Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 7, 1956—9 p.m.

2007. Following are chief points interest which emerged from my conversations with Soviet leaders last night (Embtel 1993²). I will in each case identify source of information.

Internal party matters. Originally Molotov, in reply to my question, and subsequently independently Khrushchev, gave me following information as to operation of high party organs.

1. Presidium decisions are in general taken without vote but in event disagreement vote is taken with recording in the protocol of minority or even individual views. Both were emphatic on this subject and Khrushchev said in event of disagreement which cannot be ironed out in discussion a vote is “obligatory.”

2. The Secretariat is subordinate to Presidium during periods between meetings of Central Committee and has no independent status of its own. Khrushchev was again emphatic on this point and used the word “unconditionally”.

3. The RSFSR Bureau is also completely subordinate to Presidium and, according to Khrushchev, was set up for administrative reasons in order to render more orderly the conduct of party business in the RSFSR where, as he said, there were “large party organs” in Moscow, Leningrad and other areas. He said past practice had shown that the previous mechanism was inadequate to insure continuity and administration over these “big” party organizations. In this sense the position of the RSFSR in the party structure tends to approximate, although some difference still remains, that of the Union Republic.

4. Candidates to the Presidium have right to attend regular sessions of Presidium but do not do so in all cases. They have right of participation in discussion but no vote.

Taking advantage of the nature of conversation and in order to see his reaction, I told Khrushchev that there had been some press comment that he was on the way to becoming another “great leader.” His reaction was immediate and definite, although he did not appear bothered by the question. He said that this was “absolute nonsense” and “could not be” under present conditions. He said that the objective circumstances of the Soviet Union rendered this impossible. I received subsequently from Mikoyan a statement along these same lines.

I was in a discussion with Khrushchev and Malenkov together when the subject of reasons for the latter’s resignation came up. On this subject the party line was rather closely adhered to since Malenkov said that having been designated to head the group at time of STALIN’s death it was found that he did not have enough “experience.” In reply to my question on economic policy, Khrushchev admitted that certain adjustments had been necessary. In part, he said, that this was because they came to realize that disarmament was not an immediate prospect (although he did not say so I think he had German rearmament in mind), but both denied with vigor that there had been any “quarrel” between them on economic policy. Khrushchev said “Why, Georgi Malenkov is one of my closest friends”. Of all the topics discussed I felt this one was the least frank.

Subsequent to these discussions Mikoyan gave me a brief description of how business was conducted under STALIN, particularly in later years. He described these as “difficult times” and said that STALIN made decisions on his own frequently without any consultation “with any of us.” Mikoyan said this situation could not be repeated after his death and that therefore the collective principle was reinstated in the party. He said that by this procedure STALIN had abolished the principle of voting in party organs and in effect had destroyed their vitality and usefulness. On question of rewriting history, Mikoyan said “under present circumstances” it is essential that the history of Soviet Union should be rewritten in order to conform with reality, and intimated that the process might be quite far-reaching. He told me in all probability that Lenin’s testament would be public and in reply to my question he admitted the existence of a letter from Lenin to STALIN breaking off all personal relations on the Georgian question referred to by Trotsky in his biography of STALIN.

As a sidelight on attitude towards Khrushchev, at one point in conversation with Bulganin and Molotov I mentioned that I had just seen at the Indian Embassy a documentary film of the Indian trip and said that there was one very interesting picture of Khrushchev getting on an elephant, to which Molotov said “Yes, an elephant getting on an elephant.”

At another time to both my wife and myself Khrushchev said “You will understand why after the death of STALIN we had to get rid of Beria.”

In general, whenever subject was mentioned all leaders I talked with emphasized that under present conditions in Soviet Union collective leadership was the only form of rule possible but did not do so with the appearance of voicing a line concerted in advance, since in most cases they were in response to specific questions from me on one of the other aspects treated above.

