Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

192. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Procedure for Dealing with Cyprus Question

Background

This paper is an attempt to evaluate the basic factors and probable development of the Cyprus question as affecting the United States and NATO and to assess whether there is any useful action which the United States should take.

Discussion

A. Present Situation

The United States as the leader of NATO is witnessing a dispute which for a year has made real cooperation between two NATO members and a third member impossible. It has weakened NATO internally and has also weakened outside respect for NATO as a cohesive group.

The differing positions of the three members have become so hardened by mutual mistrust and by mutual public condemnation that agreement is unlikely without outside assistance. Certainly the history of the Cyprus question for the past two and a half years shows steady deterioration. A permanent improvement is unlikely unless these countries are helped to reestablish contact, discussion and some understanding. For the past year there have been no useful discussions between Greece and the United Kingdom or Turkey. Even if the British are now able to restore order and to offer a fair constitution, it is unlikely that the Cypriots would accept it without considerable encouragement from Greece. Greece and Turkey almost certainly cannot extricate themselves from their present public positions and assume more useful roles in finding a solution without an active display of American interest. All this would be worsened by a third and more vehement quarrel in the U.N. General Assembly.

B. Possible U.S. Role

Thus the Cyprus situation will almost certainly not be improved unless the U.S., as the leading power in NATO, assumes a more active role in bringing its allies together. The following considerations would bear upon the decision as to what the United States might do:

1. Both the British and Greek Governments are under pressure to achieve some form of settlement and seem to desire a settlement.

2. The Turkish position has hardened since the United States has been less active in recent months and as the Greek attitude has become more flexible. Turkish realism would probably dictate a less intransigent attitude if faced by joint US-UK proposals for a reasonable settlement which would take into account Turkish interest in and sensitivity over the matter.

3. The general feeling among all NATO members that the difficulties emanating from this relatively small island should be settled could probably be turned to good account.

Experience has demonstrated that the mere dispatch of messages to the several parties in the dispute is not an effective means of dealing with the matter. It is also clear that a meeting of the three powers would probably be counterproductive and would lead to highly publicized intemperate oratory. It would seem in the circumstance that the United States should designate an experienced officer to go to London, Athens and Ankara to have talks quietly and informally.

This officer should seek to find and widen such common ground as may form the basis for a solution. He should report on his findings before committing U.S. prestige to any major understandings. He should avoid publicity and for this purpose a NATO cover might be useful.

The officer will see that the two main focuses of dispute have been (a) the Greek and Cypriot demand for immediate self-government for the island and (b) the Greek and Cypriot desire for self-determination. (There is little real dissension on continued use of British bases.) Of the two, the issue of self-determination is the more difficult since the Turkish Government has taken a strong stand against it. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister has publicly recognized that the principle of self-determination is applicable to Cyprus under certain circumstances. Our own position is defined by the President’s letter to Karamanlis (Tab A²) stating that “the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice” (Joint Declaration of Washington) is applicable to Cyprus. The Greek Government, moreover, has indicated its willingness to put settlement of this matter aside for ultimate disposition by the British and Cypriots or by NATO. It may be possible with U.S. assistance to reduce to manageable proportions the emotions involved in the self-determination issue.

On the issue of self-government, our negotiator will find considerable common ground. The U.K. already has asked Lord Radcliffe to draft a constitution. The Greek Prime Minister has said that requirements for a solution are a liberal constitution and amnesty for the revolutionaries. If the British can expedite the promulgation of a liberal constitution with a minimum of power reserved to the British Governor, our representative may find that the Greeks can be persuaded to accept such a solution. The Greeks, moreover, may come to see that the gap between a full measure of self-government and self-determination is not great. As for the Cypriots, there is reason to believe that Greek influence over the Cyprus Ethnarchy may now be sufficient to obtain acceptance and to bring an end to the current violence. The Turks, we believe, should be urged by us to agree on at least two important grounds: (a) that self-government has now become a cardinal principle of British colonial policy, from which there should be no exception in the case of Cyprus; and (b) that self-government is a right that can hardly be denied in the free world which the Atlantic Community protects. It must, of course, be recognized that Turkish agreement regarding self-government would depend upon the nature of the protection afforded to the Turkish minority.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recommendations:

In sum, the present impasse may result not so much from the absence of a common ground for a settlement as from the absence of a channel through which the parties can privately explore a solution without the obstruction of public confrontation and popular demagogy. We, therefore, recommend:

1. that an experienced officer be designated to explore this problem unobtrusively in London, Athens, and Ankara with a view to discovering or tactfully inducing sufficient common ground to produce an acceptable solution;

2. that Mr. Julius Holmes be the officer designated for this mission.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–456. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Rountree on September 1.
2. Not found attached, but printed as Document 161.
3. A notation on the source text by Rountree indicates that Dulles approved this memorandum.