Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, June 20, 1955—1 p.m.

512. Transmission following Embassy views re recent international developments affecting Poland has been delayed by Department’s late ban all non-urgent cable traffic. Basic views most urgent subjects sent Embtel 506 repeated information Moscow 37, London 37, Belgrade 7.²

Soviet-Yugoslav talks: Embassy believes Soviet concessions and statements made Belgrade³ have no practical implications Poland this time. Because of demonstrated tenacity in past of Polish imperviousness to foreign domination, as well as Polish hate of all things Russian and Soviet, USSR considered likely to make significant concessions, if any, in Poland as result demonstrated fact that certain aspects system in force here have shown themselves unworkable. Polish regime and Soviet masters both very much aware heavy undercurrent of dissidence in otherwise well-controlled stream life Poland and probably calculate any relaxation in controls, or decision let stream find natural course would result in still greater discontent with remaining controls, and renewed efforts to wear them away.

Embassy has no opportunity sample adequately reaction Polish public to Soviet-Yugoslav talks. However, made from few contacts, great mass of public appears apathetic towards (if aware of) this development (apparently in contrast to reported reactions from some other satellites). Private sampling opinions intellectuals, medium-level, nonparty members legislature reveals “wait and see” attitude but also great pessimism with respect possibilities less Soviet control.

In this connection, and report relating thereto in Paris Embtel 5389, June 8, repeated Warsaw 27, Moscow 291,⁴ French Ambassador’s version here is that Foreign Minister in reply to Ambassador’s question simply said that most important aspect of Belgrade declaration was the “ideological rapprochement” and thereafter nothing more was said on subject, the Foreign Minister appearing unwilling to say more. (In order preserve good relations with French Ambassador here, Embassy desires all recipients this telegram refrain from discussing this discrepancy with any foreign representatives.)

Embassy does not of course, discount psychological impact on intellectual Poles of spectacle made by Khrushchev in crawling to Tito and believes, from long range viewpoint, that incident serves well to hearten Polish will to resist passively. Parenthetically, Embassy believes Secretary Dulles statement re importance satellite independence⁵ similarly heartening to Poles even though regime distorted remarks to read imposition by US of pre-war “capitalistic” Polish Government and leaders.

Aside from constantly recurring rumors of Bierut’s impending downfall and of possibility Gomulka “may” be returned to some government position, there are no indications here of a change in Polish leadership.

Germany: Although USSR bid relations West Germany was admission weak Soviet faith in possibilities reunification East-West Germany, interesting confirmation provided recently to reliable Western colleague by East German Ambassador Heymann, who stated that since reunification impossible for long time, two Germanys “should” have relations, and that he consequently “welcomed” invitation Adenauer to Moscow. Statement particularly interesting from standpoint that satellites, including East Germany, will presumably follow Moscow’s lead promptly in attempting establish relations West Germany when and if Soviet-West German relations become fact. Embassy has heard this connection that some Poles fear Adenauer trip to Moscow may result in Soviet offer return some “recovered” territories to Germany. Department has probably already foreseen problem which would arise if USSR, having established relations West Germany, would insist inviting both West Germany and East Germany (which Western countries have refused recognize) to conference on reunification.

Warsaw Treaty: Although Warsaw eight-power treaty ratified by all signatories, no news here of any steps toward practical implementation. This would seem indicate assumption correct that none is necessary (all practical details assumed to have been already in force when pact signed) and that therefore treaty is mere legalistic confirmation for possible negotiating purposes.

General: Some private Poles have expressed disappointment that West, particularly US, has lost diplomatic offensive to USSR during period starting with Soviet visit Belgrade. Sources inclined view Soviet moves as carefully calculated, calmly executed maneuvers and to miss apparent fact that Soviets have been forced to these actions by trend of events regarding regaining sovereignty and rearming West Germany.

Embassy agrees with idea already advanced some commentators that same trend events might eventually cause USSR to offer “neutrality belt” of satellite states in return for similar “neutrality belt” contiguous Western countries. Reliability such offer obviously open to question.

Judging by way it is being attacked in Polish press, US “policy of strength” is great success.

Jacobs

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.68/6–2055. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, and Belgrade.
2. In telegram 506, June 14, the Embassy in Warsaw characterized Polish-Yugloslav-Soviet relations. The Embassy believed Poland could not pursue an independent foreign policy with regard to Yugoslavia because of Soviet infiltration in the Polish regime. (Ibid., 661.68/6–1455)
3. See Document 15.
4. In telegram 5389, June 8, the Embassy in Paris reported: “French Ambassador Warsaw has reported that he asked Polish Foreign Minister’s opinion of most important parts of Belgrade communiqué and that latter had replied immediately and unequivocably that paragraph 4 stating different forms of Socialist development are solely concerned with individual countries was of utmost importance to Poland.” (Ibid., 661.68/6–855)
5. Apparent reference to Dulles’ televised report to the President, May 17, on the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and its implications; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1955, pp. 871–876.