Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

410. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 25, 1957¹

Washington, November 25, 1957

SUBJECT

• The Palestine Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Hans Engen, Norwegian Delegation to the United Nations
• The Secretary
• IO—Francis O. Wilcox
• U—Henry S. Villard
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

The Secretary said that the Palestine refugee problem was becoming intolerable. It was proving harder for the United States Government to obtain money from Congress for refugee relief. Relief had served to perpetuate a problem which did not deserve perpetuation.

The United States had given this problem great attention. It had been the central point of the Secretary’s proposals of August 26, 1955. These proposals referred to other elements of a Palestine settlement, such as boundaries, which should perhaps be laid aside at the moment. It might be possible to separate out the refugee problem and deal with it separately.

The Secretary assumed from Ambassador Engen’s willingness to come to Washington for this discussion that he was interested and felt that something should be done. Mr. Villard had been devoting all of his time to a study of the refugee problem over the past several months.

The Secretary felt that a solution to the refugee problem would require an honest willingness on the part of Israel to take some of these people back. By honest willingness, the Secretary meant proposals that were not so surrounded by qualifications as to be a mere paper offer. There was no reason why Israel should not take some back. The Secretary knew that the Israelis considered every square inch of their land precious, and they felt if necessary to be in a position to offer a home to all Jews wishing to come there. On the other hand, if the Israelis felt they could bring a large number of Jews to Israel, it meant that more people could be absorbed there. The question was whether more Jews, more Arabs or a combination of both should be brought to Israel. The latter was possible. The Secretary imagined that the total number of Arabs willing to return to Israel would be quite low. The capacity of Israel to absorb more people depended on what was done for Israel in the rest of the world. A great deal of this help came from United States Jews. We could not attach conditions to their aid. Although there were some leading United States Jews who were willing to urge Israel to do something about the Arab refugees, there were not too many. We were also giving United States Government assistance to Israel. Here we could attach conditions and exert pressure. An offer to the refugees must not only comprehend a return to Israel but also modest compensation and measures to develop the rivers of Jordan and Iraq to create more land for settlement. Money could be raised for these efforts. We got into a political problem here because some Arabs thought that such a move would be the opening phase of a process leading to peace with Israel on the basis of its present boundaries. It would also destroy the refugees as a symbol of how evil Israel has been. There were many Arabs who did not wish to see the problem settled.

Nevertheless, the Secretary thought that there was perhaps enough of a chance of success to make it worthwhile to try. The question was how one went about it. When the Secretary made his speech, he assumed the United States would take the initiative. Since then, events had developed in the area, such as the Suez crisis, the American Doctrine, etc., which made it undesirable for us to take the initiative. We had become a target in the area and were being attacked by Syria and Egypt. If we took an initiative, these countries would perforce have to attack anything the United States did. While we must stand ready to support efforts toward a settlement—to use our influence with Israel, to contribute to a United Nations loan for compensation, to extend economic assistance to help in water development, to urge United States views to help finance compensation—it was better that the United States not take an initiative. We would put these assets at the disposal of someone else.

The Secretary hoped that Ambassador Engen and his Government would be interested in taking an initiative knowing that the United States would fully support it. We had no desire to dictate or control what was done and Ambassador Engen would be an independent operator. The Secretary did not know the chance of success, but nothing succeeded unless one tried. If it turned out that a settlement could not be reached, we would not be worse off for having tried. If we did not try, we knew the situation would get worse.

Mr. Villard said that he had made a tentative approach to the Secretary General. Mr. Hammarskjold had thought that he might explore the idea with Fawzi since he believed he had some good will in Cairo. Mr. Villard had heard nothing further.

The Secretary stated that it was either necessary to have a plan endorsed by all the Arabs or there could be a plan put forward by Israel in the hope that the refugees could accept it. It was difficult to deal with the Arabs as a group. A solution of the refugee problem would mean the destruction of a political instrument presently in the hands of Egypt and Syria for use against King Hussein.

