252. Editorial Note
The Embassy in London replied to Tosec 7 (supra) in telegram 886, August 2. Regarding parts a, b, c, and d of paragraph 4 of Tosec 7, the Embassy: 1) noted that the British proposal was a tactical maneuver connected with the General Assembly; 2) noted that Macmillan and Lloyd had assured Dulles that the British would not “tint” the conference with a commitment to Turkey; 3) reported that the British regarded military facilities on Cyprus as a way to protect the right flank of NATO, coordinate with Baghdad Pact planning, stabilize the area, and keep Cyprus in the free world; and 4) noted that, regarding British intentions, the Foreign Office indicated that it would approach the conference with an “open but not empty mind”. Regarding the question of United States participation in the conference, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office would be pleased if the United States were to attend, but that it appreciated United States reluctance. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–257)
In Polto 314 from Paris, August 2, the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to NATO noted that it would ideally like to see the conference postponed as it would “almost certainly” aggravate an already bad situation. Instead it suggested that the British, with assistance from the United States and Spaak, should continue to press forward with secret bilateral talks with the Greeks and the Turks. (Ibid.)
In telegram 283 from Ankara, August 1, the Embassy noted, regarding paragraph 6 (a) of Tosec 7, that it believed the advantages to be gained from United States attendance at the proposed conference as an observer outweighed the disadvantages. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–157)
In telegram 350 from Athens, July 31, the Embassy noted that the United States should not commit itself so firmly at this stage to [Page 488] support the British proposal for a tripartite meeting that “we will be obliged either to press Greeks to point where our potential effectiveness vis-à-vis GOG is seriously prejudiced or on the other hand to back away from our support and thus lead British to accuse us of letting them down.” (Ibid., 747C.00/7–3157)
In telegram 24 from Nicosia, August 1, the Consulate General commented that the United States should participate in the conference with Spaak as an observer. (Ibid., 747.00/8–157)