Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, April 16, 1957—4:10 p.m.

7312. In view heavy Turk pressure (Ankara’s 2324 and others²) to obtain more definitive US–UK views on future Cyprus, suggest London consult with HMG and indicate that we have given GOT preliminary reply (Deptel 2353 to Ankara³), and that we plan to have Amb. Warren discuss matter further upon his return Ankara April 22.⁴ We feel, despite excitement being generated, GOT’s Aide-Mémoire (Ankara’s 2290⁵) provides useful basis for further discussion by way of follow up to Deptel 2220⁶ to Ankara. Unless HMG has serious objections, we plan present following views to GOT orally stating at that time that we have also discussed with HMG without indicating HMG’s reaction to Turks. For the present we do not plan similar approach to GOG. We would, however, plan keep both Ismay and Spaak informed generally. Until we have first exchanged views with HMG, we would prefer hold matter closely between our two Governments.

This proposed approach to GOT will be designed primarily to indicate that US now seriously doubts whether either enosis or partition would prove to be peaceful or practical solutions and that US now believes that either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy serious consideration. Within context Deptel 2220 we have in mind developing these further views along following lines:

Any change in status Cyprus must be accomplished gradually if there is to be a peaceful solution. It would not appear practical in present tense situation and in view Cypriots’ relative inexperience in governing themselves, to pass directly to some form self-determination without providing for predetermined period of self-government, such a period would afford Cypriots opportunity to assume increased measure of responsibility for their own affairs and might also permit present tensions to cool.

Because self-government would appear best prelude to any final solution, it follows that representatives of Island’s communities should negotiate with HMG on mutually acceptable form self-government, since responsibility for achieving successful self-government will rest largely with Cypriots. The choice of these representatives should be left to members of Cypriot communities.

It seems unlikely Cypriots will agree on self-government as interim solution unless they have fairly clear conception eventual status Island. Concurrently, therefore, with these negotiations between HMG and representatives Cypriot communities, future status Cyprus might appropriately be explored within NATO framework. These explorations might possibly lead to a treaty whereby within a fixed term of years there would be a plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. NATO negotiations should be secret and insofar as possible, seriatim.

Obviously eventual status Cyprus can only be finally settled by agreement between parties directly concerned. However, reestablishment good relations between GOT and GOG is matter of primary concern not only to both Governments, but to all Free World. At the present time, either enosis or partition would appear to be counterproductive to reestablishment good relations. Enosis would in the foreseeable future seriously exacerbate Turk-Greek relations. Partition would appear do the same. It would also pose grave and perhaps permanent political and economic problems on Cyprus. Both Turk and Greek communities are fairly evenly distributed throughout Island. It would seem almost impossible divide Cyprus equitably, would certainly require major population transfer and would leave in its wake bitterness and resentments among entire Cypriot population.

A solution promising more hope for improved Turk-Greek relations might be that of offering Cypriots, after fixed period self-government, choice between independence within British Commonwealth and independence outside Commonwealth. In either case there would be a treaty signed by interested and friendly nations, as well as Government of Cyprus as then constituted, whereby Cyprus would be independent and would not become part of any other nation without full consent of the parties most intimately concerned. (FYI UK, Greece, Turkey and Cypriots. End FYI)

Any solution should recognize British sovereignty over bases on Cyprus needed for Free World defense.

GOT would be informed that foregoing views are advanced within context of frequently stated desire of both GOT and USG to have frank exchange of views. The further views of GOT would be welcomed.

After soliciting HMG’s views on foregoing approach, Embassy London should also suggest HMG seriously consider bringing Cypriot leaders to London for negotiations on self-government. Release of Makarios was certainly difficult step. If he now remains too long in Athens, situation may become increasingly rigid and opportunity provided by his release may be lost.

Athens: Ambassador Allen may wish urge on Makarios that having been released, he should indicate willingness promptly go to London for negotiations.

Comment addressee posts requested soonest without consultation except in London (and Athens only as stated in preceding paragraph).

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–957. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones and Wood. Also sent to Athens, Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.
2. In telegram 2324, April 9, the Embassy reported that the failure of the United States to respond to the recent Turkish démarche on Cyprus “could be misinterpreted by Turks as evidencing some degree USG acquiescence in whatever tactics Turkey may decide employ in Cyprus issue.” (Ibid.) The démarche was made on April 8 by Birgi to Frederick B. Lyon, at Ankara. According to Lyon, Birgi noted that there was “increased tension” among the Turkish people over Cyprus and that the government might not be able to prevent “disturbances”. Birgi also indicated that his government felt compelled to issue a statement concerning Greek “insincerity and unfairness”. (Telegram 2308, from Ankara, April 8; ibid., 747C.00/4–857)
3. See Document 238.
4. Warren was in the United States for consultation.
5. See Document 238.
6. Ibid.