Office of the Historian

152. Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 1, 1956, 9–10:55 a.m.1

Washington, November 1, 1956, 9–10:55 a.m

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

Upon entering the Cabinet Room from his office, the President informed the members of the Council that, except in so far as it was the subject of the DCI’s intelligence briefing, he did not wish the Council to take up the situation in the Soviet satellites. Instead, he wished to concentrate on the Middle East.2

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he had a few remarks to make on the situation in Hungary. In a sense, what had occurred there was a miracle. Events had belied all our past views that a popular revolt in the face of modern weapons was an utter impossibility. Nevertheless, the impossible had happened, and because of the power of public opinion, armed force could not effectively be used. Approximately 80% of the Hungarian Army had defected to the rebels and provided the rebels with arms. Soviet troops themselves had had no stomach for shooting down Hungarians, except in Budapest.

Mr. Dulles then commented that the Soviet statement of October 30, on Soviet relations with the satellite states, was one of the most [Page 359] important statements to come out of the USSR in the last decade.3 After summarizing the contents of this statement, Mr. Dulles declared that the main problem facing us today in Hungary was the lack of a strong guiding authority to bring the rebels together. Nagy was failing to unite the rebels, and they were demanding that he quit. Somehow a rallying point must be found in order to prevent chaos inside of Hungary even if the Soviets took their leave. In such a heavily Catholic nation as Hungary, Cardinal Mindszenty4 might prove to be such a leader and unifying force.

In Poland as well as in Hungary, Mr. Dulles described the economic problem as acute.

[Here follow a discussion of the Middle East and agenda item 2; for text, see volume XVI, page 902.]

3. U.S. Policy Toward Developments In Poland And Hungary (NSC Action No. 1623;5 SNIE 12–2–56;6 NSC 56167)

The National Security Council:8

Deferred action on NSC 5616 until a subsequent meeting.

S. Everett Gleason
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason. The time of the meeting is from the Record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
  2. At 8:40 a.m., Dulles called the President and described the subject of U.S. policy for the Soviet satellites, scheduled to be the major item of discussion at this meeting, as academic since the situation had largely resolved itself. The President expressed the view that it would be good to have a general discussion of Middle Eastern affairs. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 1; ibid., Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)↩
  3. See Document 141.↩
  4. On the evening of October 30, Cardinal Mindszenty was released from house arrest.↩
  5. See footnoote 14, Document 116.↩
  6. Document 137.↩
  7. Supra.↩
  8. The sentence that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1628. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