Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

353. Memorandum of Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 14, 1957¹

Washington, March 14, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2.]

U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5510/1; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560 and 1624; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs”, dated December 5, 1956; NSC 5708; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, dated March 11, 1957²)

In the course of his briefing of the Council on the reference report (NSC 5708), Mr. Cutler summarized much of the paper, read the sections containing the Planning Board recommendations in their entirety, explained the Financial Appendix,³ and summarized the basis on which the Planning Board had arrived at its recommendations. He also pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved these recommendations. General Twining said that he had no further comments to make. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s lengthy briefing, the President said he was puzzled by the statement on page 3 that Turkey was required to maintain forces to protect her southern flank. Was she apprehensive of invasion from that quarter? Mr. Cutler and Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Turks were much alarmed over the development of Soviet influence and the build-up of forces in Syria.

Mr. Cutler then asked Acting Secretary of State Herter if he had any comments to make. Secretary Herter replied that the State Department approved the recommendations in NSC 5708, and that he had no further comments to make. He understood, however, that Mr. Hollister had some comments.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. Cutler pointed out that paragraph 4–d of NSC 5708, while it advised against using the rate of military build-up as a lever to force progress toward Turkish economic stability, did indicate that the rate of military build-up should continue to take account of Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program.

Mr. Hollister then directed the Council’s attention to paragraph 15, which indicated that economic aid of between $100 million and $200 million annually through FY 1960 would be acceptable for planning purposes. Mr. Hollister expressed strong objection to the figure of $200 million. He pointed out that $100 million annually was the most we had ever given the Turks in the past, and warned that we could not keep on adding new assistance programs if we did not make cuts elsewhere.

Secretary Wilson said that he was well aware that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt rather strongly about the need for maintaining Turkish armed forces at the levels that they had recommended. Nevertheless, Secretary Wilson believed that the Turks might well be better off with a smaller elite force. This would release other soldiers for useful activity in support of the Turkish economy. Accordingly, he thought it might be desirable to take another look at the force levels which were being maintained by Turkey.

The President pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to achieve the creation of an elite force in Turkey because of the low level of education. Mr. Cutler observed facetiously that what was lacking in Turkey were the advantages of a Harvard education. It was pointed out by other members of the Council that it was precisely this lack which made the Turkish soldiers such tough fighters. The President expressed strong agreement (laughter).

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that if changes in Turkish force levels were to be contemplated, these changes would have to be negotiated through NATO channels. He thereupon asked Mr. Hollister if he thought that paragraph 15 should be revised to indicate more precisely a U.S. objective of keeping U.S. economic assistance to Turkey at a level not exceeding $100 million annually. Mr. Hollister indicated that he certainly did think the paper should specify this, and that it ought to set forth very clearly how poorly the Turks had performed in the past with respect to their promises to undertake necessary economic and financial reforms.

General Twining indicated that he, like Secretary Wilson, had a feeling that the Turks might be able safely to make a slight reduction in the level of the armed forces they were currently maintaining.

The President stated that our policy papers on foreign assistance should state that if the countries we are assisting refuse to do anything whatever to put their own houses in order, we would have to alter our own U.S. position. Help to such countries ought to be conditioned on their willingness to do at least a little something to help themselves if the United States is footing the bill. There were a number of definite steps, continued the President, that the Turks could take in the direction of economic and financial stability. We have been pointing out these steps for years. If the Turks still refuse to take some of these steps, the President was not sure that they could be described, in the words of NSC 5708, as “staunch allies” of the United States. The revised paper on Turkey should therefore say in effect that the United States “assumes” that the Turks will take these steps.

After further discussion of this problem, the President told General Twining, who was about to see General Norstad, that he should suggest that General Norstad try to persuade the Turks to accept a lower level for their armed forces.

With respect to modifications of the present paragraph 4–d on the rate of military build-up, the President suggested wording to the effect that our military assistance program to Turkey is “based on the assumption that Turkey will make some progress” toward economic and financial stability.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed the draft report on the subject contained in NSC 5708, prepared by the NSC Planning Board; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 11, 1957.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for subsequent Council consideration a new statement of policy on Turkey,⁵ to supersede NSC 5510/1, in the light of the discussion at the meeting; with particular reference to:

(1) Prompt discussion with General Norstad as to the possibility of achieving a reduction in the NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, in phase with availability of advanced weapons to the Turkish armed forces.

(2) Provision of economic aid of not more than approximately $100 million annually, unless Turkey takes reasonable steps toward stabilizing the economy and a realistic rate of exchange.

(3) Making clear that the entire U.S. assistance program to Turkey is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward economic stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange.

[Here follow items 4–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 15.
2. Neither NSC 5610 nor 5610/1 is printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) None of the NSC Action Nos. cited here is printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action) NSC 5708, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey,” February 26, is ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708 Memoranda. The memorandum for the NSC from its Executive Secretary transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs on NSC 5708. (Ibid.)
3. Not printed.
4. Paragraphs a–b and subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1682, approved on March 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)
5. Document 359.