Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

360. Letter From the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad)¹

Washington, July 15, 1957.

Dear Larry: I have been very much concerned with the adverse economic situation existing in Turkey—a situation that is aggravated by the amount of military force being maintained in that country.

Turkey has, of course, been extremely anxious to maintain and even increase her military strength and has insistently urged the United States to give her more, rather than less, financial help toward this end.

When negotiating with us she always pleads “NATO force goals.” At the same time, our bilateral aid program for Turkey in effect sets the level of the Turkish contribution to NATO defense.

I have studied your letter dealing with this general subject and I am quite sympathetic with your views.² In fact, even if you should find yourself in complete agreement with my own feelings in the matter, hereinafter expressed, it would be improper for you to make any official or public statement to that effect, or, as NATO Commander, to make any official recommendation to your superiors that directly concerns the internal affairs of one of NATO’s members.

However, there are certain facts of life that must be recognized if we are to carry on a collective security program effectively and continuously.

1. One of these facts is that the nuclear power of the United States is the indispensable element of Western collective security, although it must be supported by those other elements of political and military strength and unity needed to deter the Communists from attempting to take over Western lands by political action or limited military power.

2. We must insure that military organization and force programs within each allied nation are properly related to the impact of advance weapon systems and to the contribution of the whole security apparatus to the security of the individual member nation.

3. We must make certain that each recipient country is technically capable of absorbing, maintaining and exploiting advanced material and new weapons systems, as well as such conventional forces as may be required for the joint strategy, and that it carries its fair share of the economic burden of collective defense. I repeat that such force levels must take into account the first two facts I have stated above.

4. We must likewise always remember that the resources of the United States are not unlimited; moreover, the sustained economic health and vigor of the United States is important to each one of the NATO nations.

Review of Turkish force levels for the past ten years reveals that in 1947 the Turkish armed services consisted of some 41 divisions of widely varying active strength and effectiveness, seven fortress commands, small armored and other supporting formations, an air arm totalling roughly 300 operational aircraft and a small navy. Total mobilization strength was about 600,000 men. By 1951 a reorganization led to 19 6/3 active divisions, 11 air regiments and 25 ships. Under NATO aegis, Turkish goals for active forces have since increased to 20 8/3 divisions, 41 air squadrons and 64 ships. Divisional strengths are roughly comparable to those obtaining in the 1947 time period.

Now the significant feature of the Turkish force picture is found in the fact that although the job to be accomplished has remained essentially unchanged, and although Turkey has reaped significant benefits in terms of the overall security provided by NATO, modernization under our military assistance efforts and protection afforded by the growing United States nuclear retaliatory capability, her force goals have increased. This to me represents an illogical end result which requires careful reappraisal.

I am aware of the impact upon local sensibilities that can result from an attempt to reduce United States supported force levels. On the other hand, it is essential that our limited resources be applied in such fashion as to achieve the greatest possible security for least cost. In this connection, one of my principal responsibilities to the American people is to insure that hard-headed economies are observed in connection with these same security expenditures. Failure on my part to do this could easily result in the collapse of our entire aid program. Exercise of this responsibility leads me to question the need for conventional forces in Turkey of the size now maintained, and our wisdom in supporting these levels.

You will appreciate that while my discussion has focused on Turkey, the same general philosophy applies in varying degrees to the total range of our military assistance programs.

Greece provides an important example. We must search diligently for more effective application of our resources, recognizing once again that highly expensive and complex modern matériel cannot be injected into the replacement stream without positive indication that the recipient country is capable of its employment and maintenance and that it is, in fact, militarily required as against simpler, less expensive items.

We need to see if we cannot, consonant with security, reduce overseas indigenous forces supported by military assistance and persuade our allies to place more reliance on our flexible nuclear capability to protect them from attack. At the same time, we must not foster tendencies on the part of our allies to let down in their support of their appropriate share of the deterrent, weaken the political foundations on which our security is based, or jeopardize the ability of ourselves and our allies to apply limited force effectively and in ways best calculated to avoid local hostilities broadening into general war.

It will not, of course, be feasible to single out any one country and impose economies by precipitate unilateral action. Instead, we must point toward phased reductions attuned to careful assessment of collective requirements under the impact of modern weapons systems. The phasing of these reductions will undoubtedly have to vary in relation to the situation in each country concerned. There are different domestic political factors involved in each case. The economic capability of each country also varies, and no standard rule can be established which would cover all. We must make a major effort to persuade those allies whose economies will not support currently programmed military establishments to give greater weight to the nuclear deterrent and get them to try to develop smaller yet more powerful forces that will meet the requirements of collective security.

To give practical expression to these ideas a program of real education will be essential. The fact that we, in the United States, must be prepared to make do with less than we have had in the past is, of course, an essential aspect of this undertaking and should serve as one convincing argument to others. If we are to help increase the military ability of our allies to perform as members of the collective security team, we may well be faced with the choice between reducing our expenditures in support of conventional contingents among the allied forces in order to increase strength in modern weapons and techniques or of reducing our expenditures for advanced weapons for our allies. The question is how we can best go about this without loss of political and military strength of our collective security arrangements. In such a choice, we believe the first alternative by far the better.

This letter is for the purpose of giving you an appreciation of the thinking in the American Government and to elicit your comments as to the soundness, from your point of view, of the objectives I have so roughly outlined. I know you are now making a study for the North Atlantic Council on the balance of nuclear and conventional forces. If you find yourself in general agreement with the thoughts herein expressed, I should like your ideas as to how we could set about a gradual correction of the existing situation. If, on the other hand, you do not agree with the contents of this letter, I should like you to give me a memorandum of your approach to the same difficult problem, bearing in mind the same “facts of life” that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter.

With warm regard,

As ever,³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1952–61. Top Secret.
2. Presumably a reference to a July 8 memorandum from Cutler to the President, entitled “NATO Approved Force Levels for Turkey”, and initialed by the President. (Ibid., Papers as President, Administration Series, Box 31, Lauris Norstad (3)) According to a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS from Cutler, the President had requested at the June 26 NSC meeting that Admiral Radford provide him with information with which he could write a letter to General Norstad concerning force levels in Turkey and other countries. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–957)
3. The source text is not signed.