1. Coordination of VFC was assigned in
May 1953 by the NSC to the Secretaries
of State and Defense. After consultation with the U.S. Ambassadors in
Paris and London, and the U.S. High Commissioner in Bonn, it was decided
to delay any official approach because of the forthcoming West German
elections and the expected early resolution of EDC, both of which it was felt would have been endangered
by a premature disclosure of plans for VFC.
5. In view of the foregoing considerations, the OCB recommends that the National Security Council amend
paragraph 4 of NSC 143/2 to dispense
with the necessity of diplomatic approaches to obtain the concurrence of
the U.K. and French Governments, and that the current OCB plan be considered an adequate
implementation in other respects in spite of the small size of the
organization and the change of emphasis away from psychological
exploitation in the current situation. In view of the implications that
the Four Power Conference and subsequent negotiations developing
therefrom might have for implementation of VFC, the OCB further
recommends that the Council concur as a matter of policy that timing for
initiating action be subject to the determination of the Secretary of
State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.
[Attachment]
Report by the Operations Coordinating
Board7
Washington, June 14,
1955.
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE
ACTIVATION OF A VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS
[Page 56]
Part One—Summary
I. Background Considerations
Details regarding the origins, development, advantages and
disadvantages, and the present possibilities of a Volunteer Freedom
Corps (hereafter referred to as VFC)
have been developed in Part Two of this report.
II. Conclusions
- A.
- A VFC, composed initially of a
few military units under the control of the U.S. Forces in
Germany, the size and numbers of the units to be determined by
the availability of recruits of non-German Soviet Orbit
escapees, should now be established to provide a basis for
possible development of national military cadres in the event of
an emergency.
- 1.
- The initial step in the implementation of NSC 143/2 has been taken by
the expansion of the Labor Service Organization (LSO) in
Germany to include a unit of former nationals of the
USSR (NSC 5435)8 and
additional East European escapees.
- 2.
- From the recruiting response to the expansion of the
LSO, it is apparent that no large reservoir of qualified
personnel is immediately available for the formation of
a VFC in Europe. At the
outset, recruits for a VFC may come primarily from the LSO aided
by personnel from the Alien Enlistee (Lodge Bill)9
Program.
- 3.
- All agencies concerned with the VFC must be prepared to
minimize the impact of political pressures from the
various émigré groups who may attempt to use VFC to further their own
aims. Such pressures can be anticipated in direct
approaches to members of Congress, to the participating
agencies and to the press.
- 4.
- The principal immediate benefit of this pilot
operation, VFC, lies in
its ability to provide a cadre of trained personnel to
form, control, and exploit to U.S. advantage any large
numbers of defected Soviet Orbit personnel during war
time. No special publicity will be given to the VFC until organization and
training have progressed to such a degree that the
potential manpower and psychological values of the
organization can be estimated and reviewed by the OCB.
- B.
- In addition to the program outlined in A. above, the OCB is proceeding with studies
leading toward the implementation of paragraph 7 in NSC 143/2 which provides for the
expansion of the VFC concept to
other areas.
[Page 57]
- 1.
- Reconsideration of the formation, probably in the Far East, of
an air unit along lines previously developed within the
Department of Defense.
- 2.
- Examination of the feasibility and desirability of ground,
sea, or air units in the Middle East and in Southeast
Asia.
- 3.
- Consideration of the feasibility of expanding a skeleton
VFC general headquarters
from among personnel already being utilized by the Department of
Defense.
III. Courses of Action Prerequisite to formation of
VFC in Europe
- A.
- Diplomatic action should be initiated to secure the
concurrence of the West German Government to the formation of a
VFC within its
borders.
- B.
- A Presidental Executive Order similar to that which has
already been prepared should be issued. Until such time as the
OCB agrees that it would be
useful and proper to publicize VFC, the substance of that order should remain
classified.
- C.
