Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

230. Letter From the Minister in Romania (Thayer) to the Secretary of State¹

Bucharest, February 6, 1957.

Dear Mr. Secretary: It is eight months since I last wrote you of the situation in Rumania,² and I have waited until I believed it was possible to make a reasonable estimate of the impact on this country of the dramatic events of the last few months before sending you another brief summary of my personal views.

The events in Poland and Hungary of course deeply stirred the emotions of the Rumanian people who reacted in various ways. The few remaining members of the old regime were jubilant over what they termed the beginning of the downfall of Communism, and were quoting the saying of General Joffre, “La victoire est une pente roulante”. The population in general were restless—there were incidents here and there amongst students and workers—but there was no spontaneous movement of resistance, no general will to do anything that might risk arrest—there was not a vestige of any determination to revolt. Above all, there was no leadership anywhere except in the regime itself which acted quickly to prevent the spread of unrest by a combination of precautionary measures through police pressure, including student and other arrests, and attempts at pacification through token raising of wages, cultural concessions to Hungarian minorities, and improving student living conditions.

After the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet troops a period of disillusionment set in. Old regime members and former bourgeois turned bitterly against the United States for not intervening with armed forces. The inert population in general found justification for their failure to act and brooded on the fact that they were forgotten by the West. The people as a whole passed through one of their many periods of depression after a few weeks of wild hope, and resumed their normal status of waiting for the next event that would send their wishful-thinking spirits soaring to the skies again. This they soon found in the President’s Middle East doctrine which has tended to raise again their hope that a Third World War will soon come and will start in this part of the world, thus liberating them. Thus, again bathed in blissful expectancy, they are able to endure the hardships of day to day living in a Communist world which every man, woman and child hates with great bitterness. Their disillusionment is gone and the United States will surely be their savior. No action on their part is necessary; they need only wait.

The Communist hierarchy was frightened and disappointed by the events in Poland and Hungary. Their feeling of insecurity was apparent not only in the resumption of police pressures but in the most extravagant and almost hysterical phrases used by their representatives in proclaiming the love of the people for the socialist system, and the people’s wholehearted support of the Government in its approval of the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian counter-revolution. Their disappointment was openly expressed by a Politburo member and by Ministry representatives who had seen in the relaxed period a real chance for Rumania to acquire great material and cultural benefits from the West. However, they have never swerved in the slightest degree from their adherence to the Soviet line in every particular, and now have joined the Soviets in virulent attacks against the United States, its foreign policy, its economy and its political institutions. Many explanations can be advanced for these attacks. They are the same, probably, as those which explain similar Soviet attacks, but amongst them I like to think of the explanation that the regime is aware of the great natural admiration which the Rumanian people have for the United States and its system of “popular capitalism”, and are fearful of the consequences of this ever growing affection and esteem which always survives periods of disillusionment such as our failure to act in the case of Hungary. The smiles and waves and cries of “When are you coming” which I get when I ride around the country in the Legation car flying the American flag are even more numerous and enthusiastic today than they were six months ago. The people during the last year learned to speak out more freely, and they have not yet been scared back to their former silence.

In spite of current press articles and political speeches against the United States, and in spite of greater police vigilance, I do not believe that the regime desires or intends to return to the old rigid cold war status. Former privileges to diplomats that came after Geneva³ have not been peremptorily withdrawn, although warnings in connection therewith have been issued. Cultural relations are being initiated and pressed and personal relations are friendly and cordial. The Rumanian Government is as usual straddling the fence with its customary skill. It is following Soviet instructions and its own inclination to keep its people from becoming too keen on us by attacking us publicly from every angle, and at the same time is keeping the door open for such economic and cultural advantages as it may glean at an appropriate moment.

