Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

222. Telegram from the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, January 5, 1957—10 a.m.

908. Embtel 907.² Part II of III on developments in Poland.

Question stability Gomulka regime has two aspects: Stability Gomulka or Gomulka-type leadership within PZPR, and stability PZPR control over Polish population

Following factors seen threatening stability regime in both aspects:

1. Basic unpopularity regime which is not freely elected. Regardless whether PZPR expediently dilutes imitation of Soviets by adopting some policies conciliatory to Polish population, regime does not have legitimate, freely-voted consent of those governed. On this account it is congenitally unstable.

2. Limited degree and narrow bases of Gomulka’s personal popularity outside party. His national standing appears based largely on idea he suffered in past for his defiance of Soviet dictation and hope that he still dares defy. In internal policy his conciliatory view on agriculture collectivization appears to be only position enjoying widespread popular appeal. Extent to which Gomulka personally promoting regime policies conciliatory to Church, and extent to which population associates him with these policies, is subject about which little evidence yet available. To date indications re popular attitude towards “worker self-government” suggest experiment arouses no great enthusiasm, high hopes, or particular association with Gomulka personally. Other Polish figures of any stature are known to have been associated with discredited and disliked policies. Most commonly reported attitude this subject is “Let’s try anything, we’ve nothing to lose.” Embassy impression is that Poles attitude toward Gomulka one of some hopeful expectancy, but less enthusiasm and optimism than has been projected by western press.

3. Narrowness of Gomulka base within party. Return of Gomulka to power in PZPR does not mean he had large clique loyal supporters with whom he fought his way back up to party leadership. Weight evidence is that group central committee members composed various currents and individuals decided bring Gomulka back because his prestige as “victim of Stalinism” would be helpful to party in conducting its program of controlled liberalization. Communist functionaries whose jobs now threatened by Gomulka house-cleaning constitute important opposition. Doubt concerning Gomulka’s control over party will continue at least until results party congress in March become known.

4. Dimness of prospects for significant degree improvement in Poland’s economic plight. Poles will be asked to work hardest ever but will continue receive subsistence level standard living, drab second-rate goods at high prices, few luxuries. Recent statements by Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz that only miners may expect pay increases, continued high prices for consumers’ goods, increases in some cases, and fear of confiscation meager savings by devaluation zloty, all reveal lack confidence that present regime can improve situation substantially. This continuing absence of substantial improvement in ten years Communist rule will add to popular dissatisfaction with Communist economic experimentation and renew yearning for change.

5. Volatility and anti-Communist attitude Polish population. Unrest exemplified in recent demonstrations in Bydgoszcz and Szczecin show danger that local demonstration leading to bloodshed could spark chain of violence leading to Soviet intervention “in interests Soviet security”. Disaffected nationalists or Stalinists might try to exploit such situation.

6. Breakdown of PZPR authority at grass-roots level. On basis deduction from regime exhortations and also from independent reports Embassy believes Communists at local level probably having great difficulty exercising authority or influence.

Embassy believes above unstabilizing factors can for a while at least be kept under control by following stabilizing factors:

1. Restraining influence of fear of Soviet repression as in Hungary, where Soviets demonstrated willingness use armed force to crush opposition and western powers showed unwillingness counter with military force on behalf freedom fighters. Effect is to persuade Poles that despite vuluerability and internal weakness of present Polish Communist regime, forcible efforts to topple it not likely to produce good results. Impression of Poles that intensity of Soviet concern for eastern Europe outweighs western interest felt even before Hungarian experience.

2. Regime willingness soft-pedal Marxist-Leninist doctrine or adapt practices to “modern conditions” by introducing limited concessions, especially re collectivization, pledging cut down role of secret police, giving more freedom to church, etc, as listed Embtels 323³ and 892.⁴

3. Pacifying role of Cardinal Wyszynski and Catholic Church on behalf order and “national unity”, following regime decision make concessions to church advantage.

4. Indications that important proportion decision-making or influence-wielding “intelligentsia” prefer Gomulka and “liberalization” over hard-core Communists favoring subservience Moscow. At same time both pro-and anti-Communist intellectuals appreciate Soviet capabilities for repressing Polish attempts establish truly democratic system.

5. Fear and hatred of Germans among all segments affords solid ground for Gomulka and pro-Soviet groups alike to play upon this feeling, as occasions require, for keeping alive need for Soviet alliance and “friendship”. The two groups approach this problem from different angles but results are the same.

Comments on Gomulka regime internal and external policies in Part II next message.

Department pass other posts as desired.

Jacobs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.00/1–557. Confidential; Priority.
2. Telegram 907, January 5, briefly summarized developments in Poland during 1956. (Ibid., 748.00/1–557)
3. Document 89.
4. Document 63.