Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, November 14, 1956—10 p.m.

1130. For Acting Secretary Hoover and Assistant Secretary Rountree. Paris eyes only Dillon and Perkins. Reference: Embtel 1123.² Following is résumé of remarks made to me by Prime Minister Menderes noon November 14 when he handed me memo transmitted verbatim text reference telegram. Menderes spoke substantially as follows:

During our last meeting (re Istanbul telegram 365 to Department)³ we discussed my recent visit to Tehran and general situation in ME.

I have now studied situation carefully. Upon my return to Ankara, Cabinet meeting was held attended also by Turk chief of staff, Turk chief of intelligence, high officials of Foreign Office, and president GNA. We had long meeting. President Bayar presided. We discussed overall situation in light information available. We decided to make known US Government our views concerning dangers surrounding us. We decided it was serious, delicate, and important, and to send substance our views in written text (reference telegram).

Important events are unfolding around us. We need frank exchange of views with US Government. Events moving fast. Our real aim is to explain our estimate to US and to learn what US Government thinks. Our memo is for high level study in US. We eager know US views about memo, and about general ME situation. We also plan to make our views known to UK.

On November 13 Nuri Said sent me a message asking if we had any recent information and inquiring situation Turkey. We plan inform him we are in touch with US Government. Pakistani President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawahrdy will be in Baghdad November 16. Suhrawahrdy plans come Ankara November 19, after two days in Baghdad, with chief Pakistani General Staff who is good man and good friend. I plan to initiate Pakistani Prime Minister into Turkish problems. We will talk about BP and everything that has bearing on BP. I myself may go to Baghdad and return Ankara with Suhrawahrdy and Pakistani Chief of Staff. Pakistanis need encouragement. This evident even from Turkey. They are in great anxiety.

Re Syria, we are sending air force officer as courier to Damascus for four or five days. We are also sending chief of intelligence to Beirut. In addition, we may send two or three other competent Turkish officers well acquainted with situation to Lebanon and Syria, including possibly GNA Deputy who raised in Syria.

We are certain of our information re Soviet matériel shipped through Straits to Latakia (re Istanbul’s 365 to Department, paragraph 5⁴). Turkish general staff also convinced some MIGs have overflown Turkish territory. In these circumstances US must not leave Turks in obscurity.

US Government should keep Turks fully informed so that both countries may take measures which are necessary to be taken “in due time”.

We are cool-minded, studying situation with care, and of strong resolution.

Embassy Comment:

1. Memo, and Prime Minister himself on two occasions, referred to need to move “in due time”. Prime Minister is as convinced of need to avoid moving too soon or too fast as of moving too late or too slowly.

2. Specifically re memo, paragraph numbered 1, it significant that Turks state categorically further violations by Soviet planes “will be met with resistance”… We believe this current request should be given immediate and most serious consideration in Washington, and Embassy hopes US can find some appropriate way lend Turks support on this.

3. Re memo paragraph numbered 2, we request urgent and full guidance re Syria which we may use in early discussions with Turks. We surmise Turks would like enlist US support in taking “positive measures” in Syria. In this connection, memo refers to possibility conflict “perhaps in Turkey”. We believe this is guarded reference to Turkish fear Soviets may open old wounds re Hatay in order goad Syria into attempt incorporate Iskenderun strip into Syrian territory.

4. Re memo paragraph numbered 3, we request guidance re Iran similar to that requested re Syria (supra).

5. As emphasized reference telegram, and as he himself stated in concluding his remarks, Prime Minister was calm, purposeful, deliberate, serious. He was clearly aware gravity of ME situation without being overwhelmed by it. His attitude, and tenor his remarks, more than confirm my impression great value Turks as steadfast US ally this area of world.

6. … I am also convinced, subject to such safeguards as authorities in Washington may consider requisite, that we should take Turks into our confidence as fully as possible. They are committed to us unqualifiedly. It incumbent upon us to reciprocate in substantial measure.

7. By separate telegram Embassy is submitting synthesis information … re “alert measure” taken by Turkish military authorities in present crisis. These similar to measures taken by US Government and reported in Department’s circular telegram 390.⁵

8. Life Ankara and so far as we aware elsewhere Turkey continues completely normal with no sign public apprehension or ruffled calm.

Warren

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1456. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. Dated November 14. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 365, November 10, reported on a conversation between Warren and Menderes after the latter’s return from Tehran. Among the issues raised by the Prime Minister were US participation in the Baghdad Pact, the Palestine problem, the situation in Syria, and Turkey’s petroleum situation. (Ibid., 123–Warren, Fletcher)
4. Paragraph 5 reported that the Turks claimed to have seen Soviet tanks on board vessels headed for Syria.
5. Circular telegram 390, November 10, transmitted the text of a November 8 statement by a Department of Defense spokesman on the question of a worldwide alert for American military commanders. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/ 11–1056)