65. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 7, 1957,3:30–7:30 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Further U.S.-Saudi Arabian Talks
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S. Officials
- The Secretary
- G—Mr. Murphy
- NEA—Mr. Rountree
- Ambassador Richards
- Ambassador Wadsworth
- NE—Mr. Wilkins
- NE—Mr. Newsom
- Mr. Stoltzfus, Recorder
- Mr. Nowfel, Interpreter
- Representing Saudi Arabia
- Shaikh Yusuf Yasin
- Shaikh Mohammad Surur2
- Ambassador Al-Khayyal
- Mamdouh Adib, Recorder
- Abdul Aziz Majid, Interpreter
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects; for text, see volume XIII, pages 468–469.]
. . . . . . .
Shaikh Yusuf went on to say that His Majesty had been pleased with President Eisenhower’s statement that sanctions against Israel might be considered if Israeli forces were not immediately withdrawn from Egypt. Shaikh Yusuf said that in any event he believed the President and Secretary were well aware of the gravity of the problem and the urgent necessity of solving it. The enemy was now waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of the situation in order to escape from its obligations. Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty was very interested to know whether the United States Government would consider supporting the draft resolution put forward by the Afro-Asian bloc calling for sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw immediately. Shaikh Yusuf added that this would bring great prestige to the United States in the Middle East, and would be a great step toward bridging the gap between the two.
Shaikh Yusuf said that he had been instructed by His Majesty to explain the importance of the Straits of Aqaba to Saudi Arabia so that the U.S. could take this into consideration now and in the future. Shaikh Yusuf said that the Gulf of Aqaba was considered by the Arabs to be one of the sacred areas of Islam and as belonging to the whole Islamic world. Thus it was the duty of His Majesty as Guardian of the Holy Places to defend this area against the Jews because by doing so he would not only be defending his own territory and his own rights but also Islam against a threat to the approaches to the Holy Places. Shaikh Yusuf said that he had broached this subject because of its urgency and the fact that it was now being discussed in the UN.
The Secretary replied that he would like to make one or two comments. As the President had said last Tuesday,3 the U.S. was strongly hopeful that Israel would comply with the latest UN resolution [Page 103] calling for the withdrawal of Israel behind the armistice lines. The U.S. also hoped there would be such an interposition of UN emergency forces in Gaza and the Straits of Tiran that the likelihood of a further outbreak of hostilities in the area could be excluded.
The Secretary said he knew that the possibility of imposing sanctions against Israel was being discussed by the Arab group in the UN but he had seen no text of the resolution. He said he assumed that the United States would be consulted in connection with any such resolution because its efficacy would depend to some extent upon the United States. The Secretary said that, in the U.S. view, sanctions against Israel should be resorted to only as a last resort and not until other efforts had been exhausted. The Secretary added that His Excellency Shaikh Yusuf had no doubt observed from the U.S. press that there were those who were suggesting that sanctions should not be taken against Israel for its violation unless sanctions were also imposed on Russia for its disregard of the UN resolutions on Hungary. It was also suggested by some that Egypt, too, had violated UN resolutions by acts of belligerency, particularly through the acts of the Fedayeen. The Secretary said that he mentioned these points not with the object of retreating from the statements the President and he had made on the subject but rather in order that his friends might realize that the imposition of sanctions would open up a road that might not later be easy to follow.
Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary for his remarks and said he believed the Arabs would agree that it would be preferable for the Israelis to withdraw without it being necessary for the UN to impose sanctions on them. However, the situation was grave and affected the interest of world peace. Aggressors should not be made to feel that they could go unscathed. The U.S. was the champion of peace and it was up to it to make the aggressors feel that they could not expect any reward for their aggression. If the UN could not make Israel withdraw, the Arabs would expect the U.S. to take a firm stand for justice, and, if it did so, it could greatly lessen the gap that still existed between it and the Arab Middle East. Shaikh Yusuf said that if the draft resolution on sanctions had not yet been referred to the United States, the Saudi Arabian delegation could be instructed to pass it to U.S. delegates and discuss it with them. Shaikh Yusuf said he believed the situation would be greatly improved if Israel were made to understand that the U.S. would be prepared to support the resolution on sanctions if it did not withdraw its forces immediately from Egypt.
Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, Shaikh Yusuf said he would like the Secretary to know that Saudi Arabia considered the question of freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran a matter of life and death to Saudi Arabia. In view of the seriousness of the dangers involved, His Majesty had asked Shaikh Yusuf to raise the subject with the Secretary [Page 104] and had told him that he would raise it himself with the President. Shaikh Yusuf asked whether the Secretary was prepared to issue instructions to the U.S. delegation in the UN asking it to support the resolution on sanctions in case Israel was not prepared to withdraw.
The Secretary said that the matter of the Straits of Tiran was related to the whole question of Aqaba as an international waterway and that it might some day be necessary to submit the case to the Court of International Justice. He said that the United States was not prepared to disregard international law but as yet it did not know what the law was on this point.
Shaikh Yusuf said that the important point was that Israel had not had freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba before it started its aggression on Egypt. Thus, he contended, the first thing to be done was to liquidate the state of aggression and to return to the status quo ante-bellum. After that has been accomplished there would be opportunities for Israel to submit its complaints concerning freedom of passage and other matters. Shaikh Yusuf said this was, in fact, the position that the U.S. had apparently taken up to now in the UN and as it was known to the world. This position had also been emphasized by the President and the Secretary. The U.S. should therefore bend its efforts toward assisting to achieve the withdrawal of Israel without conditions. Shaikh Yusuf said that he hoped that Saudi Arabia and the United States were in agreement on this point of view.
The Secretary said that the two countries were substantially in agreement in their view that the withdrawal of Israel should be unconditional, that is, that Israel was not entitled to attach conditions to its compliance with the UN resolution. Once the Israeli withdrawal had been assured there would remain the further question of ascertaining the legitimate rights of the interested parties in what was an international waterway. These rights would have to be resolved, and it was to be hoped that this could be done without the recurrence of hostilities.
Shaikh Yusuf said he wondered whether the question of freedom of passage in the Straits really needed to be submitted to the World Court. This matter should not, he felt, be raised until after the unconditional withdrawal of Israel. Shaikh Yusuf said that the UN should not commit itself for the future since the UN emergency forces were merely symbolic in nature. If the intention was to impose a settlement on Israel or Egypt, the UN forces, which were small and composed of the forces of small nations, would not be sufficient for the purpose. On the other hand constructive action by the United States would serve a dual purpose: it would establish peace and would raise U.S. prestige in the Middle East.
[Page 105]The Secretary said that he had raised the legal matter only in order not to conceal the fact that there had been some discussion in the UN with Egypt as to the possibility of resorting to the International Court for decisions on the status of some of these waterways.
Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary for his explanation and said that his main contention was that the U.S. should be on the Saudi Arabian side on this question.
Ambassador Al-Khayyal said he wished to know whether, after Israel’s withdrawal from Sharm al Shaikh, the UN emergency forces would proceed to that point or would advance to the armistice line. Shaikh Yusuf said it was his understanding that the movements of the UN forces would be phased according to a pattern already established in the UN resolution on Israeli withdrawal. The UN resolution, according to Shaikh Yusuf, stipulated that the UN forces would proceed eventually to the armistice line. The Secretary said he knew that talks were in progress between Secretary General Hammarskjold and Egyptian and Israeli officials but that he did not know what their present views were. The Secretary agreed with Shaikh Yusuf that the position of all countries should be to support the UN resolution.
. . . . . . .
[Here follows discussion of relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia; for text, see volume XIII, pages 469–477.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/2–1057. Confidential. Drafted on February 10 by Stoltzfus.↩
- Shaikh Mohammad Surur, Royal Counselor and Minister of Finance.↩
- During a press conference on Wednesday, February 6, President Eisenhower stated his belief that Israel had “a decent respect for the opinion of mankind” and would withdraw its forces. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 123)↩