- Arrangements should be made for funding of this project by a
Presidental determination and allotment of monies, initially
from the Kersten Amendment authority (Section 401, MSA ’55)10
to the Department of the Army.
IV. Recommendations
It is recommended:
- 1.
- That the Board concur in the implementation of the actions
indicated in paragraph III above.
- 2.
- That the OCB advise the
NSC of these actions and
request NSC approval as a
matter of urgency.
- 3.
- That the interested departments proceed immediately upon
NSC approval with the
courses of action outlined in Paragraph III and that the
Department of Defense concurrently initiate action,
coordinating with the Department of State, to establish the
cadre VFC.
Part Two—Detailed Report
I. Background
1. Origins
The Volunteer Freedom Corps (hereafter referred to as VFC) was proposed in a letter from the
President to the National Security Council on February 14, 1953
(NSC 143).11 The President, mentioning the potential
additional combat manpower and the mobilization of the will to
oppose communism, recommended that the U.S. Army recruit and train
national battalions of anti-communist volunteers for freedom
[Page 58]
from Iron Curtain countries.
He suggested the establishment of an ad hoc committee to work out
all other terms and provisions of the proposal. The President
mentioned the British precedent during World War II: 15 national
battalions in the Pioneer Corps.
2. Initial Reactions
NSC considered the President’s letter
on February 18 and 25, 1953.12 On the latter
date, the NSC approved the proposal
in principle but referred it to an ad hoc committee, chaired by
General Willis D.
Crittenberger, Retired, a consultant to the NSC, to study all aspects of the
proposal for its feasibility (NSC
Action No. 724).13
The Crittenberger Committee
studied the basic proposal in all of its ramifications for two
months. All available viewpoints, contingencies, conditions and
details were presented to and discussed by that Committee. On April
20, 1953,14 the Crittenberger Committee reported that the VFC concept was sound and that the
establishment of VFC on a modest and
austere basis, namely several battalions of non-German escapees from
the European Soviet orbit, was now feasible.
3. The Crittenberger Committee Report
(attached to NSC 143/2)
The Committee Report interwove the detailed plan and the analysis of
the feasibility of the VFC proposal.
It admitted the unavailability of exact information on eligible
foreign nationals, then or in the future, but estimated 33,000
eligible “escapees” over the next four years. Analyzing the
available escapees and the differences between a VFC during a cold war and in actual
war, it selected West Germany as the recruitment area. The Committee
Report gave extensive treatment to the psychological considerations
in the VFC proposal. Emphasizing the
anti-Soviet “rallying” point value, the Report recognized that the
psychological advantages, disadvantages, envisaged gains and
drawbacks, were dependent on and in proportion to the manner and
spirit with which the proposal was implemented.
4. NSC 143/2 (May 20, 1953)
The Crittenberger Report was
forwarded to the NSC Planning Board
on April 21, 1953, and the policy paper recommending for NSC consideration the establishment of
a VFC (NSC 143/1),15
was prepared in early May 1953. The NSC on May 20, 1953 adopted the
[Page 59]
policy paper with an amendment. The President
approved the statement of policy. This paper, NSC 143/2, concluded that “a Volunteer
Freedom Corps should be established.” It provided that several
battalions of European anti-Soviet escapees, excluding Germans, but
including escapees from the USSR, should be trained by the U.S. Army
as cadre units for further development in case of an emergency.
Details of organization such as permissive nationality distinctions,
recruitment, pay, command by U.S. officers and attachment to U.S. or
UN divisions as well as future
entry into the U.S. were listed. Diplomatic approaches were to be
made to the Allied and German governments to secure their
concurrence. Para. 8 of NSC 143/2
provided that: “In the event of delay in the initiation of the
Volunteer Freedom Corps project, and upon instruction of the
National Security Council, there should be put into effect an
interim proposal designed to expand the existing Labor Service
Organization in Germany until such time as it is considered
desirable or possible to undertake the Volunteer Freedom Corps
program.”
