215. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 19561
SUBJECT
- Radcliffe Proposals for Constitution for Cyprus
In his call on the Secretary today, the Greek Ambassador severely criticized the Radcliffe proposals for a constitution for Cyprus, terming them a “mockery” and “very sad”. He said that on instructions from his Prime Minister he wished to ask the Secretary to reconsider the apparent intention of the Department to issue a statement that might be construed in any way as favorable to the proposals.
In reply, the Secretary said that we must make some kind of statement. However, he assured the Greek Ambassador that whatever statement we made would be kept on a very low key. The Secretary added that we had hoped that the Greek Government would not feel it necessary to reject the Radcliffe proposals out of hand. When the Ambassador retorted that they had studied them fully, the Secretary replied that the proposals could not have been given very much study since the Foreign Minister had told him last week almost immediately after the proposals had been received that Greece could not accept them. The Secretary added that he thought in such matters as these the [Page 440] test was often in the administration of a constitution. He also thought that in the Radcliffe proposals there was at least a basis to ask for further clarification. The Secretary was sorry that the Creeks had felt they had to reject them so hastily without seeking that clarification.
The Greek Ambassador responded by again denouncing the proposals as offering a “phony constitution”.
The Secretary advised him that in these matters the important thing was to get the momentum started or, in other words, to get a foot in the door of independence. The Secretary also referred to the British Government’s present difficult situation which must be recognized as a fact that did not provide a good climate for a Cyprus solution. Referring again to the possibility of a public statement, the Secretary agreed that we might be able to postpone it until further Greek views were presented, but he reiterated to the Ambassador that some sort of statement would have to be made. It was suggested that we could hold off for at least a day or two. The Secretary further said that he would like to see more analyses—both Greek and our own—of the Radcliffe proposals.
In reply to a question from the Secretary regarding our study of the proposals Mr. Williams stated that we had made an analysis and had found some features which were good and others not so good such as the fact that the whole matter of education seemed to be entirely in the Governor’s hands.2 In general we felt that a great deal would depend upon the manner of administration.
In leaving, Mr. Melas undertook to obtain promptly from his Government its further views regarding the statement we felt impelled to make.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2156 Confidential. Drafted by Williams.↩
- In a December 21 memorandum to Dulles, Rountree noted that the Radcliffe proposals included only draft recommendations for a constitution. The British would retain full control over external affairs, internal security, and defense. Greek Cypriots would have an elected majority in the legislature. Rountree added that the proposals did not discuss self-determination. (Ibid.) A study prepared by the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa on the Radcliffe proposals is attached to a memorandum from J.D. lams to Wood, December 19. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–1956)↩
- On December 19, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London that the British Foreign Secretary had requested that the United States issue a public statement expressing support for the Radcliffe proposals. The British believed that such a statement would assist Greece with respect to public opinion in taking a position of greater flexibility vis-à-vis the proposals. Although the Department noted that its estimate of the situation was “less sanguine” it instructed the Embassy to inform the Greek Government that the U.S. Government felt obliged to issue a statement that in its view the Radcliffe proposals offered an opportunity “to take important step in direction of self-government and eventual peaceful and satisfactory solution Cyprus problem.” The Department added that it believed it would be against the interests of all parties for the proposals to be “summarily” rejected. (Telegram 2329 to Athens, December 19; ibid.) In telegram 2246 from Athens, December 20, Allen, in reply to telegram 2329, noted that if the United States issued a statement supporting the Radcliffe proposals at this time, Karamanlis would “very probably” resign. (Ibid.,747C.00/12–2056)↩