Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

250. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Caccia) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, July 25, 1957¹

Washington, July 25, 1957

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

The Ambassador called to leave with the Secretary the attached “oral communication” concerning a United Kingdom plan on the Cyprus problem.²…

In leaving this document, the Ambassador made the following supplemental remarks. The Cyprus problem had now entered a critical stage and it was of the utmost importance that efforts be undertaken speedily to arrive at a compromise solution. The present United Kingdom approach was prompted by the belief that it was necessary first to arrive at an agreement on the ultimate status of the island; within that framework the internal problems of self-rule could then be negotiated with the Cypriots. In the past, the problem of self-rule had been approached first; these efforts had failed, in part because of Greek Government support of the Greek Cypriots; there was, therefore, more hope for effective self-rule negotiations with the Cypriots if the Greek Government first became a party to an agreement on the ultimate status. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of United States influence and expressed the hope that we would use this not only to get the parties together for the proposed meeting but to have them approach the meeting with a reasonable spirit of compromise. This was particularly important in the case of the Greeks, who undoubtedly would not attend without United States encouragement. No public announcement concerning the meeting was intended and the proposed discussions with the Greek and the Turkish Governments would be on a confidential basis. It was the United Kingdom’s hope that the time between now and the meeting in September could be used to consider carefully with the United States the various possible solutions. In that connection he expressed the hope that these discussions might be held in London. He also pointed out that after the Suez experience the “essential military facilities” mentioned in the document would now be quite small and should present no problem.

The Secretary said the United Kingdom plan would be studied by the Department. He asked if there was any reason to hope that the Greeks would attend, recalled the past Greek attitude toward such a meeting, and observed that it probably would be very difficult for the United States to prevail upon Greece to participate without assurances of support that we were not in a position to give because of the interests of our Turkish ally in this same problem. The Secretary also noted the importance of there being no public announcement about this plan and took under advisement the suggestion that the proposed United States–United Kingdom discussions be held in London.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2557. Secret. Drafted by Jones.
2. The “oral communication,” dated July 24, not printed, proposed a plan in which Great Britain would invite representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference in London in September. According to the plan, the United States and Secretary General Spaak would be invited as observers. The conference would have no fixed agenda and might discuss “without prejudice every solution so far mooted.” The “only fixed requirement[s]” the British plan proposed, on which any solution must be based, were: essential military facilities under British control; protection of the island from Communist infiltration; and ensuring peace of the island. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–2457)