Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

231. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State¹

No. 330

Budapest February 6, 1957.

REF:

• Legtel 589, January 24, 1957²

SUBJECT

• Soviet Policy in Hungary; Signs for the Future

[Here follows a table of contents.]

A. Summary

The Hungarian puppet regime has followed a consistent, but since the end of December perhaps a more intensive policy not only of removing or weakening resistance centers but also of gaining control over the country’s political and economic life. The Hungarian people are united in their hatred of the Kadar government; but despite this hatred, a number of factors, including economic pressure, fear and the activity of the regime have reduced their capacity for violent action below that of November or early December. In the absence of some substantial change in Hungary’s international environment, the prospects for a considerable period of time are for a Soviet policy of repression against a Hungarian population resisting strongly in every way open to it, but except for sporadic outbreaks, primarily through passive means. The chances for some relaxation on the part of the Soviets or their puppets appear poor in the immediate future; but over a longer period of time, increasing pressures of various kinds may bring some changes for the better, although there is little reason to believe that these will be substantial.

[Here follow sections B–E, entitled “Introduction”, “Regime’s Policy”, “Population’s Reaction,” and “Conclusions.”]

F. Signs for the Future

For the immediate future, the attitude of the regime seems reasonably clear; to extend its controls in scope and in depth as rapidly and as far as possible. No substantial concessions seem likely until these controls have been attained.

For the general population, as well as for specific groups and classes among them, there would seem to be two general courses of action possible, which in a sense, but not altogether so, are alternatives. One course is that of active, violent resistance to whatever extent possible; the other is slow passive opposition, to await a gradual softening of attitude on the part of the Russians, and to hope to be able again to force the regime along the path of gradual concessions which it took in 1953–54 and 1956.

The first alternative seemed clearly to be the popular choice up to at least the middle of December and to a certain extent well into January. Since that time there has been talk of renewed opposition, including violence, on many fronts in the Spring. Considerable mention has been made of March 15, the old Hungarian National Holiday. People have talked of hidden arms and of underground organizations and of the increasing determination on the part of the people to rid the country of the Soviets or to die in the attempt. What in fact the Spring will bring is by no means clear. First priority has been given by the regime to organization of the new militia around an old secret police base, and this body is certainly more likely to maintain its loyalty to the regime in the face of public disorder than did the army in October. On the other hand, as its size increases, the chance for disloyalty grows. Nevertheless, considering the steps being taken by the regime in anticipation of trouble and the fact that additional steps will surely be taken in future, it seems that the Government will probably be able to control any outbreaks that should occur without too much difficulty, that is, without calling in Soviet forces in mass. (It can certainly handle almost any conceivable uprising by repeating the October call for assistance to the Soviets.) To make such an assessment so soon after the events of October is, of course, a difficult and dangerous task, and no judgment regarding the future attitude or actions of the Hungarian people can be considered a sure one. Nevertheless, at present, the odds seem to favor a degree of regime power sufficient to handle any situation that is very likely to arise in the Spring.

The Legation has heard speculation that the regime might actually provoke uprisings later on with the intent of using these to disclose the remaining insurgent leaders, who could then be picked off with greater ease. The possibility of regime action of this nature is not thought to be very great, however; in view of its growing strength, a method of disclosing opposition leaders which would be both dangerous internally and harmful abroad would not seem warranted.

Violence as discussed in preceding paragraphs has been thought of as primarily urban. The mood of the countryside will also be restive, however, and it is very likely that the regime’s control in this area will not be sufficient to prevent sporadic violence. It seems rather unlikely, however, that this could grow to very serious proportions or could achieve a wide organization except on very local levels.

If, therefore, violent uprising in the cities and in the countryside will probably not be of sufficient magnitude to threaten the regime’s physical control, does this mean that the population will fall back on the longer-term tactic of passive resistance? And if so, what can they hope to achieve, in the absence of great international changes? Does past Soviet experience in Hungary dictate that the present policy of repression be continued forever? As indicated, present policy seems to point to the conclusion that the Soviets will be much more chary of concessions in the future than in the past. But can a policy of this nature continue for a year as easily as for a month, for six years as easily as for six months?

Clearly, in a long-term battle of this nature, the experience and the determination of both sides has been increased. The Soviets have seen where concessions have led them; the determination of the Hungarians to win their freedom has increased. The situation is different from that of the earlier struggles for freedom in a number of regards. Those changes which argue against many concessions, even over a considerable period, seem to be the following:

1. Soviet experience in the past.

2. Increased Soviet concern over effect of Hungarian developments on Polish and East German situations.

3. Death, flight or arrest of many potential leaders of fight for concessions.

4. Increased concern for personal safety on part of Hungarian regime personnel.

There are also changes, however, which argue for a gradual amelioration of Soviet control:

1. In event of gradual liberalization in Poland, increasing anomoly of Hungarian situation.

2. Some decrease in competence in regime’s leaders as compared to past.

3. Fact that at all levels of regime, anti-Soviet and pro-liberalization sentiment either exists or will exist. In some instances, this sentiment and perhaps its influence, will be strong.

4. Change in popular attitude: Increased hatred of Soviets, feeling of unity amongst population, increased determination to achieve national freedom.

5. Greater difficulty, after the 20th Congress³ and the Hungarian Revolution have disclosed the ideological bankruptcy of Soviet communism to the world, of maintaining the ideological basis for contiued regression.

6. Growing pressure of economic consequences of Revolution and passive resistance.

7. World opinion.

There remains, of course, essentially unchanged from the past, the basic difficulty of continuing a harsh line; that the pressure for concessions will be heavy, continuous and broad, and that one concession breeds another.

Other questions in this connection are 1) the reaction of the Soviets to the Hungarian attitude over a period of time, in other words, in an unchanged international situation, are the Soviets more likely to relax in Hungary if the Hungarians are quiescent and work well than if they continually strain and tug at their chains and let the country go to wrack and ruin? In which direction should United States (and Western) influence bear? No definite answer can be given to these questions, but the examples of Czechoslovakia and Rumania would seem to point to a negative answer to the first.

The general conclusion to which the above analysis, which is based primarily on our appraisal of local Hungarian developments, brings the Legation is that in the absence of some substantial change in Hungary’s international environment, the prospects for a considerable period of time are for a Soviet policy of repression against a Hungarian population resisting strongly in every way open to it, but, except for sporadic outbreaks, primarily through passive means. The chances for some relaxation on the part of the Soviets or their puppets appear poor in the immediate future, but over a longer period of time, increasing pressures of various kinds may bring some changes for the better, but there is little reason to believe that these will be very substantial.

Although this despatch was not intended to take up exclusively events which occured during January, a chronology of some significant events in January has been prepared and is attached as Inclosure 1.⁴

Edward T. Wailes

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/2–657. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Daniel Sprecher.
2. Telegram 589 reported on the “increasingly terroristic attitude and actions” of the Hungarian regime since the beginning of the new year and concluded that the regime was “moving rapidly toward Stalin–Rakosi-land, in fact is in some respects already there.” The Soviets were said to have learned from past experience that concessions were dangerous. (Ibid., 764.00/1–2457)
3. Reference is to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
4. Not printed.