Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

430. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 15, 1957—6 p.m.

1523. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC. After well-nigh disastrous agreement December 28 between Souvanna and Souphanouvong which included coalition, our tactics as stated Embtel 1018² were to (1) delay adoption agreements; (2) create doubts and reservations; and (3) if possible defeat it. Today National Assembly closed (Embtel 1519³) without government having been able present agreement based on December 28 communiqué. Thus, this chapter in Laos has just come to close.

Turning points in struggle were return of Katay January 10, decision British locally string along with US, conversion of Phoui Sananikone and, latterly, staunch assist from Communists themselves in pushing for ChiCom aid as condition to settlement. Much credit due key Lao also, especially as future looks to them uncertain and dangerous.

While one chapter has closed, no grounds for complacency. Mixed commissions remain and so does Souphanouvong, who is quite attractive and persuasive figure. With Petsarath’s return in about week, three brothers will at last be reunited. The two younger have no doubt both fastened their hopes in older, who is a commanding figure. It will be imperative prevent if possible Petsarath from committing himself prematurely before he has sounded more responsible Lao opinion.

Despite dangers we foresee, there may be only limited opportunity for actual negotiations next two months. Former head of political commission, Ngon Sananikone, has gone Paris, new head Nou-Ing leaves late March for US as leader grantee. We hear rumors Petsarath wishes tour all twelve provinces soon after arrival, and Souvanna is again talking of trip Europe and US late April early May.

According unconfirmed … reports … Souvanna in secret session Assembly yesterday reviewed negotiations along lines undelivered letter to Souphanouvong (Embtel 1448⁴). Re failure negotiations he asked Assembly whether PL or RLG at fault. Assembly answered PL. More important, Souvanna himself spoke in terms critical of PL, placing blame on them rather than on foreigners who interfered. Allegedly he also said Laos could not afford alienate its western friends. Be that as it may, his attitude has changed materially, although I do not doubt he still dreams of national unity to be accomplished by Petsarath if not by himself. This incidentally would constitute family hegemony.

At one point in Assembly yesterday … Souvanna reportedly said he would step down when Assembly met again May 11 if agreement with PL had not been reached. Both Phoui and Bong rose to protest against this. Souvanna asked Assembly to tell him if it saw other avenues open to PL settlement.

As already reported (Embtel 1506⁵) Souvanna worried actual rupture with PL would lead to resumption hostilities. Best military assessment (including talks with Kou Prasith, Director Defense Department and Colonel Ouan, Chief of Staff) indicates no great apprehension at present, but movement on PL lines of communication is into Laos not out as in November–December. This suggests PL do not expect early agreement and are settling in again for long pull. In fact, I believe failure PL to capitalize on opportunity they had in January may well have been due to belief Viet Minh and HICOM that Lao cadres not well enough indoctrinated to carry on as hardcore party after entry PL into national community. In other words, Communists as well as we may find Lao hard to activate.

With Souvanna, whatever his motives, shifting ground somewhat, and with position we have developed on behind-scenes basis with other Lao leaders, it is timely watch for opportunities play constructive and positive role. This means above all that administration of aid problems relating to import program and exchange stabilization must be tackled seriously if our operations here in those fields are to support and not hamper our policy. While we will try develop recommendations more practicable from Washington viewpoint than those which have repeatedly been turned down, I hope Washington agencies fully aware key importance these problems which so closely related to survival of Laos. As immediate constructive move I continue favor common declaration developed from US and UK texts and concur fully in reasoning presented by Yost in points 1 to 3 Paris telegram 4722 to Department.⁶

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Ottawa, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Manila, Djakarta, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
2. See footnote 3, Document 410.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1557)
4. According to telegram 1448 from Vientiane, March 6, the Royal Government insisted in this letter on the guarantees of dissolution of the Pathet Lao movement, submission of Pathet Lao forces, and Royal Government civil administration of the two northern provinces, as well as refusal by Laos to entertain the idea of aid from Peking. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1657)
5. Dated March 13, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1357)
6. In telegram 4722, March 14, the Embassy suggested that, in order to dispel doubts, the common declaration should be identical if not joint; that it must be public; and that the British draft was a good starting point. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1556) For a draft of the common declaration, see the attachment to the memorandum, infra.