Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

404. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Washington, November 17, 1957—8 p.m.

1229. Following is comment on Embtel 1226.²

1. At time of Ambassador Hussein return from Washington his stock with Nasser was very low as was indicated by his having to wait about two weeks before even being granted interview but since that time his stock seems to have risen somewhat as result his taking bit in teeth and telling Nasser some homely truths such as he was not accustomed to hear from his sycophants. It would be mistake however to overemphasize this development since there considerable element of risk in Hussein tactics.

2. Hussein’s idea of truce based on quid-pro-quo moves, without commitment on either side, has merit in sense that it meshes with realities of situation here, including character of Nasser who is congenital reactor and who therefore tends reach general conclusions as result of specific actions as contrasted with person of Bourguiba’s type who makes basic determination and then proceeds to specific implementation. In circumstances there would seem to be little prospect of success of policy of waiting till Nasser comes to his senses of his own volition or even of bringing him to his senses by abstract persuasion. If there is any hope at all of bringing him around to something approaching more acceptable position, it believed that it will be by pragmatical means.

3. Although idea of truce something to which Hussein has obviously given considerable thought, specific suggestions which he has made have been casual ideas developed in course of conversation with US and are not specific product of consultation with Nasser, although Hussein says he did tell Nasser that press and radio, GOE ties with USSR and Egyptian interference in other Arab states would obviously be areas in which we would desire changes. Endorsement given by Nasser to Hussein continuing his efforts would therefore seem be in nature of temporary hunting license rather than mandate discuss agreed points.

4. Idea of truce which would be without commitments or publicity which could be stopped at will and which would not presuppose nonexistent confidence either way appeals to us here as being logical in set of circumstances where … alternative of complete non-cooperation can deprive US of maneuverability. Ultimate purpose would of course be to reach point where sufficient degree of confidence could be restored to permit of more forthright collaboration, although difficult at present to foresee results which would go beyond making best of continuingly difficult situation. That, however, not situation peculiar to Egypt.

5. In carrying out any such policy we would not think it advisable to draw up comprehensive check lists of grievances and requirements for over-all negotiation but would suggest proceeding point by point on ad hoc basis as for instance was case in Black Mission. To attempt handle on comprehensive basis would not only serve to complicate matters by relating unrelated matters but it would also presuppose measure of basic understanding which only time and experience can furnish. Under such arrangement successes may not be spectacular but by same token failures need not acquire undue significance.

6. As regards media by which such policy might be tested, it would seem desirable for time being to use normal contacts supplemented by services of Ambassador Hussein as long as he here and reserve decision on sending special emissary till later time when it will be possible see whether sufficient progress has been made to widen horizon of prospective action.

7. On assumption that Nasser’s decision tone down attacks on Jordan³ doubtless regarded by him as related to truce with US and, taking note of noticeable improvement in this regard in past two days, Department might wish to see that this development brought to attention of Jordanians in order avoid possibility of Amman radio proceeding under momentum and re-kindling fire. Should be made clear, however, that we are in no position certify present partial let-up other than temporary and Jordanians should of course keep up their guard.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/11–1757. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:30 p.m.
2. Supra.

3. On November 17, the Embassy in Cairo reported in telegram 1228 that it had been reliably informed that Nasser had decided to taper off his radio and press campaign against King Hussein. The Embassy in Cairo also commented that reciprocation by the Hashemite Broadcasting System would be an important factor in determining the continuation of this trend. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.40/11–1757)

   Subsequently, on November 18 the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Amman to inform the Jordanian Government that reports indicated that the Egyptian media campaign was tapering off and to suggest that some reciprocation by the Jordanian media would improve the atmosphere. (Telegram 1196 to Amman; ibid., 674.85/11–1857) On November 20 the Embassy in Amman reported that a strident anti-Hashemite broadcast, emanating from Cairo and Damascus on November 19, had eliminated all reason to believe that Egypt was easing its propaganda campaign against Jordan. (Telegram 1025; ibid., 674.85/11–2057)