37. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 581. Re Suez. In luncheon meeting with Hare, Wadsworth and Barco today, SYGHammarskjold made following points:
Hammarskjold said that, if Israelis are not required to withdraw from Sinai, he fears Egyptians will move in their forces (which until now they have in agreement with him refrained from doing), and they will turn towards USSR which in his opinion Nasser is not doing at present and which he does not want to do. According to SYG, based on his talks with Fawzi and Nasser, Nasser’s first reaction when the UK, French, Israeli invasion began was definitely against relying on [Page 57] UN. He was persuaded, however, to do so and was pleasantly surprised at what had happened. If, however, after the actions which UN had taken and which encouraged Arab reliance on UN, it now turned out that UN could not implement its decisions as far as Israel was concerned, he, Hammarskjold, greatly feared they would turn away from UN . . . . Hammarskjold felt that this would really mean great deterioration in the UN’s influence. In addition, it would be much more difficult to get UNEF forces along the demarcation lines, in Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza, and to get basic Suez settlement. Hammarskjold hoped discussions on Suez Canal settlement will start shortly in New York, and he hoped to go to Cairo in fortnight for further extended discussions. On January 20 he gave letter … to Fawzi asking that Suez settlement discussions begin. He expected a response from Fawzi today.
SYG said he believed that we will inevitably be confronted with resolution condemning Israelis and calling for sanctions against them if they do not withdraw along lines first draft of recent Arab-Asian resolution based on US resolution in SC which UK and French vetoed. He feels there should be a second resolution introduced and pending during consideration of first which would pick up the suggestions on stationing of UNEF on armistice lines, in Tiran, and Gaza made in his report, and deal with these suggestions in context of the Armistice Agreement. This resolution should also include: (a) a statement that above steps would be taken once withdrawal of Israeli forces has been completed; and (b) a request that SYG negotiate with parties with view making such arrangements. Hammarskjold said in his opinion Suez negotiations should not be connected with the matters to be dealt with in this resolution. In this connection he said Egypt had accepted the idea of a surtax to pay for the Canal clearance operations.
SYG said he thought Canada, US, India, Norway and one LA country should co-sponsor this resolution with Canada taking lead. He believes there is a good chance Egypt will not oppose such a resolution and thereby ensure its passage. He believed the first resolution would have to be passed before taking up the second and that the one should not publicly at least be made dependent on the other.
SYG also reported Dixon (UK) reacted very favorably to SYG’s report.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/1–2457. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:44 a.m., January 25.↩