Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

369. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Turkish Ambassador (Ürgüplü) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1957¹

Washington, October 23, 1957

SUBJECT

• The Turkish-Syrian Problem in the United Nations

After delivering a personal letter² from the Turkish Prime Minister to the Secretary, Mr. Urguplu turned to the current UNGA debate on the Turkish-Syrian border problem.

The Ambassador reported that Mr. Sarper, former head of the Turkish delegation at the UNGA, had arrived to assist Mr. Esen, present head of the Turkish UNGA delegation, and had reported there was yesterday at the UNGA a great deal of confusion and lack of coordination among our friends, while the neutralists were close to Gromyko. He expressed the view that the delay in the debate was unfortunate in that it afforded the Syrians and the Saudis an opportunity to get together; that we have failed to take advantage of King Saud’s embarrassment over Syria’s refusal to mediate; and that our delegations should work more closely together.

Mr. Rountree, after agreeing that it was important for us to consult and establish a concerted position by Friday, then went on to explain why the United States felt that it had been desirable at yesterdays’s UNGA debate to concentrate on the Saudi offer. He said that there were two principal reasons for this. In the first place, it was consonant with the Secretary’s position that this was a regional problem; this had prompted him to defer his plan to put in a resolution that would refer the matter to the Security Council and call for an investigation that would be broad enough to include the activities of the USSR. Within this context it was logical to accept the Saudi offer,³ particularly in view of the fact that Syria had declined the Saudi offer under circumstances that were a measure in themselves of the extent to which Syria was under Russian influence. The second general consideration was the forthcoming Turkish elections. Because of the preoccupation of top Turkish officials with the election, it was felt that it would be better to defer any debate on this subject until they were over. Mr. Rountree said that these tactics had been partly successful, that Mr. Lodge was now working on the statement that he would make Friday, and that our delegation would be in active contact with the Turkish delegation in New York. Later in the conversation, Mr. Rountree assured the Ambassador that he would telephone to New York to assure that effective liaison was maintained between our two delegations.

In the course of the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador made a number of other observations. He urged that we coordinate with the British, but went on to deplore the excessive British reliance on Nuri Said in recent years. It had, he asserted, the effect of alienating from the West other Iraqi leaders who could have been useful to us. He also expressed a deep distrust of Arabs generally, citing particularly the chain of events and public statements following King Saud’s recent visits to Damascus and Beirut. In the course of a plea that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact, he suggested that Iraq might be allowed to leave the Pact. When Mr. Rountree pointed out that this would be regarded as a major victory for Nasser, the Ambassador discounted this, asserting that this could be neutralized by the United States joining the Pact, and could be further neutralized by the way it was conveyed to the Arabs. Throughout the discussion, the Ambassador’s comments carried overtones of not only the need for more effective liaison among our friends, particularly at the United Nations at the present time, but also that we could and should be doing a great deal more among the Arab states.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.833/10–2357. Confidential. Drafted by Jones.
2. The letter expressed Menderes’ appreciation for Dulles’ remarks at a press conference on October 16, in which the Secretary indicated that if there were an attack on Turkey by the Soviets, “it would not mean a purely defensive operation by the United States, with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary from which to attack Turkey.” For the full text of the Secretary’s comments, see Department of State Bulletin, Novembers, 1957, pp. 708–714. Forwarding a copy of Menderes’ letter to Eisenhower, Dulles informed the President, “Here is one person who seems to have liked my press conference of which you read the transcript.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
3. Documentation on King Saud’s interest in mediating the Syrian-Turkish dispute is in Department of State, Central File 682.83.