Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

262. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 14, 1957.

THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

The Problem

On July 12, 1957, Greece submitted for the fourth time “Question of Cyprus” for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 12th session of the General Assembly. The Greek item has two parts: (a) “Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus” (the same formulation as in the Greek proposals in 1954, 1955 and 1956); and (b) “Violation of human rights and atrocities by the British colonial administration against the Cypriots”.

United States Position

1. To the extent feasible in light of other considerations influencing the order of items in the Political Committee, the United States should support and encourage efforts seeking to ensure that the Cyprus item will not be considered before the Turkish elections scheduled for October 27.

2. (a) The United States should emphasize its conviction that the only way to solve the Cyprus question is through quiet diplomacy among those parties concerned—Greece, the UK and Turkey. It should state its belief that there are various possible solutions which would protect the interests of the parties and peoples involved.

(b) The United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on the parties involved. In particular, it should urge the parties not to press any resolution which would prejudge the future status of Cyprus or which would in other ways make more difficult the renewal of negotiations and undermine the prospects for peaceful settlement. The United States may also encourage others, such as India, to exercise a moderating influence on the parties.

(c) The United States should not take the lead on this item, except where such action may be necessary to insure the success of a compromise resolution acceptable to the parties directly concerned and consequently to the United States.

3. In keeping with the above and subject to review by the Department of any specific proposal, the United States should:

(a) In general, support any resolution acceptable to all of the parties (Greece, the UK, Turkey).

(b) In particular, support a resolution along the line of the one adopted at the 11th General Assembly on the grounds that it would give the parties maximum latitude for arranging direct negotiations but would not prejudge the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem.

(c) Oppose resolutions of the type noted in paragraph 3(b) above, e.g., a resolution condemning the UK administration of Cyprus or a resolution condemning the Greeks for inciting terrorism on Cyprus, on the grounds that a solution can only be reached through an agreement between the parties involved and that such resolutions would only make an agreement more difficult to attain.

(d) Oppose any resolution providing for establishment of a good offices committee or a similar body to deal directly with the problem of Cyprus.

(e) Consult the Department concerning the position to be taken on other resolutions which might be presented.

Comment

In 1954 the General Assembly, by a vote of 49 (US, Greece, UK, Turkey)–0–11, adopted a resolution according to which it decided not to consider the item further. In 1955 the Assembly refused to inscribe the Greek item on Cyprus by a vote of 28–22–10, the US opposing inscription. This action reflected the conviction that “quiet diplomacy” offered a better prospect for the successful conclusion of the then current negotiations between the UK and Greece than General Assembly discussion. In 1956 both the United Kingdom and Greece submitted items on Cyprus, and both were included in the agenda without objection or formal vote. The Greek proposal called for self-determination for Cyprus and the British proposal was entitled “Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus”. On February 27, 1957, the General Assembly adopted an Indian compromise resolution which “expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end”. The United States supported this resolution.

While the situation on Cyprus and Anglo-Greek relations have improved somewhat, there have been no further direct negotiations. Greece took the position that the 11th GA resolution required negotiations between the British and the Cypriots, while the United Kingdom contended that the resolution was intended to cover not only such negotiations but also negotiations among the three governments concerned, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

However, some progress has been made. The British Government has released Archbishop Makarios from his exile in the Seychelles Islands, and violence on Cyprus has largely subsided. The Secretary General of NATO, Paul Henri Spaak, offered his good offices to the three governments concerned but has so far been unsuccessful in bringing about a resumption of negotiations under the aegis of NATO.

Meantime there has been a helpful modification of the British position. The United Kingdom has expressed a willingness to surrender its sovereignty over Cyprus if a mutually acceptable solution can be reached and has reduced its minimum conditions to (1) essential military facilities to remain under British sovereignty, (2) protection of Cyprus from Communist infiltration, and (3) establishment of peace and tranquillity on the island as a whole. Greece now appears willing to consider “guaranteed independence” or dominion status for Cyprus. Turkey continues to favor partition but might shift its position in the absence of British support.

In August the United Kingdom through diplomatic channels proposed a tripartite conference including the three governments, with the United States and M. Spaak to attend in the capacity of observers. The British proposal contemplates a conference on the ultimate status of the island. There would be no fixed agenda. Spaak immediately agreed to attend as an observer, and later the United States reluctantly concurred. Turkey reacted favorably but indicated it could not attend the conference until after the Turkish elections which are scheduled for October 27. Greece rejected the British proposal but qualified its answer in such a way as to permit reconsideration of its position. Moreover, at British initiative arrangements have been made for secret informal talks in London between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States continues to believe that the best prospect for a satisfactory solution lies in quiet diplomacy involving direct negotiations among the parties. Debate of the item in the General Assembly would probably not be helpful and could exacerbate the existing situation. Consequently, the United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on any debate in the General Assembly in the hope of facilitating a return to direct negotiations and should encourage others, such as India, to do likewise. It is clear that Greece is determined to press the question of Cyprus in the General Assembly in the hope that discussion there will strengthen its own position in any future negotiations.

Discussion of the Cyprus question prior to or concurrently with the Turkish elections would only serve to make the Turkish position at the Assembly more inflexible and to inflame popular passions in Turkey. It would therefore be desirable to delay substantive discussion of the issue until after the Turkish elections.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1457, Secret. Drafted by Shaw, Sisco, and Brown and attached to a brief covering memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles.