Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 14, 1957—noon.

1513. Department pass Defense, ICA, USIA.

I. My 1391² put forth preliminary and personal thoughts re our approach to possible contingency RLG–PL negotiations had broken down and US expected come up with positive alternative course. As part of broader framework of general positive program for Laos, combined US agencies have at my request come to agreement, as first step, on recommended political posture in contingency of breakdown or, as appears more probable, semi-suspension. This is not addressed to situation of settlement; assumption is latter would be through some form of coalition, thus entailing US reappraisal. Neither does it enter into broader field of US role in economic, social and administrative aspects of question, which presumably must in large part cover twin contingencies of coalition or breakdown. Outline which follows covers (a) RLG position vis-à-vis PL which would be acceptable to US, (b) US relation to such position. Outline follows.

A. In event negotiations broken off, or indefinitely suspended, US would be prepared support RLG internal position on following lines:

1. In line January 7 ICC resolution giving practical interpretation Geneva Agreement, RLG is lawful sovereign and cannot allow PL foster two-equal-parties concept, nor subscribe their premature unconstitutional entry into government.

2. Within that framework, RLG stands for peaceful reunification and will always leave door open to resumption negotiations. Meanwhile, RLG:

(a) Proclaims intent continue respect cease-fire as long as PL do so.

(b) Welcomes all Lao of good faith, offers amnesty and freedom from reprisals all who wish shake off VM yoke and rally to national community. Honorable future guaranteed; designated reception points, resettlement facilities, etc.

3. RLG prepared engage in intensified program of national unity through peace, intensified civic action, economic and cultural development, medical assistance programs in ten provinces, special projects each province and in those parts of two provinces loyal to RLG. Special attention to those loyal provinces now underdeveloped in respect to rest (e.g., Attopeu). (Would also give special attention to provinces adjacent Phong Saly and Sam Neua, for showcase value.)

4. RLG prepared step up measures for internal stability and security in all its territory, to limit and diminish foreign Communist subversion and build up strong and independent Laos.

5. Door being always open, RLG stands ready renegotiate with any group of PL leaders who willing and able throw off foreign yoke, stand up for national rights of Lao brothers in foreign-dominated territory, and return to national community on same terms as did Lao Issara in 1949. RLG willing negotiate on internal (Lao) matters only, will make no commitments on future foreign policy.

(a) RLG willing give suitable guarantees that its part of any agreed settlement carried out.

(b) When two provinces returned to rightful authority they will be assured of comparable benefits any development and assistance programs, with due allowance for their relative under-development (and within limitations of future aid programs).

B. Concomitant US assurances to RLG:

1. Foreign policy: US would not oppose diplomatic relations with members UN (this is empirical formula to cut out ChiCom and Vietminh; in practice, discourage relations with Soviet bloc on all available bases, e.g., situation Hungary). While believing in principle collective security US would respect RLG policy of genuine neutrality so long this does not involve acts liable undermine Lao independence. US would of course back Laos to maximum re membership UN agencies, etc.

2. Military and security:

(a) In event of military action not involving external attack, RLG may be assured full US logistical support.

(b) As regards external attack, Secretary’s general assurances apply. US would also support referral to UN and SEATO.

(c) US prepared aid RLG build up ANL and police as effective instruments to protect Lao independence and foster national morale and well-being, e.g., to reorganize ANL into mobile contact groups to live more closely with people and maintain internal security (e.g., one commando company in each province, with attached technical services such as engineers, signal and medical, to aid local peoples progress); to train Lao take over many as feasible of functions now performed by foreign advisers, “nationalize” ANL as true army of Lao people; to continue police program; to aid RLG to continue to train and equip auto-defense units; to build up national information program.

II. References to aid and developmental programs in foregoing would of course be in relation to availability of funds. Combined agencies now seeking develop economic, social and administrative aspects of a positive program for Laos and US support therefore. Will submit views in subsequent message soon as possible; Toica 860³ was preliminary segment in economic field.

Appreciate Department’s views.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1456. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Document 427.
3. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 60, Vientiane)