Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

211. Memorandum From the President’s Special Representative (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Report on Cyprus Mission

Pursuant to instructions contained in Department’s top secret telegram 907 to Paris, September 8,² and oral instructions received from the Secretary in London on September 21, I undertook to explore the positions of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus dispute. Cables which I sent from Missions abroad contain a record of my discussions and this memorandum-report will be brief. I visited London three times; Athens twice; and Ankara once.

The Suez crisis occurred in the midst of these conversations and was, in my opinion, the principal element which handicapped progress. It is now clear that at the time of my first substantive discussion with the British³ the decision had already been taken to intervene with the French in Egypt, and they were unwilling to discuss Cyprus which was their base for the military operation.

My estimate of the positions of the three disputants follows:

The controlling factor in the British attitude is that the members of the Government have been giving their undivided attention to the Middle East situation and have not put their minds to the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. The Radcliffe Constitution and report have been completed and transmitted to HMG. At the time of my departure from London on November 14, they had not yet been considered by Ministers. The question of when a constitution for Cyprus would be promulgated had not been decided nor had the proposal to consult the Greeks and Turks about the constitution been considered. This indecision was brought about not only by preoccupation with Egypt but also by the absence of Ministers, Nutting’s resignation, etc … I believe, however, that such a settlement would not commend itself to HMG except as a last resort.

…When I got down to specifics with Karamanlis and Averoff, …. they did give me a proposal which I was authorized to present to the British and which might have served as the beginning of a negotiation had the British felt able to make a counteroffer. Although the Greeks appear willing to settle for self-government now with the question of self-determination put off to the future, they would insist on some definite commitment that the principle of self-determination would be applied to Cyprus at some time. I think there is no doubt that, although the Greeks are prepared to take a reasonable attitude for the time being, there is no doubt of their ambition to incorporate Cyprus into Greek sovereignty. I have the impression that Karamanlis now feels that he has the British at a disadvantage because of the criticism leveled at the UK for its action in Egypt.

I found the Turks, particularly the Prime Minister, considerably less intransigent than their previous utterances had led us to believe. Although much less adamant in their statements, I found them unwilling to agree to any formula of self-government accompanied by anything that resembled a commitment with regard to self-determination for the future. Even the suggestion of the mildest kind of statement which might be made by the UK was immediately construed as being “only a corridor to Enosis”….

Although there is no specific progress toward agreement to report, I believe that certain favorable results have emerged from my conversations.

(1) Relations between British and Greeks and Greeks and Turks had become so strained that there had been no recent attempt to approach agreement. They all, particularly the Greeks and Turks, were pleased at this informal attempt on the part of the United States to be of assistance and as a consequence spoke quite freely. I feel that all three of the Governments involved now understand the attitudes of the other much better than previously.

(2) The fact that the Secretary had sent a special representative to discuss the Cyprus question impressed the Turks particularly, and I believe was influential in softening their attitude.

(3) There is some prospect of an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations as an agreement has been reached for a secret meeting between the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris where Averoff will stop on his return to Athens from the General Assembly in New York.

(4) As a result of this mission, it is reasonable to expect that none of the disputants will take any radical action without consultation with us.

(5) I think that this mission contributed to the calming of positions at the UN and that we may reasonably expect that debate on the Cyprus issue will be postponed until toward the end of the General Assembly,⁴ thus giving additional time to try for a negotiated solution.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1956. Top Secret.
2. Document 194.
3. See Document 198.
4. On March 13, 1956, Greece requested that the General Assembly place the Cyprus issue on the agenda at its Eleventh Session. On October 12, the United Kingdom requested that an item entitled, “Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus”, be placed on the Assembly’s agenda. On November 14, the following item was placed on the General Assembly agenda: “Question of Cyprus: (a) Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus; (b) Complaint by the United Kingdom of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus.”
5. Hoover responded to Holmes in a letter of December 1 that he found this memorandum a useful and timely summation of the situation and that this difficult problem deserved all the attention Holmes could give it. (Attached to a memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, November 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/ 11–2956)