5. Subsequent
Developments
Initial coordination of the implementation of VFC was assigned to the Secretaries of State and
Defense. State then queried the U.S. Ambassadors at Paris and London
and the U.S. High Commissioner in Bonn as to the attitude of the
foreign governments toward establishment of a VFC. The tenor of these replies
advocated delaying any official approach lest the West German
elections be affected adversely and later lest the approaching
ratification of EDC be endangered.
On September 24, 1953, NSC assigned
the coordinating responsibilities for VFC to the Operations Coordinating Board. In informal
OCB discussions, early in 1954,
it was agreed that General Crittenberger should visit the above U.S. missions,
explain the background of the VFC
proposal and probe the views of American diplomatic and military
officials in Europe.
General Crittenberger
reported on May 11, 1954 that it was still the consensus of U.S.
diplomatic and military representatives that VFC should be held in abeyance until the problem of
EDC was resolved and that
thereafter the plan might be reexamined in light of the then
existing factors. General Crittenberger also reported on the developing Labor
Service Organizations. He reported that it might be better to
recruit escapees directly for the VFC if it were formed rather than to disrupt the LSOs
by transferring personnel from them to the VFC.
[Page 60]
6. Most Recent
Developments
As of March 31, 1955, the LSO strength was 25,974 which is 1,556
under authorized strength. Slow recruitment and losses are laid to
the civilian nature of LSO coupled with the competition for manpower
from an expanding German industry, and the fact that no publicity
has been authorized in connection with the expansion. It is
estimated that an initial body of recruits could be drawn from the
LSOs who would volunteer and be qualified for VFC, and that the much needed LSOs
could be brought up to strength by appropriate means. Since the LSOs
have a fine record of efficiency and morale, this source could
provide an initial VFC cadre.
Since LSO performs service support and guard duty, the term “Labor
Service” is perhaps not fully descriptive. Nevertheless, because of
LSO’s abbreviated military training and civilian status, they can
not be considered as combat troops. Moreover, they are badly needed
in their present capacity.
On September 8, 1954, the OCB
recommended to NSC an expansion of
LSOs to not more than 1,000 former nationals of Soviet orbit
countries. This OCB action resulted
in NSC 5435/1, “Expansion of the
Labor Service Organization in Germany”, which was approved by the
President on October 16, 1954. Recruiting for this expansion has
been slow. As of May 10, 1955, only 168 former Soviet nationals and
152 escapees from European satellites have been instated.
All LSO men must have German work permits. An escapee may never get a
work permit if he can not adequately identify himself to German
authorities. In the meantime, he may languish, for months or years,
in a Lager such as Camp Valka. This condition
hardly induces escape from Iron Curtain countries. On the other
hand, escapees qualified for VFC
could probably be enlisted without work permits, thus obviating a
major drawback to escape.
II. Advantages and Disadvantages of the VFC
1. Advantages Noted in the
Crittenberger
Study
- a.
- The establishment of a VFC
would provide a positive and dramatic symbol around which the
will to resist Soviet-Communism could be mobilized, particularly
in the event of war, and it would:
- (1)
- Establish cadre units of anti-Soviet volunteers
capable of rapid expansion in case of intensified
emergency or general war. (It should be noted that
valuable time would be lost if preparation for military
cadres of the captive nations were made only after the
start of actual hostilities. Assignment and training of
qualified U.S. personnel would consume much time at the
outset.)
- (2)
- Provide honorable employment for suitably motivated
escapees, thus maintaining their morale and will to
resist.
- (3)
- Contribute toward sustaining the national self-respect
and will to resist of the enslaved peoples behind the
Iron Curtain by demonstrating that anti-communist
activists representing these peoples are sufficiently
respected in the free world to be accorded the proudest
right of a free citizen—the right to bear arms in
support of his homeland.
