176. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
5818. Eyes only for Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd called me to FonOff today and advised for your strictly confidential information, since he said he was not authorized by his colleagues to do so, that the Cabinet has approved proposed next step on Cyprus forecast in my telegram 5803.2 However, there was one significant change in procedure, namely that British approach to Turks would be undertaken before you had an opportunity to comment. Cabinet felt that you might prefer not to be associated with the approach to the Turks and thus be in a position to deny foreknowledge. Lloyd was concerned that this procedural development might be contrary to promise he had given me that no steps would be taken without first receiving US comments. It was of course one of main purposes my conversation reported Embtel 5803 to head off British action without reference to Washington. On other hand he did make clear on that occasion that views he was expressing and the substance of the proposal were yet to be determined by cabinet.
Only substantive addition to proposed statement resulting from Cabinet meeting appears to be that, in addition to other stipulated conditions for eventual transfer sovereignty, it would also be provided that a security treaty relating to the island would be concluded [Page 367] between the British, Greeks and Turks. This designed assure Turks that they would ultimately have major say in transfer together with UK and Greece.
British Ambassador Ankara has been instructed to raise proposed statement with Turks today, and if he is successful in reaching them, British anticipate instructing Makins to see you tomorrow. With regard to British course in the event of a strongly adverse Turkish reaction, Lloyd said that he anticipates the Turks may “go through the roof”. If they do so, British will, as forecast Embtel 5803, revise statement to omit section on self-determination. However, before making such revision they will wish to take into account estimate of British Ambassador in Ankara, on whose judgment they rely heavily. If he really considers statement on self-determination would result in Turkish withdrawal from NATO, statement will be revised. Lloyd’s attitude implied, however, that if the Turkish reaction seems likely to entail almost anything less drastic than withdrawal, British will proceed with statement as now contemplated.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1856. Secret; Priority.↩
- In telegram 5803, June 15, Aldrich reported that during a meeting with Lloyd he had learned of a proposed British approach on the Cyprus problem. The British planned to make a public statement on Cyprus that would indicate they were prepared to proceed with the formulation of a constitution and that Lord Radcliffe was ready to travel to Cyprus for that purpose. Aldrich reported that the constitution would provide a bicameral legislature with the first chamber on a proportional basis according to population and the second divided equally between Greeks and Turks. Unless the Turkish reaction to the proposal was so negative as to make it completely unacceptable, Aldrich continued, the British planned to indicate that after a suitable period, possibly 10 years, they might refer the matter to NATO to discuss whether transfer of sovereignty of the island, if approved by a plebiscite, would be “strategically feasible.” (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1556)↩