, July 22,8 in order that there may be a free flow between us of ideas, of things and of people.”
2.
Exploitation of Text
a.

Challenge Soviets to Dismantle Iron Curtain

Enslavement of East Europe clearly shown to all Europe by physical entity of Communist-erected and maintained Iron Curtain. No one can deny existence of Iron Curtain . . . . It is a 1200-mile monstrosity stretching from Baltic to Adriatic . . . . a barrier of barbed wire, land mines, watch towers, border guards with machine guns, etc. . . . . divides people of Europe . . . . anachronistic and barbaric in an age of modern communications and transportation . . . . prevents honest trade, social intercourse and understanding between peoples of divided nations . . . . indefensible on any other ground than to give Communists time and opportunity to mold their people in preparation for aggressive war against the Free World.

USIA, RFE, and Am Com Lib could do a good job dramatizing the physical horror of Iron Curtain apparatus. Their efforts might be augmented by help of good American advertising firm in turning out grass roots pamphlets, brochures, with sketches, etc. for Free World consumption—all with purpose of generating a popular demand to implement the President’s plea “that all curtains . . . should . . . come down.”

b.

Hit Secret Police

M.V.D. in U.S.S.R. and Secret Police in satellite states like U.B. in Poland as interior barrier to free association between two peoples, etc.

c.

Hit Slave Labor Camps as barrier to freedom.

Challenge government of U.S.S.R. and satellite governments to give visas to representatives of the A.F. of L. that did such a good job in initiating UN investigations of slave labor in Soviet orbit to search out and investigate System of Camps at places like Vorkuta, etc., inquiring from prisoners therein the nature of their “crimes”.

d.

Hit Lack of Freedom in Soviet Trade Unions

Seek opportunity for A.F. of L. and C.I.O. representatives to talk to rank and file trade union meetings in Soviet orbit about:

(1)
Right to strike for better working conditions.
(2)
Right to change jobs. Give communist trade union representatives the right to appear before American locals and tell of what “freedom” they have in Soviet orbit.

e.

Hit Lack of Academic Freedom in Soviet Orbit

Challenge Soviet and satellite universities to permit Free World teachers and professors to appear as guest lecturers on Communism and, by way of demonstration give, over radio, for the benefit of Soviet orbit students the answers to,

(1)
Marxian economics.
(2)
Marxian philosophy.

Obtain cooperation of several American universities to invite Soviet professors on Marxian-Leninism to lecture here (perhaps should include even professors in places like Lenin Institute who educate Communist agents). Such a bold invitation could do little harm here as Marxian economics and philosophy are taught in a few places here under wraps. Coming from the U.S.S.R. the bottle would be labelled.

f.
Hit Soviet Suppression of Religious Freedom
(1)
Expose fraud of Soviet 1936 Constitution which permits freedom of anti-religious propaganda but does not give same right of “propaganda” or promulgation of religion.

“Section 124.—All citizens are guaranteed freedom of cult and freedom of anti-religious propaganda.”

(2)
Recent Khrushchev decree merely a refined and sophisticated promulgation of “scientific atheism.”
g.
Hit Lack of Freedom of Movement of Citizens of U.S.S.R. or Satellites
(1)
Within Soviet orbit
(2)
Impossibility of average citizen on his own volition to leave Soviet orbit.
h.
Hit Government Suppression of Consumers Goods
(1)
Shipping consumers goods to foreign countries for propaganda while there are shortages at home.
(2)
Refusing peasant ownership of his own produce on farms.
i.

Hit Communist Exploitation of Soviet Orbit Economy for World Revolutionary Aims rather than National Interests

Entire Soviet economy made to support world revolutionary activities at expense of national interests. Even Government of U.S.S.R. is mere “lever” of Communist Party. Elections to government posts by [Page 70] citizens are meaningless, all power in hands of internationalist party which does not work for welfare of State, as such, but for international revolutionary aims of Party.

Therefore, Soviet leaders should be challenged to work for the national interests of the nations of the Soviet orbit.

In the present “collective leadership” there are signs that some of the newer members—in contrast to the “old Bolsheviks like Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan—may be more inclined towards national interests.

j.
Hit Exploitation of Red Army for World Revolution rather than National Interest
(1)
See Exhibit A attached. “Three Characteristics of Red Army” by J.V. Stalin, the fundamental doctrines as to function of the Red Army, which has never changed.
(2)
This same doctrine expressed by Lenin in letter dated October 4, 1918 to Central Executive Committee in which he called for raising strength of Red Army to three million to lend aid to German proletariat.
(3)
Same doctrine expressed by Stalin in Moscow in October 1952 that forces of Peoples Democracies were to be used as “shock brigades” to liberate countries enslaved by capitalism.
(4)
Malenkov, Khrushchev, Zhukov have not in the slightest disavowed the purpose of Red armed force.

Exhibit A—Pamphlet obtainable in Library of Congress

“Three Characteristics of the Red Army” (Russian), J.V. Stalin, Voyenezdat (Military Publishing House), Moscow, 1948.

Translated from the Russian

Speech made by Stalin on the 10th Anniversary of the Red Army

“The Party is proud that it succeeded in creating the first Red Army in the world. What are the characteristics differentiating our Red Army from any other army ever existing in the world?

The first and basic quality of our Red Army is that it is an army of liberated workers and peasants, an army of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The second characteristic of our Red Army is reflected in the fact that our army is an army of brotherhood among nationalistics of our country, an army of liberation of oppressed peoples, an army protecting the freedom and independence of our country.

The third characteristic of the Red Army consists in its spirit of internationalism, in internationalist feeling permeating the whole Red Army. The strength of our Red Army, Comrades, is in that it was since the first days of its existence educated in the spirit of internationalism and precisely because our army is being educated in the spirit of internationalism, in the spirit of the unity of interests of workers of all countries: it is for that reason the army of world revolution, an army of workers of all countries.”

  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges. Secret.
  2. Approved by the President on August 1. (Ibid., S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
  3. Reference is to a draft of a memorandum by Allen Dulles and Theodore C. Streibert, printed in final form as a report from the OCB to the NSC, Document 29.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  5. Reference is to Eisenhower’s opening statement at the Geneva Conference; for text, see Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 707–712.
  6. All ellipses in this document are in the source text.
  7. Reference is to Bulganin’s opening statement at the Geneva Conference printed in The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (October 1955), pp. 35–43.
  8. For text, see Secto 72, July 23, vol. V, p. 474, or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 716–718.