Internally, the Rumanian regime is at last trying to save a disintegrating economy by a series of new moves including the raising of basic wages and the abolishing of agricultural quotas. It is too early to estimate what measure of success they will achieve in their frantic effort to create an incentive that will induce the hostile Rumanian worker and peasant to produce. If the proposals are carried out efficiently both worker and peasant stand to gain substantial benefits. The complicated problems involved, however, and the deplorable efficiency record of Rumanian bureaucracy, would seem to lend considerable weight to the attitude of incredulity and apathy on the part of the Rumanian people toward this effort. The plight of the ordinary Rumanian today is pitiful. He cannot earn for himself and his family enough to survive, and even wholesale stealing on the part of all members of industry, from the worker up to high officials, does not furnish him with nonexistent consumers’ goods or a decent place to live. The peasant and the worker lead lives of misery, and their willingness to endure this existence without rising in revolt is a constant source of wonder.

What can the United States do in this country, where the only leadership is in the hands of a united Communist hierarchy which shows no signs of internal dissension, and where the people, though united in their hatred for their leaders and their form of Government, suffer in silence and show not the slightest will to resist?

In my last letter, I remarked that due to this lack of will to resist, the Communist guard was down here possibly more than in any other country and this opened up many interesting possibilities. This, of course, is no longer true. The Soviets can be trusted to be watching Rumania, at least for the present, with the same watchful eyes that they are casting upon all the satellites. By the same token, the regime itself will be keeping close tabs on those non-Communist opportunists who, during the period of relaxation, I thought could be persuaded to bring pressure on their bosses for more reliance on the West. Before the revolts in Poland and Hungary, I advocated the use of controlled trade as a means of perhaps setting in motion pressures which the hierarchy would find hard to resist and later to control. This I no longer believe is worth-while trying under present conditions. Furthermore, as a result of recent agreements the Rumanian economy is now so tightly tied to that of the Soviet Union that any advantages they might obtain from us in trade would add directly to the efforts of the Soviet Union to surpass the Western world economically. I feel very strongly therefore that trade between the United States and Rumania should now be held to a minimum.⁴

I do believe, however, that cultural exchanges between this country and the West redound overwhelmingly in favor of the West and should be encouraged and increased as much as possible. The reasons set forth in my last letter to you remain as valid today as then. We have had occasion here to see and hear the results of the impact of the United States on the trickle of Rumanian visitors who last year began to visit our country. Stories of what they have seen spread like wildfire amongst this rumor-laden population. If you had seen as I did the rising stands of thousands of Rumanians acclaiming three United States athletes marching behind the American flag at an International Track Meet in Bucharest last fall you would appreciate the adulation which these people have for our country and our people. Every Rumanian who goes to the United States and returns and every American who comes over here brings a knowledge and an understanding of the United States which contradicts every word read in the press or heard over the radio. It sustains far better than anything else possibly could the faith of the people in America and furnishes certain proof of the falsity of Rumanian propaganda.

A German General is reported to have said after the last war that the bravest soldiers under his command were Rumanians. Some people believe they have what is termed great explosive courage which rises within them only when they are sparked by inspirational leadership. Such leadership certainly is not visible today. They are, however, being more and more tried by the bungling Rumanian economy, and one continues to hear from time to time prophecies that the peasants are nearing the end of their rope. Time alone will produce an answer. Meanwhile, I believe that we should concentrate on keeping up the faith of the Rumanian people in the American system through a gradual increase in cultural activity, and I sincerely hope that everything possible will be done in the months ahead to develop a comprehensive program of cultural exchanges.⁵

With best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Robert H. Thayer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 766.00/2–657. Confidential; Official–Informal.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Reference is to the Geneva Summit meeting, July 1955.
4. Thayer also opposed the continuation of normal trade relations with Romania. He told Romanian officials that “far more dramatic proof” of their sincerity was required beyond what he had called for at the October 1956 negotiations. He also strongly recommended that all export licenses be deferred or disapproved for the time being. (Telegram 3201 from Bucharest, December 29, 1956; Department of State, Central Files, 766.00/12–2956)
5. On February 21, Dulles thanked Thayer for his letter and assured him that his views were “receiving careful attention in the Department.” (Ibid., 766.00/2–657)