Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

41. Memorandum From Richard H. Davis of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie)¹

Washington, April 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Mr. Bohlen on Soviet Developments

At the EE staff meeting last Tuesday² Mr. Bohlen exposed himself to a wide variety of questions concerning developments in the Soviet Union and its policies. Mr. Savage has suggested that a list of the principal points made by Mr. Bohlen might be useful to you before the S/P meeting on Friday with Mr. Bohlen.³

The EE staff meeting covered a wide variety of subjects and Mr. Bohlen’s responses were as usual made in his own inimitable style and language. I, therefore, do not feel able to do more than list principal subjects and points made by Mr. Bohlen in the discussion.

1. Denigration of STALIN

Reasons:

a. Assurance against another STALIN or one-man dictatorship.

b. Fundamental need for establishing new basis for operation of collective leadership—necessity revise all history, philosophy, etc All facets of Soviet life intertwined with cult of STALIN which had to be placed in perspective.

Timing:

Not a last-minute decision. Natural that new Soviet leaders should await Party Congress before defining position on STALIN.

Effects:

a. In Russia certain bewilderment and shock among uneducated masses who never had “inside track” on methods STALIN’s rule. On the other hand, bureaucrats, intellectuals and Army welcome assurance that STALIN-type rule less likely to reoccur.

b. In satellites Mr. Bohlen pleaded ignorance of latest developments, but advanced opinion that while this attack on STALIN would provide temporary difficulties, it would contribute in long run to readjustments Moscow groping for in its control-relationships.

c. In free world countries foreign Communist parties would experience considerable difficulties. Socialist parties were less likely to be taken in by appeal to united front; whereas, bourgeois parties were more susceptible to Soviet blandishments.

2. Internal Developments

a. No struggle for power. Collective leadership most important fact and source of Soviet policy changes.

b. Collective leadership is in process “institutionalizing” its rule. Under STALIN all Soviet institutions were subject to his arbitrary and often brutal rule. New leadership seeks to revitalize institutions of Soviet state led by Communist party. This applies to army and there is no evidence army has assumed separate rule.

c. Ideological reformulations at 20th Congress striking evidence that ideology, except in its basic sense, such as the public ownership of all means of production, is servant of the Soviet regime in power.

d. If possible, we will soon witness “honorable” retirements from Presidium to make way for new, younger blood at pinnacle; for example, Vorashilov out to pasture with Molotov assuming chief of state role.

e. Problem of discipline vs. initiative and responsibility. Soviet leaders may have opened up “Pandora’s Box” but unlikely serious difficulties will arise.

3. Foreign Aspects

a. Western world, particularly US, attune to fighting past Soviet threats of (1) military nature, (2) subversion. Soviets have now moved to classic methods of diplomacy.

b. Immediate aim is assault on Western defense systems with concentration on weakest links such as Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, NATO members object of Soviet attentions, particularly flanks: Scandinavian countries, Greece and Turkey.

c. Yugoslavia: Contrary to widely held Western opinion, journey to Belgrade⁴ was not a pilgrimage or “Canossa”. It was a carefully calculated move with eye toward Soviet relations with other countries, particularly Egypt, India, etc. Moreover, it is part of long-term readjustment in control-relationships with satellites where STALIN-type control no longer feasible in long run.

d. Ideological reformulations and move to diplomatic offensive suggest foreign Communist parties no longer as necessary as in past to Soviet Union.

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential.
2. Apparently April 3.
3. No record has been found of this meeting. An unsigned memorandum, dated April 12, of the meeting on April 10 between the Ad Hoc Working Group on Stalinism and Ambassador Bohlen, is in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, STALIN Committee. In a telephone call to Dulles on April 18, Sherman Adams asked whether the Cabinet would like to hear Bohlen. Dulles replied that the Cabinet members might enjoy it, but he would rather that Bohlen not speak. Dulles said that “it would build him up too much—he is not working with us.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)
4. Reference is to the visit of a Soviet delegation, including Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan to Belgrade, May 26–June 2, 1955.