40. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 26, 19571
SUBJECT
- Gaza and the Straits of Tiran
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- G—Mr. Murphy
- NE—Mr. Bergus
Mr. Eban was critical of the Secretary General’s report,2 stating that it had been difficult to understand. Mr. Hammarskjold had narrowed the opening to a solution of the Aqaba problem, he seemed to have closed all the doors to a solution in Gaza.
[Page 62]As for Aqaba there were a number of factors, including Israel’s willingness to withdraw and the interest of a good many maritime nations in free passage through the Straits of Tiran. In previous conversations, the Secretary General had indicated to the Israelis a United Nations interest in keeping open this international waterway. Hammarskjold had also expressed the view that the UNEF could be posted at Sharm el Sheikh and remain there as long as necessary to prevent hostilities. It was on this basis that Israel had formulated its position. Hammarskjold’s report now appeared to be a retreat from his previous statements. The Secretary General had attempted to explain his present views on the Straits on the basis of the fact that the International Law Commission was meeting on the problem of international straits during 1957.
It seemed to Mr. Eban that if Hammarskjold’s interest was in preventing belligerency that the way to do it was through the use of the UNEF. Israel’s continued occupation of Sharm el Sheikh could be considered as an act of belligerency; Egypt’s resumption of the blockade of the Straits would be an act of belligerency; posting of the UNEF at Sharm el Sheikh could forestall either of these belligerent situations.
Mr. Eban reported that an eight inch pipeline from Eilat would reach Beersheba by the end of March and the Mediterranean coast two weeks later. Israel was sure of a source of oil (which he hinted was Iran) to ship through the pipeline. This line would handle 700,000 tons of oil per year. Plans were in advanced stage for a sixteen inch pipeline. While there would be little exportable surplus of oil from the eight inch line, still it was important that this link be in being prior to the full opening of the Suez Canal. Shippers were also showing interest in sending general cargo overland from Haifa to Eilat. This was an expensive arrangement, using presently available transit facilities, but it was cheaper than the Cape route.
Mr. Eban said that he had been discussing with the Canadian Foreign Minister a draft resolution which would assign to the UNEF the task of keeping open the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Eban speculated that Mr. Hammarskjold’s shift of position on the Straits may have arisen from his desire not to irritate the Soviet bloc. Mr. Shiloah thought that this might be too charitable an analysis, since he believed that Hammarskjold had made certain commitments to Nasser. Mr. Murphy said that we knew of no such commitments.
Mr. Eban continued that Gaza was a more difficult problem because people were involved. The proposed Israel control of the Gaza Strip would be limited by Israel’s declaration of non-annexation of the Strip and acknowledgment of UN suzerainty over it. There would not be an outright take-over . . . . From the viewpoint of security and the welfare of the Gaza inhabitants, Israel’s proposal had much more to offer. The local government councils in Gaza liked the Israelis. If the [Page 63] Israel proposal ran into juridical difficulties at the UN, Israel hoped that some formula could be worked out, based either on a temporary Israel role in the Strip, or the UN’s calling on Israel, as a neighboring state, to assist in administering Gaza. Mr. Eban was thinking in terms of an enabling resolution to authorize the Secretary General to pursue further his discussions on Gaza.
Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would oppose a campaign of denunciation and condemnation in the General Assembly. He also asked that Israel be consulted on the text of any resolution which the U.S. intended to table.
Mr. Murphy asked what Israel would do in the face of a UNGA resolution unsatisfactory to it. Mr. Eban replied that he would not continue to act as a servant of his Government if it took the frivolous course of leaving Sharm el Sheikh without arrangements for the UNEF’s replacing it and firm assurances that freedom of navigation would be maintained. Mr. Shiloah said that Israel would not accept suicidal recommendations.
Mr. Murphy said that the U.S. wanted a resolution which would be acceptable to Israel and to others. It would be something based on Mr. Hammarskjold’s report although the report had not been exactly what we had expected. We understood the Israel viewpoint on these matters. He felt that Aqaba was the more important of the two issues. The question was how to get the UNEF there. Mr. Shiloah felt that the U.S. should take the initiative and not join in railroading any resolution through at the initiative of Krishna Menon. He was afraid that other countries were pressuring the United States. Mr. Murphy said that no such process was going on.