113. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)1
Dear Harold: Supplementing my letters to you of December 12 [11] and January 26, my comments upon your memorandum of February 22 are as follows:
- 1.
- I believe that we should continue to support the proposal that the United States and the USSR accept mutual inspection so as to give insurance against great surprise attack, as proposed by the President. We must realize, however, that this proposal has been consistently rejected by the Soviet Union, at least as an isolated measure. Unless this proposal is clearly put forward in the context of a broader plan to supervise and control an agreed arms reduction program of substantial proportions, a wide sector of world opinion will consider our proposal as a mere delaying action.
- 2.
- We agree with the proposal that all future production of nuclear materials should be for peaceful purposes only, under effective inspection. As I understand your proposal, it would provide no limitation on the continuance or amount of such production. In our own interest, I believe we should now go further and propose that, under effective safeguards, all production of nuclear material should cease, except for amounts which may be currently required for non-weapons purposes. Material produced as a by-product of peaceful power reactors should be transferred to locations beyond national control under international supervision and earmarked for future non-weapons uses. Cessation of production should facilitate reliable inspection and control.
- 3.
- In this connection, I doubt whether other countries will agree to forego making nuclear weapons in perpetuity, if the U.S., USSR and U.K. are to continue indefinitely to have them in significant amounts. I suggest that we now propose that both the U.S. and USSR should undertake to make major contributions from existing stockpiles, in a ratio to be determined, to the internationally supervised depository from which withdrawals could be made only to meet proved peaceful [Page 332] requirements. This proposal would have wide public appeal both as an initial measure for control of nuclear weapons and as a contribution to the diffusion of the benefits of nuclear energy.
- 4.
- In regard to your proposal for reducing the forces of the U.S. and USSR to 2.5 million and the military budget by 5%, I do not believe that it is practical to supervise and control an agreement which focuses upon the number of men in the armed forces, at least with any feasible inspection system. This is an extremely elusive element. Following the principle of the WEU, however, a certain size of military establishment can be postulated as a basis for determining the weapons required, but it is the weapons rather than the men which should be subject to agreement and control. Even on this basis, if agreement were confined to the USSR and U.S., the U.S. would want to maintain approximately the present level of forces and armament. We should, however, be prepared to consider a lower postulated number of men in the armed forces if an appropriate formula can be found which embraces Communist China. I think we should inform the British, French and Canadians to this effect.
- 5.
We note that your plan suggests a possible control of certain types of armament, although you do not further develop the subject, and we know of no specific studies of it. This approach to reductions seems to us much better than through control of manpower, which, as I have said, is the hardest single element of military strength to verify and which tends to favor the Communist powers. We believe that reductions in terms of selected major weapons could be inspected and controlled much more easily and effectively than force levels.
We believe that U.S. security would be advanced by effective reductions in these fields, especially in delivery systems for nuclear weapons, such as planes, guided missiles, submarines, etc. The control of such selected items would provide a further safeguard against the nuclear threat and surprise attack and should also permit an inspection system much less pervasive and onerous for both the Soviet Union and the U.S. than reductions across the board, however modest.
- 6.
- We do not believe that the agreement to negotiate for settlement of serious differences should be made contingent upon the successful initiation of the provisions against surprise attack.
- 7.
- We doubt the desirability of restating in a new agreement the commitment against the use of force already contained in the United Nations Charter. In his letter of January 28, 1956, to Mr. Bulganin, the President rejected such verbal repetition.3 Of course, it will be perfectly proper, as part of any new substantive agreement, to refer back to the United Nations commitment.
- 8.
- The character of the “Armaments Regulation Council” is so vague that we cannot comment upon it usefully.
- 9.
- While we believe that an ultimate goal should be to create some world organization with preponderant power to enforce peace, we doubt that at this stage we should propose to furnish the Armaments Council with tactical nuclear weapons for enforcement purposes. We would, however, favor the United States agreeing to earmark a quantity of such weapons to be used by us, in conformity with our constitutional processes, at the call of the United Nations in pursuance of the Charter or the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.
- 10.
- With respect to procedure, we would not want to express any opinion until the substance is settled. It is our impression that the present plan, and any likely to evolve from it now, will not justify the elaborate publicity program which is suggested.
I recognize that we must take a position for international negotiation in the near future based on those elements now under consideration which appear sound. But I believe that any program which can be put forward on the basis of studies and deliberations to date may not go as far as our national interest requires or as necessary to command wide support.
I recommend therefore that the whole subject continue to receive urgent study.
Sincerely yours,
Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—General. Secret. In a covering note to Dillon Anderson, February 8, Dulles wrote:
“As I think you know, I promised the British that we would let them know something about the figure on numbers which is being discussed in connection with disarmament. I understand that you will bring this up at the NSC meeting tomorrow.
“I enclose a copy of my letter to Mr. Stassen of February 7. I have read over the telephone to Admiral Radford paragraph 4 dealing with this topic. He thinks it is acceptable from their standpoint.” (Ibid.) Disarmament was not discussed at the NSC meeting on February 9.
↩- For Dulles’ letters to Stassen, see Documents 87 and 102. Regarding Stassen’s February 2 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 109.↩
- For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pp. 191–193.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