I believe the foregoing will be of interest to Department, not because remarks in themselves are of such great importance, but as an illustration of the greater frankness with which these people are now talking to foreigners.

Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev spoke to me at some length on problem of disarmament, stating as already reported he felt President’s message³ had “certain positive elements” in it. I told him I thought disarmament question seemed to be in something of a chicken and an egg stage, since I am sure he realized that the US and other Western nations could not accept any agreement on disarmament until we were certain that workable and effective method of inspection and control had been developed; to do otherwise would be to take an unacceptable risk for national security. Khrushchev said that he favored control, but he thought their proposal of inspection airfields, ports, railheads, etc would provide safeguard against surprise armed attack based on his experiences in the war. I told him that development of modern weapons had changed the picture since last war and, as President indicated, combination President’s open skies proposal and Soviet plan for inspection airfields, ports, etc could form basis for an adequate inspection and control system. He reminded me of his observations to the President at Geneva⁴ and said in their view this could be culminating point of disarmament structure but that present state of mistrust in world affairs did not render it feasible. He admitted, in reply to my question, that what chiefly concerned him was possibility that aerial inspection in itself would not lead to disarmament and that when adequate photographs had been taken it might be abandoned, and repeating his Geneva observation said it was primarily an intelligence operation.

I told him I thought his fears were groundless, since that was not its intention and indeed as President stated the very institution of aerial photography would be probably the most effective means of dispelling distrust and fear of surprise attack. He repeated several times, as did subsequently Molotov and Bulganin, that the Soviet Union was deadly serious in regard to disarmament and that they felt that with genuine effort some common basis for agreement could be found. He did not repeat in this conversation the usual charges that “certain circles” in the US were blocking progress in this field, but seemed to show a realization of the complexities and difficulties of the problem.

Germany. Khrushchev and Molotov asked me if I had read recent TASS declaration on Germany,⁵ and I said that I had and that I did not find it [at] all surprising in view of the position they had taken at both Geneva conferences. Khrushchev then said he hoped that the West understood very clearly that they were “not in a position” to make any deal behind the backs and at the expense of the DDR, and that they could not and would not go along that path. Khrushchev said that the West German Government did not seem to realize this fact which had been the reason for the TASS announcement, and he expressed the view that Von Brentano was largely responsible since he had found Adenauer “more realistic” during their Moscow visit. Both repeated that the only road to unification was by direct dealings between the two Germanys.

I said I thought this provided no solution whatsoever and would merely legalize and perpetuate division of Germany, and until German unity was achieved in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the German people there could be no real tranquility or security in Europe. Neither disagreed with this statement but merely repeated that they would not sell out East German regime for any consideration and that this fact must be faced.

I gained the distinct impression that the Soviet leaders themselves had no clear policy for the future in regard to German unification and had gotten themselves into position where they had very little room for maneuver, and their problem of DDR set-up was chief obstacle. In fact, Khrushchev at one point said strategically Soviet Union had little interest in, what he rather contemptuously described as, 17 million Germans but that matter of DDR was a “political” question.

Bulganin made to me last evening what I regard as one of the best expressions of Russian Bolshevik mentality when in discussing Soviet American relations he said “You cannot escape Russian friendship.”⁶

As indicated in my previous message on this subject,⁷ while none of foregoing is new or of vital importance I hope it will be possible to keep it confidential.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–756. Secret; Limited Distribution. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this telegram was pouched to Tokyo on March 30 and to Budapest, Bucharest, and Belgrade on April 5.
2. Document 30.
3. See Document 28.
4. For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.
5. Not further identified.
6. A similar view was expressed to the first U.S. Minister to Russia, John Quincy Adams, in 1810 by Russian Chancellor Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, who said, “Our attachment to the United States, I assure you is obstinate—more obstinate than you are aware of.” (Quoted in Adams’ despatch of October 12, 1810; The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765–1815 (Washington, 1980), p. 704.)
7. Document 30.