Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, July 6, 1955—2 p.m.

6. While realize Department has its own current estimate of situation in Poland, in view of approaching “summit” meeting,² following résumé of thoughts may be of interest.

1. Communist regime still firmly in control with no detectable signs any relaxation. Likewise no detectable signs any change in methods and measures of regime flowing from Belgrade Accord (especially recognition of right to choose socialistic methods different from Moscow–Cominform variety). Our view is that if Polish officials were queried this subject they would reply simply that question doesn’t arise as Poland has chosen and follows of own “free will” Moscow (Cominform) variety of Communist socialism. We do not however discount undermining influence of Belgrade Accord upon minds of some Polish leaders and intellectuals which may some day bear fruit in efforts to shape trends along non-Cominform lines.

2. Notwithstanding current talks on relaxation of tension and real “peace, goodwill and understanding among nations” (theme-song of Polish radio broadcasts), there are few signs of real efforts to act more friendly toward USA—development one might well have expected at least during pre-summit meeting period. While we note some slight improvement in few official and personal contacts had with Foreign Office officials and somewhat larger attendance at our fourth July reception, in contrast, however, USA during this pre-summit period is target for greater than usual abuse and misrepresentation in local press; five spy trials have been paraded within past two months alleging US Intelligence instigation; in radio broadcasts US defense plans and military aid are continually played up in warmongering light; misrepresenting Austrian Peace Treaty solely as Soviet accomplishment; no mention is made of US assistance abroad in peaceful utilization of atomic energy (conversely USSR “assistance” is overplayed); and Secretary Dulles is lampooned in cartoons as brooding on how to “destroy” our atomic and hydrogen bombs by dropping them on defenseless cities and civilians (on other hand, little adverse is said against Great Britain and France). Great popular fervor was shown for French during Chopin festival and Britain has just come in for good share of “goodwill and understanding” during visit of HMS Glasgow. This is probably part of campaign to play these powers against USA.

3. Another striking development of current period is play given to statements by the President and Secretary concerning our unwillingness to accept as final satellite regimes. In this play-up, advantage is taken of fear of Poles (not merely Communist party followers) of a resurgent, rearmed Germany. Line taken is that USA desires replacement of present regime in Poland by one which would permit reopening of Oder-Neisse Western boundary and East Prussia questions and return of some part at least of these areas to Germany. No intimation is given in these radio and press play-ups that USSR, if it goes along with rapprochement with West German Republic, and ultimately with German reunification, will likewise be confronted with German demands over frontier Silesia and East Prussia. Likewise play-ups are silent on known Polish desires for return of Soviet held Wilno and Lwow areas. On balance we believe all Polish circles (Communist and non-Communist) would like to see Polish frontiers “fixed” as at present with only few minor changes so that full development those areas as Polish territory could be proceeded with—at same time average Pole obviously uncertain as regards “permanency” this frontier.

4. Anent fear of resurgent reunited Germany, French and UK fears are well-known. We have noted here recently similar strong feelings of diplomatic representatives of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, especially if future German Army is to be trained by some former German generals mentioned to head that army. Finnish diplomatic officer, one of few who have driven from Berlin to Warsaw, was shocked by “arrogance” of Eastern military unit in forcing all traffic “in the ditch” while its cavalcade roared by. There is some feeling among Scandinavian representatives that Silesian industrial area (Europe’s second Ruhr) would for world peace and security be better under Polish control than resurgent Germany’s. Point here is that these pro-Western diplomats sympathize with Polish fear and may help abolish it in their more frequent talks with Polish officials.

5. Present regime is striving, more than ever it seems, to gain goodwill of Polish people. Its favoritism toward youth and workers is well-known—holidays, tours, bonuses, et cetera—ridiculous in Western eyes but may be not so ridiculous to younger generations. Strong efforts to play-up to cherished Polish accomplishments in art, music, literature, national monuments and the like (Chopin festival and rebuilding of Warsaw shrines). Even in police and prison terrorism, there seems to be some alleviation. Recent report of Jewish prisoner released to emigrate to Palestine reveals that prison life has improved greatly in past year and more prisoners pardoned. Our Embassy as well as British, French and Israeli are noticeably aware that regime has relaxed in permitting Poles to leave the country, especially those with relatives abroad. Other examples are some signs of improved State-Church relations; more liberal laws on private property holdings; and frequent “self criticism articles” (and cartoons) appearing in press on regime’s shortcomings. This may be planned drive to improve regime’s standing with Polish people against day when regime will bid for support in some new “free” elections.

6. Visits of Nehru³ may have started some new thought trends here. Veteran diplomats have commented on size of crowd who lined streets to greet Nehru—larger they say than crowds hitherto greeting such celebrities as Bulganin–Khrushchev and company and Chou En-lai. Deduction is that some Poles see in Nehru possible neutral spokesman in power struggle between USA and USSR. If this be true, regime might lean toward neutral status for Poland (and other satellites) in return for neutral Germany with Nehru as “salesman”. He could help sell theirs and Moscow’s brand of coexistence. Apparently this is the role Nehru has been fishing for in this area. At least Nehru seems to have captured good share of Polish “imagination” as well as much favorable press comment.

7. While there is inadequate supply of meat, there is no real food problem in Poland as of now. People everywhere appear well-fed. They may complain of “prices” but all seem to eat. Likewise there is complaint about prices of clothing but nearly everybody appears to be fairly well clothed. Recent visitors to Moscow and Warsaw exclaimed how much better “appearances” are in Warsaw. People in such circumstances, especially the younger generations who know little else are not likely to brood and breed revolution. Economically capital, tools and machinery are needed to develop more fully Polish heavy industry but no one who has seen the thousands of smoking chimneys in Poland can deny progress.

8. Military situation in brief is that Polish military forces solely dependent upon USSR for logistics and direction. However, present level of supply, training and organization of Polish military forces makes them potential offensive force which cannot be ignored when integrated into an Eastern NATO organization. It is felt that Polish forces are capable of conducting delaying action on their frontiers and of defending lines of communications across Poland, as well as suppressing local uprisings while Soviet forces conduct main effort elsewhere in Europe. There is no sign that USSR intends to relinquish military (anymore than political) control in Poland.

9. In summary our view is that Belgrade Accord will produce no immediate change in Soviet-Polish relations. Polish regime hopes some relaxation will flow from summit meeting which would permit it to continue in undisputed power while it continues to consolidate its position with rising generations. It does not want a reunited or a resurgent Germany, even though divided into East and West, but would probably prefer latter. It would resist return of Silesian “Ruhr” to Germany. It may be expected to support Nehru’s salesmanship of neutralist-coexistence line. It would like greater volume of trade with West to develop economy.

10. What Polish people think of summit meeting and Soviet bid otherwise for relaxation of tension is difficult to estimate. Obviously there must be goodly number of people who long for a change and secretly hope for downfall of regime. It is probably safe to say that most Poles believe that regime’s downfall can be accomplished only as result of a general East-West war.

Department pouch copies Moscow, Belgrade, London, Paris.

Jacobs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.00/7–655. Secret.
2. Reference is to the Four-Power Heads of State meeting at Geneva, July 18–23.
3. Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made official visits to seven West and East European nations and Egypt from June 6 to July 14. He was in Poland June 23–25, and had previously visited the Soviet Union June 7–23.