Ambassador Engen spoke of the “petty politics” which the Arab states played against each other. When Egypt recently had permitted, after some delay, two Norwegian ships with Israel cargoes to transit the Suez Canal, Egypt had been attacked by Iraq. Egypt’s acquiescence in the stationing of UNEF at Sharm el Shaikh was attacked by Jordan. The same thing would happen with regard to a program for the refugees. Mr. Rountree felt that was why quiet diplomacy was called for. Ambassador Engen continued that while he had no fixed ideas, he had had many talks with the Secretary General and with Arab representatives in New York. He had arrived at the conclusion that one could not get an opening on the refugee problem by means of any action which would compel either the Arabs or Israel to take an official position. Ambassador Engen had become more convinced that the only possible approach to the refugee problem was an effort to get around it by working out and implementing economic projects to create areas of employment in the Near East. Ambassador Engen pointed out that the population picture among the refugees was changing and nearly half of them were young people. He believed that we should work at the refugee problem in terms of providing about 200,000 job opportunities. There were two factors in our favor: it was the obvious desire of all the Arab countries to raise their living standards; and the fact that the only outside agency to assist in this, acceptable to all, was the United Nations. It was difficult to think of a method within the United Nations to link the United Nations with any kind of economic development. The initiative should come from the Arabs. Ambassador Engen did not exclude that possibility.

Ambassador Engen continued that the Secretary General had carried on discussions along these lines with Fawzi and the Iraqis. The Iraqis had approached Mr. Hammarskjold on their own initiative to draw attention to the dangers inherent in the refugee situation and to warn that Iraq could not be looked to as the major contributor to a solution. Fawzi had responded to the Secretary General’s initiative by asking for time to think the matter over (obviously in order to consult Cairo), after which he had displayed a quite positive interest. The direction in which we should work was to try to find a combination whereby an initiative would come from the Arabs to seek United Nations assistance. This could lead into appropriate financing.

The Secretary asked if there was a place at the beginning for an Israel offer. Ambassador Engen felt that this was hard to answer. There was perhaps a fifty-fifty chance that such an offer would be forthcoming. Mr. Wilcox did not think that the Israelis would move if it appeared to be as a result of Arab pressures. Mr. Rountree felt that one of the problems of an Israel offer would be the quid pro quo; Israel would desire at a minimum Arab recognition of Israel’s existence. The Secretary said he hated to see the United States do things for Israel and not attach the condition that they should think about some Arabs coming back. Ambassador Engen wondered if it were politically possible for Israel to recognize the principle of repatriation. We could not ignore Israel’s desire for recognition by the Arabs. Mr. Wilcox wondered as to the possibilities of progress being made, in the absence of any public announcement, by a quiet economic program.

Ambassador Engen felt that this was an appropriate moment for a discussion of the refugee problem. The Secretariat of the United Nations had been asked to study an Economic Commission for Africa and the Near East. This Commission could be utilized for the big development projects. The Secretary General was seeking to obtain the services of Mr. McCloy to assist him in this effort. This matter was not unconnected with Mr. Black’s recent talks in Egypt. A pattern was beginning to form for a line of action which would not raise political problems. This was worth exploring. While it could not start while the General Assembly was in session, the Secretary General wished to start immediately after. The Secretary General had assumed from his discussions with the Egyptians and Iraqis that they would come out with a request for a study group to come to the area. Then the question of financing would arise. At a later stage, there would be no incompatibility between such a line of action and talks with the Israelis to see if they could make a move. As far as the Arabs were concerned, the question of a solution to the refugee problem should not be raised— not even privately. Ambassador Engen felt that the permanent employment for the bulk of the refugees must be found outside Israel, mostly in Iraq and Jordan. Any repatriation should probably come from Gaza.

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Engen for coming and stated we appreciated and valued his interest. He asked if Ambassador Engen thought the Secretary General should take an initiative. Ambassador Engen believed that the present time was not appropriate for either a political or diplomatic initiative. An approach to the problem along economic lines deserved to be explored. Ambassador Engen would be glad to be of use in any further consideration of the matter. He would keep in contact with the Secretary General and would be glad to keep in contact with the United States. Mr. Wilcox inquired whether we might not be probing the Israel attitude at this time. Ambassador Engen felt that in the course of the next two or three months we could see whether we could investigate the possibility of the economic approach. He would hesitate to discuss this matter with the Israelis now.

After the group left the Secretary’s office, the discussion continued. Mr. Rountree suggested that after both the United States representatives and Ambassador Engen considered what had been said they might keep in touch through Mr. Villard. Ambassador Engen agreed and concluded by saying he would like to make clear that he had not taken a negative attitude to the suggestions put forward by the Secretary. His present thinking, however, was in favor of great caution.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884.411/11–2557. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on November 26.