63. Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1957, 9 a.m.1
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Mr. [Allen] Dulles pointed out that clearance of the Suez Canal was continuing at a very rapid pace, and limited transit for vessels with not more than a 25-foot draft was possible right now. Unlimited transit could be expected in early March. Meanwhile, there was not very much evidence to suggest that Nasser has changed his position of insisting on all payments for the transit of the Canal be made to Egypt.
[Page 100]Secretary Dulles observed that we had proposed yesterday to Hammarskjöld that he try to get Egyptian agreement to the payment of all tolls to the International Bank. Half of these payments would immediately go to Egypt; the other half would remain with the Bank pending the achievement of a solution of the Canal problem.
Admiral Radford pointed out that three or four Soviet merchant vessels were at this moment approaching the entrance to the Canal. He thought it quite likely that they would pass through the Canal on Sunday. They would ostentatiously pay their tolls to the Egyptian Government, and thus make a great propaganda play. Secretary Humphrey commented that every single minute was important to us. If a large number of ships start rushing through the Canal as soon as it opens and pay their tolls to Nasser, we will be confronted with an accomplished fact. Nasser would have secured complete control of the Canal, and the only thing left for us to do would be to station battleships at both ends of the Canal and prevent the transit of any ships. This was hardly a welcome course of action.
Secretary Dulles pointed out the difficulty that all of this was in a certain sense Hammarskjöld’s responsibility, and he already has too much to do. Nevertheless, we are pressing him hard on this matter. Secretary Humphrey closed the discussion with a statement that the moment Soviet vessels go through the Canal, that will mark the end of all negotiations with Nasser for a reasonable settlement.
[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and agenda item 3.]
4. The Suez Canal Situation
Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Radford wished to bring the problem of the Suez Canal situation before the Council. Admiral Radford explained the fear of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that once ships begin to transit the Suez Canal paying their tolls to Nasser, control of the Canal would again revert completely to Nasser. The only possible ray of hope that the Chiefs could perceive was that the Israelis would prove themselves smart, would obey the injunctions of the UN, bring their own ships to the entrance to the Canal, and thus clearly pose the issue of the right of Israeli ships to transit the Canal. If the Egyptians forcibly prevented the passage of Israeli vessels, they would place themselves clearly in the wrong and we and the UN would be in a position to impose sanctions on Nasser.
Secretary Dulles pointed out that, after all, the United States was not anxious to get into a war in the Middle East in place of the British and the French. He indicated that the United States had applied about every sanction it possessed against Egypt except the ultimate one of military force. In reply to a criticism of Hammarskjöld’s handling of this issue by Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Dulles defended Hammarskjöld [Page 101] as having done a very good job, at least up to now. We need not necessarily assume that Hammarskjöld will fail on the last and most important phase of the Suez Canal problem.
The National Security Council:2
Discussed the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presented orally at the meeting by the Chairman, JCS.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on February 8. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
- The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1668, approved by the President on February 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1957)↩