Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

52. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 16, 1956—3 p.m.

2837. At last night’s reception I had short talk with Khrushchev and following points emerged. He seemed to be considerably more subdued than usual and mentioned fact that he was very tired after his trip with Tito.² I took advantage this reference to tell him that American and other Western correspondents who had been along on trip with Tito were very much displeased at discriminatory treatment they had received during trip, and told him of complaints I had had in this regard from US correspondents. Khrushchev said that he had been unaware of this on trip although he said Tito had mentioned it to him, and brushed matter aside by stating that there were still some bureaucrats in Soviet system who could not easily adjust to new conditions.

Khrushchev then in mild but definite terms said that he simply did not understand attitude of US, and particularly that of Mr. Dulles, and felt that recent speeches and statements were difficult to reconcile with views that had been expressed at Geneva Conference.³ I told Khrushchev that I felt that he simply did not understand operation of American system with its free expression of opinion and, in particular, the institution of press conferences where leading government officials were subjected to free and untrammeled questioning by correspondents on any subject.

He said he felt that while Soviet relations were improving with other countries, with the US it was going very slowly indeed. Given this opportunity I told him I thought words were insufficient in matters of this kind and he surely realized special responsibility of the US to which he agreed. I told him that as long as the major questions such as Germany, disarmament and others which were the chief causes tension remain unsolved that mere words on desirability of improved relations, etc were not going to change situation. I gave him my personal opinion that Soviet leaders seemed believe they could have everything their own way and that the constant assault in their own statements and their propaganda against measures such as, for example, NATO, which US and its associates felt to be vital to security seemed to me to be incompatible with the constantly reiterated thesis of desire for co-existence and normal relations. I told him that constant attacks on so-called policy of “positions of strength” led me to believe the Soviet Union desired we should operate from position of weakness while they maintained their strength intact. Khrushchev countered by saying that at Geneva Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to accept as an international fact NATO and had proposed renunciation of force agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. I told him I thought that additional pieces of paper of this nature were unnecessary in view of the Charter of the UN and besides any such question brought US squarely up against the problem of the division of Germany. Khrushchev did not argue point but returned to his original thesis and said he felt the US did not understand the depth and significance of changes which were taking place in Soviet Union.

I told him I did my best to keep my government informed but despite certain improvements the area of secrecy was so great in this country that it was very difficult for an Ambassador to obtain a clear picture of what was going on. I mentioned in this connection fact that middle of March the whole world knew that he had made very important speech to a closed session of Congress but no reliable information on this subject had been available in Moscow. (I did this in hope that Khrushchev would make some remark on subject of version published by Department.) Khrushchev at first attempted to deny that there had been any special speech, but finding this untenable he said versions had been circulated which did not correspond to truth but denied (incidentally this is party line since similar statements were made to me last night by Malenkov and Molotov with big smiles on their faces) that he had read the version recently published on grounds that it required “a big work of translation.”

Khrushchev then referred to Twining visit⁴ and said he hoped that this would be step which would lead to better understanding of Soviet Union, to which I replied that would depend in no small measure to degree of frankness which General Twining was dealt with during his visit here.

Khrushchev throughout the conversation spoke in unusually quiet and restrained terms and seemed to have very much on his mind the problem of relations with the US. He inquired after President’s health and expressed satisfaction when I told him that his condition was excellent and from all accounts he had undergone the operation without any difficulty.⁵

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6–1656. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. During Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union, June 1–23, Khrushchev accompanied him to Stalingrad, Rostov, and Novorossisk, June 10–13.
3. For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.
4. Twining visited the Soviet Union June 23–July 1; see Document 105.
5. President Eisenhower had an operation for ileitis on June 9.