Office of the Historian

201. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary’s Office, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, October 7, 1956, 7:30 p.m.1

New York, October 7, 1956, 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

  • US Side:
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Lodge
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Tyler
  • UK Side:
    • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
    • Sir Pierson Dixon
    • Mr. Coulson, British Embassy
    • Two Other Advisers

Mr. Lloyd said that although it had been possible to defeat inscription of the Cyprus item last year, he thought that this year would probably not be possible.

[Page 416]

The Secretary agreed and said that it looked as though that would be the case. Mr. Lloyd said that if the battle for inscription were lost this would hamper the prospects for peace. Therefore, the UK intended to put forward a counter-item, which would be directed against the Greek broadcasts and Greek help to terrorists. He said that while the UK did not want “a public wrangle” on the subject, he hoped that each item would cancel the other out and that this would discourage the Greek Government from pressing its item. The title of the item the UK had in mind was “Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus”.

Ambassador Lodge questioned this title which suggested that the Greek Government was being indicted.

The Secretary suggested something like “Support from Greeks of terrorist activities in Cyprus”. He said that the US is satisfied that the present Karamanlis government is sick to death of the Cyprus business. At the same time it is subject to pressure by Greek public opinion. He did not exclude the possibility that something might be worked out between now and the time at which the General Assembly convened which might lead to a settlement. But if an item were inscribed under an inflammatory title it would place the Greek Government in a position vis-à-vis Greek public opinion where the Greek Government would have no freedom of action. He, therefore, hoped that the UK would find a title which would not inflame them. He understood the reasons why the UK might feel compelled to put forward a counter-item but suggested that if they had to do so it might be something like “Support from without Greece of illegal activities within Cyprus”.

Mr. Lloyd questioned whether the US was psychologically right in its estimate of the situation. He thought that perhaps the prospects for a settlement would be improved if we seemed prepared “to beat Greeks over the head”.

The Secretary repeated that it was our view that the present Greek Government is sick of the whole Cyprus business and was groping desperately to find a way to settle matters. … He questioned the advisability of publicly appearing to challenge a government’s integrity and honor.

Mr. Lloyd said he was inclined to agree and suggested another variant: “Support from overseas of terrorism in Cyprus”. This, he said, would not be provocative and would leave the Greeks concerned about what might be said. After a little further discussion with his advisors, Mr. Lloyd said he would suggest to London the formula: “External support for terrorism in Cyprus”. He added that he would see what support he could get for the above title from London.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.001/10–756. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. Dulles and Lloyd were in New York to attend a Security Council meeting on the Suez Canal situation.↩