267. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and John J. McCloy in New York, April 4, 1957, 1:35 p.m.1
TELEPHONE CALL TO MR MCCLOY IN NEW YORK
M said he had a very interesting trip. Sudden, and he thinks he got there a little late, but he talked loud and long with everybody he could talk to and gave them about the line they talked about before he went. He had a long, long session with Nasser. M went over the American draft with him which he had just gotten. It is quite a long story. The Sec replied in the affirmative that M should talk with someone. The Sec said he was seeing the Pres and wanted his general impression. M had the feeling that N was more uncertain of himself than a year ago when M saw him. A couple of times he put his head in his hands and said he is perplexed. “What do I do with this Israeli situation? I don’t know how to solve it.” M said N said the problems are overwhelming. Nothing bombastic. He was quite disarming. He began by thanking Wheeler and the UN for clearing the Canal. Also he said he knows he is not in good favor in the US but he knows they caused the withdrawals and is forever grateful to Gen Eisenhower and is aware of the political difficulties involved in taking the course he did and even now there is indirect pressure being brought to bear by the [Page 513] US. He will always be grateful for the stand which induced the withdrawals. The Sec said that was interesting. M thinks he was sincere. N asked why he should make this international. N said the American draft as he read it emphasizes the 6 points and the last para is phrased legally and that scared him off. N thinks some lawyer drafted it in order to give Israel a better case before the Int’l Court than they now have. That troubled him more than anything else. N also mentioned it being for eternity and tying him up so he can’t increase the tolls. He will not increase them without careful consideration but it ties him down too much. N asked for a solution between detachment and lack of authority and some Unacceptable infringement on his authority— that is what he is looking for. The Sec asked why he is not willing to sit down and negotiate. M said Fawzi is anxious and they did go over the paper para by para. M told N he should deal with the 6 points, let Israeli ships go through and have a solid consulting arrangement with some users. Forget the London users and maybe not have nations but shippers. N rather liked that but said it had to be other than Western users. M agreed to that. M said N has to make it expressive because the world abhors a bottleneck and N should not discount the alternatives, which are not bluffs. N said re the 6 points—when they were dealt with and they were ready to reach agreement at the same time they were conspiring against him on the invasion and anything like the 6 points is reminiscent. He would not accept insulation as the Canal goes through the country. M said it has to be political but it is unrealistic to talk about its not being political and it is unrealistic to talk about its not being international as that is its value. N said he can’t do it because of speeches. M said that is a weak argument etc. M does not know what impression this made. When M made some suggestions, N said what does M think Fawzi thinks etc. He won’t take a veto on his sovereignty or allow the arrangement to tie him down to eternity. N said he was nervous about movement of the French fleet and the Sec said we are looking into it too. N said he was aware if he let the Israeli ships go through the atmosphere would be clearer but he does not dare. He would have to deploy the Army along the Canal. Maybe it would be quieter in 6 months. He said Aqaba is quite different but did not say more than that. Re comments about the Russians— he said he was not surrounded by them. The Sec said he has been spending a lot of time with them lately and M said he was protesting too much. Malik2 told McCloy that Communist infiltration in the ME is greater than it ever had been. They agreed one is probably talking to Moscow via Nasser. M mentioned talking to Fawzi and the Finance Minister re drafting an agreement. M thought there might be a middle [Page 514] ground. M asked if they told the Sec they want to publish on a certain date, and the Sec said yes. M said that is contrary to what Fawzi told him. F wished there were ships in the Harbor so he could postpone and compromise. M said the thing he reacted most actively against in the American draft was re making a case for Israel before the Int’l Court. He would like to have something less legal, less rigid. M thinks they are in a box on the dredging and tugs. We would not be able to buy for them new dredges and tugs they will need. They haven’t the money to buy them and could not without UN help and support and that is something the man who runs the Canal is concerned about as is the Finance Minister and Fawzi. That may be the leverage that will be of value. They are frightened about being able to run it well and fully. The Sec mentioned meeting with Hammarskjöld in NY tomorrow. M said he reported to him and if the Sec wanted him he is available. M saw a little light through the clouds but mainly clouds.3
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.↩
- Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik. McCloy had stopped in Beirut on his way to Cairo.↩
- Following this
conversation, McCloy
telephoned the Acting Legal Adviser John M. Raymond. A memorandum of that
conversation by Raymond,
in which McCloy repeated
much of what he had told Dulles, is in Department of State, Central
Files, 974.7301/4–457.
On April 5, Dillon told the Secretary’s Staff Meeting that during a conversation with McCloy the night before in New York, he mentioned three points additional to those transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3093, Document 262. These were: “(1) Nasser’s objections to the six principles. It is mainly to the principle about divorcing the Canal from the politics of any nation; Nasser told McCloy that the Canal has always been an Egyptian political matter; (2) Nasser’s experts have advised him (badly) that Western talk of alternative routes, especially for oil, is bluff; (3) Nasser now seems depressed and unsure of himself.” (Tentative Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting prepared by Greene, April 5; Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
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