Office of the Historian

213. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1

Paris, December 14, 1956—9 a.m.

Secto 20. (Telegram based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.)2

During meeting with Secretary December 13 Menderes and Birgi discussed Cyprus at length. Menderes asserted some solution must be found to avoid debate in United Nations which could only make situation more complicated and perhaps more dangerous. Secretary said he had received today copy of Radcliffe constitution and understood Greeks and Turks had also. Constitution did not prejudge issue of self-determination and he hoped Turkey would find it an acceptable basis to get over present crisis. Menderes insisted that question of self-determination must be settled now. If left open it would only cause trouble for future and Turkish people would think Greece had received gift. … He stressed importance of Cyprus to security of Turkey. Turkey could accept Radcliffe proposal as draft provided it understood at same time that when self-determination implemented it would be through partition. He thought British desire for haste in making public statement on constitution would only create added difficulties…. Said he recognized that constitution could not be total solution. He stressed importance of immediate proposal. Said he hoped Turkey could look favorably now at Radcliffe constitution leaving partition for future. Menderes replied he would consider matter.

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Secretary gave Menderes copy of Department reply to Turkish memorandum (Deptel 2210 to Paris3). Said Turkey could count on United States taking more active part in Middle East and making its presence more felt than before. Had just issued firm statement on Baghdad Pact. Did not exclude possibility adherence to Pact at some later time but question of ratification by Senate posed difficulties. Although no decision had been reached we considering joint congressional resolution giving President authority to use our forces in area. We would like to see Saudi Arabia in area grouping since confident King Saud anti-Communist, anti-Nasser and willing work with UN. King in difficult position and to some extent unable to do all he would like. Menderes also thought Saudi Arabia with West but in difficult position. He described instability in Arab countries with Syria almost Soviet satellite. He said must express again his deep conviction that if United States joined Baghdad Pact, it would bring tranquillity to area and greater safety.

Menderes referred to Nehru’s coming visit to United States.4 He described Nehru as able but most dangerous man, champion of Baghdad Pact opponents and intent on isolating Pakistan.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1456. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia.↩
  2. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 181.↩
  3. Printed as telegram 1339, Document 352.↩
  4. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Washington December 16–20.↩