153. Notes on the 42d Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, November 1, 19561
MEMBERS PRESENT
- State—Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Chairman
- Defense—Colonel Oscar R. Schaaf
- Defense—Mr. Roger Ernst
- CIA—Mr. Laughlin Campbell
- Office of Spec. Asst. to the President—Mr. Oren M. Stephens
- USIA—Mr. Alfred V. Boerner
- OCB—Mr. Paul B. Comstock, Staff Representative
OTHERS PRESENT
- State—Mr. Edward L. Freers
- State—Mr. Howard Trivers
- State—Mr. Robert O. Blake
- State—Mr. Robert M. McKisson
- State—Mr. Philip Burris
- State—Mr. Boris H. Klosson
- State—Mr. John E. Horner
- State—Mr. Arthur Compton
- CIA—Mr. Arthur M. Cox
- USIA—Mr. E. Lewis Revey
[The following notes are not exact quotations.]2
Freers: (Read the FBIS reports that the Russian troops had started to reoccupy Budapest, and a rumor from Vienna that Nagy had been removed from office.)
Boerner: USIA is playing heavily on the reentry of Soviet troops to Budapest.
Ernst: Should we not develop some courses of action under the draft NSC action on Poland and Hungary that the Council did not get to this morning?3 (The general consensus was that this point might be discussed at a later meeting.)
Freers: The big question is what is developing in the other satellites.
Beam: We have just talked with the Secretary, prior to his departure for New York.4 The thinking in State is that a UN Security Council meeting should be called with the view of asking the Soviets the meaning of the latest reports.
McKisson: What steps should be taken in the U.S. Government?
Beam: Right now we should concentrate on the discussion and action in the Security Council. It seems we cannot get the subject into the General Assembly at the moment because this Special Session was called to consider only the fighting in the Near East. The thinking in State is that it would be better not to have our Hungarian resolution vetoed in the Security Council; however, the regular General Assembly meeting is still twelve days off.5
[Page 361]Blake: Should we not discuss measures to develop support of other nations?
Beam: We don’t have time for that. Ambassador Lodge will have to handle the operational problem.
Freers: It is reported that the Hungarian representatives have been withdrawn.6
Cox: The Hungarian Government has asked the Soviet troops to get out. Why not let the Soviets veto our resolution in the Security Council and then take it to the General Assembly?
Freers: It may not be possible to get it before a special session of the General Assembly.
Beam: We better be sure of where we are going before we put up a firm resolution.
[At this point Mr. Beam was called out of the meeting.]
Schaaf: How is this situation different from Egypt?
Freers: There are many fundamental similarities.
Schaaf: It would have a good effect to bring the Hungarian situation to the General Assembly as soon as possible.
Freers: We agree, but it would probably have just as good an effect if brought before the Assembly tomorrow.
Ernst: About the most you can hope for is to enlist world opinion.
Schaaf: We should certainly do no less to the communists than we have done to our allies. Why do we not try to get it before the General Assembly this afternoon?
Freers: All of the top people in the General Assembly are concerned with the Suez situation.
Schaaf: It would be very dramatic to put up a resolution to the Security Council this afternoon.
Blake: Even if it were vetoed, it might be possible to introduce a similar resolution tomorrow in the Security Council to be vetoed again, and then it might be possible to get it into a special session of the General Assembly. Is there any way to get the Yugoslavs to support the insurgents?
Campbell: The Yugoslavs would probably help the Hungarian Government which is not a definite U.S. policy as yet.
Blake: Would Austrian neutrality prevent the Austrians from helping implement a UN resolution?
[Page 362]Compton: They would probably cooperate if there is a firm UN decision. In the absence of UN action, they are strongly friendly to the Hungarians and they will do what is possible within the limits of their neutrality.
Freers: There are some indications that the Italians would like to help.
Blake: We need a military estimate.
Schaaf: We do not know how well the Hungarian armed forces are organized at this time.
Cox: If there is a UN resolution, would it be possible to use an airdrop to supply the Hungarians?
Freers: If a UN resolution calls for assisting the Hungarian Government to repel invasion, presumably assistance would be granted. But a resolution of this kind raises a lot of big questions.
Freers: We are discussing UN action with Mr. Murphy.
Boerner: The Soviets must have brought enough troops to put down the revolt. The UN provides the means to mobilize world opinion.
Freers: We have a question as to whether we give material aid or restrict ourselves to psychological methods through the UN and elsewhere. If a decision is given to render assistance, do we give enough to save the situation or just enough to hold the Russians off for a while? It would seem desirable to be drafting a resolution for the General Assembly which would provide the basis for assistance if such a decision is made. What is done right now depends upon the countries in the immediate area, unless their air space is violated.
Schaaf: It might not be possible to assist them by air drop without getting the Soviet air force committed against us.
Ernst: Since it appears almost certain that we will not be assisting the rebels, we should make an offer of asylum and a major effort to evacuate as many of the rebels as possible as refugees.
Compton: The Austrians will grant asylum as they have promised, but we will have to do more to help the refugees out than we are now doing.
Freers: We could offer all necessary economic assistance to the Hungarian people to carry on the struggle.
Blake: That would take time. Psychological measures are about the only ones open to us at the moment.
Campbell: We cannot offer economic aid to existing government in the present situation unless a policy decision is taken.
Revey: It would appear that we cannot take any concrete action within the next 24 hours which is a pretty unfortunate fact.
[Page 363]Boerner: As a psychological measure, we might consider assembling all of the Hungarian émigré leaders on the Austrian border. If they do not wish to form a government-in-exile they might serve as a rallying point. . . .
Stephens: Are we sending propaganda to the Soviet troops in Hungary?
Campbell: Radio Free Europe is urging them not to shoot the Hungarians. These programs are in Russian and beamed to the Soviet troops.
Boerner: It would appear desirable to slow down on our East-West exchange note negotiations with the USSR.
Blake: That is pretty clear. There are a lot of little things that we will have to watch.
OCB Staff Representative
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4–OCB/11–156. Top Secret. Drafted by Comstock.↩
- All brackets are in the source text.↩
- See the memorandum of discussion, supra.↩
- The Secretary left Washington at 3 p.m.↩
-
On November 1, Nagy cabled U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to protest the entry of more Soviet troops into Hungary and to declare Hungary’s neutrality. He requested the “help of the four great powers in defending the country’s neutrality.” He also requested that the question of Hungarian neutrality be put on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. (U.N. doc. A/3251)
At 7 p.m., November 1, Barnes was called to the Hungarian Foreign Office and handed a note verbale informing him of Nagy’s request. (Telegram 213 from Budapest, November 2; Department of State, Central Files, 661.64/11–256) Shortly thereafter, Nagy broadcast the declaration of neutrality to the Hungarian people; for text, see Zinner, National Communism, pp. 463–464.
↩ - Nagy took over as acting Foreign Minister on November 1. In a second cable to the United Nations, he noted that János Szabó would represent Hungary at the special session of the General Assembly.↩