- (4)
- Enable anti-communist volunteers who are otherwise
without national rights to contribute to the defense of
the free world, to prepare themselves to play a combat
role in any military action in which the U.S.
participates in defense of freedom, and even when the
occasion is suitable, actually to participate in such
U.S. military action.
- (5)
- Set an example of dedication to the cause of freedom
of morale-building value to free men everywhere.
- b.
- VFC would also create an
additional incentive to defectors behind the Iron Curtain, thus
giving promise of threatening and weakening the Soviet’s
psychological and military position by one or more of the
following:
- (1)
- Increasing the flow of defectors.
- (2)
- Increasing the strain on the Soviet security
system.
- (3)
- Raising or intensifying in the Soviet minds doubts as
to the reliability of satellite—or even Soviet—armed
forces in case of war.
- (4)
- Provoking the Soviet rulers into self-defeating
counterpolicies such as increased restrictions on armed
forces.
2. Possible Additional
Advantages
- a.
- A VFC might attract larger
numbers of escapees than have the LSOs. (Recruitment for the
expansion of LSOs has been slow. This may be due to the fact
that the LSOs have not been publicized, they are not first-class
military organizations, and members must have German work
permits.)
- b.
- The U.S. Ambassador to the UN
has recently reaffirmed his position that establishment of a
VFC would be in the national
interest of the United States.
3. Disadvantages Noted in the
Crittenberger
Study
- a.
- Even if the implementation of the VFC is carefully planned and publicized, propaganda
comparisons with mercenary foreign legions may be expected and,
to a degree that these can be made to appear valid, such charges
may weaken any psychological appeal to nationalistically
motivated groups behind the Iron Curtain.
- b.
- In addition, the creation of conspicuous Soviet-nationality
contingents will tend to provide the Soviets with the
opportunity to arouse suspicion at home and abroad that the
United States is committed to a policy of dismemberment of the
USSR empire.
- c.
- Special efforts by the USSR to exploit the VFC as proof of United States
aggressive intentions, as well as the sole United States
responsibility for continuation of world tensions, may be
anticipated;
[Page 62]
and United
States psychological strategy will be required to develop
measures therefore to reduce Soviet capabilities to benefit from
such moves.
4. Possible Additional
Disadvantages
- a.
- With the rearming of Western Germany, the military advantages
of VFC in the current situation
are questionable, although the subsequent potential weakening of
satellite forces may create a relative military strength.
- b.
- The flow of new Soviet orbit escapees who would provide
recruits for a VFC is decreasing
according to current National Intelligence Estimates (NIE 12–54, “European Satellites
through Mid-1956”, August 24, 1954).16
- c.
- Certain émigré leaders would probably interfere in the VFC for their own political
purposes which might not be identical with U.S.
objectives.
- d.
- Establishing a VFC on a
conspicuous scale may militate against the attainment of
important U.S. objectives at the forthcoming 4-Power
Conference.
III. Present Considerations
1. Legislative
Authorizations
Section 401(a), the so-called Kersten Amendment, of the Mutual
Security Act of 1951 provided the original general legislative
authorization and the basis of funds for the support of VFC. In the Mutual Security Act of
1954, this original section was continued but re-numbered as Section
401. The Executive Branch has proposed that the Mutual Security Act
of 1955 continue the general legislative authority and in addition
provide funds for programs under the Kersten Amendment and for
contingencies arising abroad.
2. Political
Considerations
The German Federal Republic is now a sovereign state and a member of
NATO. While present agreements
provide for the maintenance of U.S. forces in West Germany, it would
be necessary to obtain the cooperation of the German Federal
Government for the establishment of a VFC in West Germany. Since the occupation status of
West Germany has ended and it is not intended to exploit the
formation of the VFC for propaganda
purposes it is felt that it would be adequate simply to inform
France and the U.K.
