Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

223. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, January 5, 1957—10 a.m.

909. Embtels 907,² 908.³ Part III of III on developments in Poland.

Re Gomulka regime internal policies, Polish Communists emphatically stress they have no intention letting “socialist democratization” lead by phases to western-style democracy. Forthcoming parliamentary (Sejm) election January 20 organized on single-list basis denying population right to free vote whether it favors PZPR leadership over other freely organized and competing parties. By presenting about seven candidates for every four posts, regime offers voters limited choice in personalities all of which have been nominated by “national front” machinery on basis their demonstrated or professed support for PZPR policies and programs as outlined at last two meetings Party Central Committee. Issues such as ratification or approval of the Polish-Soviet economic or military agreements; economic or labor policies, agricultural or tax measures, western aid, relations with Hungary, have not yet been presented to the electorate.

Election questions about which western observers here most interested at present are (a) extent to which voters may approve Communist and pro-Communist unknowns over “big-name” Communists and (b) extent to which voters will be permitted to scratch ticket, abstain from voting, or be forced to vote. Either (a) and (b) may result in protest against regime. Evidently regime hopes its concessions particularly on collectivization and to the church, together with its show of resistance to Soviet dictation, will enable it to coax reasonably satisfactory performance out of voters.

Regime cannot effectively deny population right privately to cherish anti-Communist or anti-Socialist views but continues to deny right to express them or to translate them into action. Openly stating that it does not believe in freedom for such views, regime reinforces its restrictions by implying that debate on such questions as desirability Soviet garrisons in Poland or events in Hungary invites Soviet armed intervention as in Hungary. Having cut away this much freedom, regime willing permit limited freedom in other respects. For example, recent trends indicate regime becoming much less restrictive in passport policy. Immigration policies other countries and foreign exchange problems now compete with regime passport policy for blame in hindering free travel Polish citizens.

Although press remains under regime control, slanting and suppression appear diminished from year ago. Western broadcasts heard with negligible interference. Whether existing interference Soviet, Czech or Polish origin not fully established. Entertainment and human interest given more space in press, radio and theater. Regime sensitivity to press criticism especially with police state connotations, illustrated by refusal grant visas to certain US correspondents.

Future developments in regime internal policy promise to reflect not only relative influence supporters conservative “nationalist” policies and exponents “progressive” policies of bolder measure liberalization, but will also reflect developments within Soviet leadership, and in relations between Soviets and Yugoslavs, Chinese, Hungarians, and other orbit countries. Similarly, Polish external relations will be affected by important considerations outside Poland and beyond scope this assessment. In present international climate Polish regime may be expected seek avoid startling changes in previous pattern beyond those made in October. In past year regime drew increasingly close to Yugoslavia and optimistically professed to have found Chinese Communist and Indian support. Present evidence suggests Chinese Communists more anxious to promote solidarity between Chinese and Soviet parties than to support Polish insubordination.

Embassy believes regime will seek cautiously and without effusiveness to improve relations with US, Great Britain and France. Polish note of October 8⁴ offered discuss all pending problems with US.

Embassy summarizes assessment present situation in Poland as follows:

1. Soviet military, political and economic domination over Poland has been slightly weakened, but Soviet influence over Polish internal and external affairs remains substantial, with an estimated 47,000 Soviet troops stationed by agreement in Poland.

2. Gomulka leadership within PZPR not yet firmly established but prospects appear at present better than those of more conservative or radical elements in party leadership. Party Congress scheduled March 1957 will be crucial event.

3. Economic planning is being re-examined, with prospect more experimentation in decentralization, increased scope for private initiative in agriculture and small-scale artisan production, without renunciation of collectivization goal or of continued nationalization of industry. Increased friction with Soviet-bloc economic partners presaged by financially hard-pressed regime seeks sell and buy, in West or East, where most favorable terms (including credits) can be obtained, [sic] Regime appears desire both increased trade with West and credits, partly in interest real improvement in standard living and partly on psychological grounds, to show population it has enough interest in people’s welfare to seek “non-political” aid any quarter.

4. Release of Cardinal⁵ and related regime decisions showing conciliatory attitude towards church, represent events great importance. Regime attitude and church concurrence re necessity calm combine to exercise stabilizing effect on internal order.

5. Despite departure Marshal Rokossowski and some senior Soviet advisers, armed forces continue heavily dependent Soviet research, doctrine and, in event sustained operations, logistic support. Possible reductions in size, also gradual reversion to Polish military traditions presaged in present draft conscription law. Poznan and October events indicate Polish troops unlikely fight own people once mass revolt under way, but would probably serve regime in suppressing initial outbreaks. Polish soldier basically nationalistic, opposed both Germans and Russians. Gomulka’s statement that Poland needs Soviet troops (in view of menace of West Germany) is not far removed from stating that he wants them.

6. Large majority Poles including youth and many intelligentsia remain disaffected from Communist regime, approving only some of Gomulka’s policies and these only as partially satisfactory. Fear Soviet intervention (Hungarian experience) appears strongest force inhibiting organized or overt resistance to regime. However, as evidenced particularly by Bydgoszcz and Szczecin demonstrations in November and December, there exists in Poland strong under-current of unrest which is easily provoked by signs and symbols of hated Communist authority. This explosive situation bears careful watching as it may (a) spontaneously for minor causes and without warning erupt or (b) be provoked to erupt by Moscow or pro-Moscow elements and used as excuse to clamp down on Gomulka and further liberalization.

Department pass other posts as desired.

Jacobs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.00/1–557. Confidential; Priority.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Supra.
4. See footnote 2, Document 92.
5. Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski.