36. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2232. Vienna for Ambassador Bohlen. Embassy is making tentative comments re statement proposed in Deptel 11122 but subject to Ambassador’s views if he can be reached.
Presumably would be best if we are able to defer official comments until Soviet actions provide surer guide to meaning of 20th Party Congress and of de-Stalinization movement, but presume comment unavoidable if press raises issue. Objective then would presumably be to have best impact on those areas at moment most critical to our interests, as we do not believe it feasible to formulate comments which would have universally favorable impact.
[Page 83]It is also desirable comments provide minimum opportunity to Soviets for distortion as counter-propaganda.
In Asia and Middle East there appears willingness even anxiety to believe that the new Moscow lines indicate a basic reorientation of Soviet policy having as objective a lessening of tensions which will make it easier for newly sovereign populations to pursue development of their economies in peace. These peoples must also recognize that Soviet offers of assistance give them the opportunity to bargain. Probably the Yugoslav interpretation of events is similar although much deeper since it evidently stems from a conviction the principles that Tito has been enunciating are vindicated by Soviet emulation. Therefore, if it is Asians (and Yugoslavs) whom we particularly want to impress at this time, we would suggest that the statement give particular emphasis to what might be called “promising” elements in the current developments. We also believe that “denouncing STALIN” is of secondary importance; such denouncement seems to have been necessary (although the reasons may be obscure) in order to give emphasis and meaning to the line that has been developing for some time of so-called revolutionary legality.
In sum, we would hesitate to give the impression to the Asians that we rebuff without waiting to test the sincerity of the Soviet leadership in their offers of cooperation, negotiation and aid which have certainly impressed the Indians, Burmese and Arabs.
If it is considered desirable to retain the enumeration of deeds which the Soviets could perform as proof it would seem important to include disarmament in the third paragraph. We are somewhat dubious, however, about the desirability of including the Japanese since it is quite conceivable that the Soviets, having set up inflated bargaining positions, may be preparing in the relatively near future to make some “concessions” which the Japanese would find difficult to turn down at the price of normalization of relations. Also, although from our point of view Soviet activity in the Middle East is increasing tensions, we wonder whether our referring to the matter, at least until after Hammarskjold has completed proposed mission, would have a useful effect on the Arabs.
If we wish to concentrate on Europeans it should be useful to point out that although Soviet leadership may be responding in part to the aspirations of Soviet citizens long submerged by the repression characteristic of the STALIN style of government, nevertheless what that leadership now gives, it does so unilaterally and in no way surrenders the right to take away again although barring major domestic or foreign crisis, it would appear difficult for them to return overnight to Stalinist methods. The prerogatives STALIN monopolized have been somewhat dispersed, but not dissipated, among the new governors; and if there is at present a closer identification [Page 84] between the interests of the regime and the aspirations of Soviet citizens, with consequent effect upon the method with which the regime operates, there has been no renouncement of objectives. What seems to have happened is that the regime’s conviction that communism will ultimately prevail by operation of historical forces, barring nuclear warfare, has grown deeper and its greater self-assurance permits it a more relaxed method of rule and allows it to concede greater self-determination to satellites and Communist parties abroad.
Although the new posture may in the short run cause waverers in Western Europe to waver more and permit intellectuals etc. who found it difficult to stomach STALIN to satisfy their nostalgia for Lenin and therefore to regard the Soviet Union with additional sympathy, we concur fully with draft statement to effect that these and possibly other foreign repercussions have, in the light of circumstantial evidence so far available, played secondary part in the formulation by Soviet leaders of the present line. As statement implies, internal developments, e.g. the system although beset by serious, although not critical problems, has held together and operated successfully without the all powerful hand of STALIN; vested interests, professional and economic, have contributed to regime’s stability.
Soviet people have long frustrated aspirations, seem to have been decisive in bringing the regime to its present conclusions and postures [sic]. Cutting across all of this is sobering effect of honest estimate of the nuclear equation (difficult for STALIN to reconcile with principles of infallibility and vulnerability).
In sum we would heartily agree that none more than the United States would welcome such changes provided they have cumulative favorable effect upon Soviet conduct of its relations with other countries.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–156. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Vienna. Bohlen left Moscow on March 19 to take leave in Vienna and to return to Washington for consultations. He returned to Moscow and resumed charge of the Embassy on April 24.↩
- Telegram 1112, March 31, contained a draft statement on the anti-STALIN campaign for use by the Secretary at his April 3 press conference and requested the Embassy’s comments on the statement. (Ibid., 761.00/3–3156) For text of the statement as released by Dulles at his news conference on April 3, see Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, pp. 637–638. A transcript of the news conference, during which several questions were asked regarding the Soviet Union and Khrushchev’s speech, is ibid., pp. 638–643.↩