[Page 63]
3. Psychological Factors
In view of the uncertainty that exists as to the manpower and
psychological potential of a VFC and
the international repercussions and hostile propaganda that might
result in the current situation, no special effort should be made to
publicize it at the outset. Psychological and political exploitation
should be held in abeyance and, for the present, establishment of
VFC should be essentially a
military operation. After the VFC
has been organized and trained, consideration should be given to
planned psychological exploitation.
4. The Practical Solution
A VFC as a normal and legitimate
military preparation for defense against the contingency of Soviet
aggression might be acceptable to the German Federal Government.
Units of militarily-fit escapees (some of whom are now available in
the LSOs, whose services to those units could be replaced by
appropriate means) would be organized without a special publicity
effort for first-class military training under the control of the
U.S. Army in Germany as the basis for national cadres in time of
emergency. Emphasis would be on the military desirability of
developing such cadres in the current situation so that they could
be immediately and rapidly expanded when the need arises.
IV. Description of Current OCB Proposal
- 1.
- A VFC, composed initially of a
few military units of non-German Soviet Orbit escapees under the
control of the U.S. forces in Germany, should now be established
to provide a basis for possible development of national military
cadres in the event of an emergency.
- a.
- The initial step in the implementation of NSC 143/2 has been taken by
the expansion of the Labor Service Organization (LSO) in
Germany to include a unit of former nationals of the
USSR (NSC 5435) and
additional East European escapees.
- b.
- From the recruiting response to the expansion of the
LSO, it is apparent that no large reservoir of qualified
personnel is immediately available for the formation of
a Volunteer Freedom Corps in Europe. At the outset,
recruits for a VFC may
come primarily from the LSO, possibly under the
leadership of selected personnel from the Alien Enlistee
Program.
- c.
- The principal immediate benefit of a VFC is that it will provide
a cadre of trained personnel to form and control to U.S.
advantage any large numbers of defected Soviet Orbit
personnel in the event of war.
- d.
- All agencies concerned with the VFC must be prepared to
minimize the impact of pressures from the various émigré
groups. Such pressures can be anticipated in direct
approaches to members of Congress, to the participating
agencies and to the press.
- 2.
- Questions of detail, such as status, size, relationship to the
U.S. forces, etc., of the VFC
will be developed generally in accordance with the details in
NSC 143/2. However, the
Department of Defense will be given freedom to modify those
details as implementing problems necessitate.
- 3.
- Diplomatic action must be initiated to secure the concurrence
of the West German Government to the formation of a VFC within its borders. Since the
occupation status of West Germany has ended and it is not
intended initially to exploit the formation of the VFC for propaganda purposes, it is
felt that it would be adequate simply to inform Allied
Governments that these units will be developed as cadres for an
emergency. This approach is not inconsistent with the NSC 143/2 wording:
“Diplomatic approaches should be made to Allied
Governments necessarily concerned and to the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany, to enlist their
advance concurrence, insofar as possible, in the
Volunteer Freedom Corps project”.
- 4.
- Due to the uncertainty that exists as to the manpower and
psychological potential, as well as the international
repercussions and hostile propaganda that might result in the
current situation, the VFC
should be essentially a military operation. No special publicity
should be given to the VFC until
organization and training have progressed to such a degree that
the potential manpower and psychological values of the
organization can be estimated and reviewed by the OCB.
- 5.
- The actual establishment of the VFC pilot project in Europe is the responsibility
of the Department of Defense. That Department will develop the
implementing authority and plans for establishing such a VFC pilot project and it will
execute the project in the field upon the resolution of the
diplomatic arrangements noted above in IV.3.
- 6.
- Arrangements should be made for funding of this project by a
Presidential determination and allotment of monies, initially
from the Kersten Amendment authority (Section 401 of M.S.A. of
’55) to the Department of the Army.
- 7.
- Although no estimate can be made of the number of volunteers
initially available for this pilot project, a planning figure of
1,000 men in the first year is considered ample for budgetary
and other purposes.
