Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

392. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Our Relations with Egypt in the Light of the Syrian Situation

Discussion:

In your staff meeting on October 28 you mentioned the possibility that developments in Syria might have contributed to establishing an atmosphere favoring the improvement of our relations with Egypt. We offer the following views on this point.

Although public and even private utterances by President Nasser have set Egypt squarely behind Syria,² we nonetheless have the impression that Nasser has been concerned by the manner in which the Syrians have involved themselves with the Soviet Union. We think it is likely that the Syrians took their recent steps in this direction without consulting Nasser and that Nasser thus considers that the primacy of Egypt in Syria has been seriously compromised. He may also have qualms that the Soviet Union is seeking to displace him as the leader of the area. We are inclined to believe that the dispatch of Egyptian troops to Syria was more a reflection of Nasser’s desire to bolster Egypt’s prestige and to give Egypt a greater voice in Syrian affairs than a genuine act of solidarity with the new Syrian regime.

In addition to what we believe to be Nasser’s concern with regard to the Soviet-Syrian understanding, there have been indications that Egypt is increasingly concerned that it has become too dependent on the Soviet Union, particularly in the economic field. It may well be that Nasser understands that many of his difficulties in the area have stemmed from his losing the balance necessary to maintain a policy of “positive neutrality.” It is probably out of desire to restore the equilibrium in his role as between East and West that he has made some moves to seek better relations with the West, especially the UK and France. He may believe that for economic reasons, relations with France and the UK are more important at this stage than relations with the US. However, he undoubtedly recognizes that a full balance can only be regained if tolerable relations are established with all three major Western powers.

Restoration of tolerable relations with Egypt would clearly be in our interests, provided that Nasser shows greater awareness of the dangers of close association with the Soviet Union and adopts a genuinely neutral position, and provided that a resumption of constructive relations can take place in such a way that Nasser cannot claim a victory for his policies. In this connection we have in mind the adverse effect which such a victory would have upon the Western position in those Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which have become alarmed by Nasser’s activities and the facilitation they have afforded Soviet penetration in Syria.

While it is probable that the Syrian development, in addition to the situation in Egypt itself, may be producing an atmosphere slightly more favorable to laying the groundwork for better relations between Egypt and the US, we believe we should proceed most cautiously in the circumstances. In the first place, despite what may be Nasser’s unexpressed though real concern over Syrian developments, Syria remains Egypt’s only ally and thus ties between those two countries are close. We should be under no illusion that Nasser is ready or willing to use his influence to bring about the kind of changes we would like to see in Syria, or approves of our policy toward Syria. Secondly, although there are encouraging signs that Nasser is fearful of too great an economic dependence on the Soviet Union, there has been no basic change in the Egyptian Government’s attitude toward close political associations with the Soviet Union. In this regard it is not without significance that while Nasser is unwilling to go to Moscow, his Minister of Defense³ is departing on November 1 in a special Soviet TU–104 plane for a twelve-day visit to Moscow, a new invitation having been issued to him by Khrushchev following Zhukov’s removal. Thirdly, we may be certain that Nasser will seek to gain concessions from the West without giving anything in return and will do everything in his power to present such concessions to the other Arabs as a triumph of “positive neutrality” and a victory over the West. We believe that the policies we have followed have been responsible in important measure for Nasser’s political isolation and economic discomfiture. We believe that we should continue these policies without basic change, but be prepared to make adjustments here and there to remove relatively minor points of irritation, in order to reveal that we are not entirely inflexible with regard to the possibility of better relations.

Recommendations:

1. That we recognize that current circumstances may have improved in some degree the possibilities of restoring tolerable relations between the US and Egypt.

2. That we make no basic changes in our present policy at the moment but carefully watch developments to determine whether there are signs of an improved atmosphere in Egypt with regard to the US. For example, it would be of interest to see whether the Egyptian press and radio will cease their attacks on the US, its policies and official personalities.

3. That we take appropriate opportunities to indicate our open-mindedness about improved relations with Egypt and our desire to continue correct relations at this stage. (In this regard we believe it would be useful to make a now-due deposit ($600,000) to the joint account of the Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service since failure to do so would represent a definite breach of an agreement which has been suspended but not cancelled. Failure to make the deposit would result in termination and would raise doubt about our present policy of “cool, but correct” relations.)⁴

4. That we be prepared to reduce specific points of irritation between the US and Egypt, provided always that there is appropriate reciprocal action on the part of Egypt. (For example, and as we have already informed the Egyptian Government officially, we will be prepared to release the blocked funds if substantial agreement is reached between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company. Additionally, increasing evidence that Egypt is becoming aware of the dangers of close association with the Soviet Union and is taking action to reduce that association, might enable us to negotiate PL–480 wheat shipments and to resume activity in some of our development and technical assistance programs.)⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/11–457. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell on November 1.
2. Documentation on this subject is ibid., 661.83, 783.00, and 674.83.
3. Major General ’Abd al-Hakim Amir.
4. Documentation concerning the EARIS project is in Department of State, Central File 774.5–MSP.

5. Dulles initialed his approval on the source text with the comment: “Suggest possibility of very private check with Saud as to what he now thinks”. A handwritten notation, dated November 22, indicates that action on this directive was taken by Rockwell. See telegram 713, Document 406.

   Dillon also initialed his concurrence on the source text with the comment: “Concur, but would go slow on starting up PL 480 again”. Dulles initialed his concurrence next to this comment. G.W. La Rue (U/MSA) also concurred in the memorandum.