Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

206. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Israel–Jordan Affairs (Bergus)¹

Washington, March 8, 1957

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICY FOR EGYPT

I. United States Objectives With Respect to Egypt

Our long term, broad objectives with respect to Egypt are the restoration of close relations with an Egypt which lives up to its international obligations, recognizes the advantages of close relations with the West and is prepared to curtail its relationships with the USSR. Specifically, this would involve on Egypt’s part satisfactory arrangements regarding the Suez Canal, scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement with Israel, cessation of anti-Western propaganda, an end to attacks on the Baghdad Pact, and termination of efforts to establish Egyptian domination of neighboring countries, undermining for this purpose established regimes.

It will obviously require a considerable period to attain these objectives. There are few prospects of an immediate reorientation in Egypt’s basic attitudes. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed step by step, disposing of immediate pressing issues working by this process towards an eventual overall betterment of relations.

In the short term, two problems are paramount: 1) Satisfactory arrangements regarding the Suez Canal; 2) Implementation of the recent United Nations resolutions, and the reports made by the Secretary-General in conjunction with them, regarding the Israel-Egyptian situation.

Suez Canal. Egypt has now agreed to resumption of work on clearance which should be completed within two weeks. The immediate need is Egypt’s acceptance of interim arrangements along the lines of the US-UK-Norwegian-French proposal recently given to Secretary-General Hammarskjold for transmission to Egypt. The principal points are:

1) Payment of Canal tolls to a neutral agency, perhaps the IBRD;

2) Only 50 percent of the funds accruing to be turned over to Egypt, the remainder being held by the agency for disposition in connection with a final settlement;

3) That the operation of the Canal, pending a final settlement, will be in accordance with the Six Principles.

Israel-Egyptian Situation. The immediate requirements are: 1) Strict observance of the Armistice Agreement; 2) elimination of the Fedayeen raids into Israel; 3) acquiescence in continued United Nations administration of the Gaza Strip pending an agreement on the future of the Strip or a permanent general settlement; 4) acquiescence in the passage of Israel ships as well as the ships of other countries through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, in the absence of a contrary opinion by the International Court of Justice.

We also seek from Egypt in the period immediately ahead acceptance of the objectives of the President’s proposals on the Middle East or at least absence of opposition to them.

II. How We Have Made Known to Egypt the Actions We Would Like To See Egypt Take

A. General Steps

On December 15, 1956, Ambassador Hare, in response to instructions from the Department, met with Nasser for three hours, to set forth the steps the United States would like to see Egypt take. The Ambassador recalled the benefits which had come to Egypt as a result of the strong United States action at the time of the invasion of Egypt, action which placed the United States in the position of strong opposition to the policies of its oldest friends, the United Kingdom and France. The Ambassador asked Nasser to take the following steps:

1. Offer full cooperation in the urgent clearance of the Canal.

2. Offer full cooperation in the renewal of negotiations on a future Canal regime.

3. Place no obstacle in the way of fulfillment by the United Nations force of its responsibilities under the November 2 General Assembly Resolution in Egypt.

4. Take effective measures to prevent Fedayeen operations.

5. Cease operations by Egyptian agents in violation of the sovereignty and authority of neighboring states and cease inflammatory radio attacks on these states.

6. Move toward the settlement of outstanding problems between the Arab states and Israel.

The Ambassador made clear that the United States believed it had the right to ask Egypt to do these things in the interests of peace and stability in the area.

On February 15, 1957, Ambassador Hare had another long conversation with Nasser on American-Egyptian relations, pointing out that we had done just about all we could to show our good faith, without appropriate response from Egypt.

On both these occasions, Nasser’s reaction was defensive and evasive. He took occasion to refer to United States actions which he regards as unfriendly and not indicative of good United States intentions toward Egypt, such as the continued freezing of Egyptian funds, and the suspension of United States aid programs. He also stressed Egyptian determination to follow a foreign policy of “positive neutrality”, or non-alliance. He maintained that Egypt had no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union for economic assistance if this were cut off by the West.

B. Interim Regime for Operation of the Canal

We have reached agreement with the British, French and Norwegians on the elements of an interim arrangement governing the operation of the Suez Canal, which we consider to be consistent with the Six Principles endorsed by the Security Council and with the 1888 Convention and which we hope, if it is agreed by Egypt, will lead to a permanent settlement on the same basis. We have forwarded this plan to the UN Secretary General, who has given it to the Egyptians but who has not yet received any specific comment from them on it. However, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in New York has adopted an optimistic attitude toward an interim Canal arrangement and has expressed the opinion that Cairo will in the next few days forward suggestions for such an arrangement in the form of unilateral declaration by Egypt. We do not view this development with confidence and have pointed out to the Secretary General the need for a firm agreement with Egypt based on our suggestions for an interim arrangement. We have also suggested that the Secretary General should in the near future proceed to Cairo to secure the necessary Egyptian agreement from Nasser.

C. Discussions with King Saud and Response to Four Power Memorandum

During the visit of King Saud, we fully discussed with the King the current status of United States-Egyptian relations, in response to his own request. We clearly pointed out to him the steps which we would like to see Egypt take, and we assured him that if Egypt would adopt a constructive attitude on these problems we were certain that progress could be made toward establishing a more cordial relationship between Egypt and the United States.

The King brought with him a memorandum from the Chiefs of State of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, which largely reflected Egyptian views. The memorandum dealt in general with relations between the Near East and the West. We gave to King Saud for transmission to the same Chiefs of State a written reply to this memorandum. In this, we referred to the need for cooperation to assure progress toward the solution of the Palestine issue and for implementation by Egypt, through an agreement, of the principles of the 1888 Convention and the Six Principles agreed on in New York governing the operation of the Suez Canal. In the same reply we reviewed the problem of economic relations between the United States and Egypt, with particular reference to the Egyptian funds frozen in this country. We indicated the obstacles standing in the way of the solution of these problems. King Saud delivered copies of this reply to Nasser and the other Chiefs of State.

D. The United Nations

In the United Nations recently we have clearly set forth our desires and opinions regarding such problems as freedom of transit through the Suez Canal, the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, and the status of the Gaza Strip. We can have left no doubt in Egypt’s mind that we favor free transit through the Canal for all nations including Israel, that we believe the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters and that the ships of all nations, including Israel, have the right of free and innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf, and that while we agree that Egypt has the rights of occupation in the Gaza Strip accorded it by Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, we believe that Egypt should not exercise those rights for the time being in the interests of peace and security of the area, and should acquiesce in the United Nations’ administering the Strip.

E. Approaches in Washington

In informal conversations with officers of the Embassy of Egypt, officers of the Department of State have from time to time discussed problems outstanding between the United States and Egypt and have indicated ways in which these could be solved.

III. Steps Which Could be Taken if Egypt Does Not Undertake the Measures Desired by the United States

Before proceeding to a discussion of this point, it is important to set forth three considerations. First a boycott of the Suez Canal is not practicable. A wealthy nation like the United States might be able to stand the expense of diverting its ships around the Cape, but the European nations, and particularly those with heavier traffic through the Canal than we have, could not afford on any long-run basis to do this. Secondly Egypt, a poor country which for centuries has had an extremely low standard of living, is not, except possibly over a relatively long period of time vulnerable to economic and political warfare measures which would in the case of other countries, and particularly those highly dependent upon foreign trade and assistance, be effective. Thirdly, the USSR would no doubt increase its already sizeable assistance to Egypt should the latter become desperate in the face of long term sanctions by a group of nations.

A. Continue our Present Policy

If Egypt does not take the steps we would like to see her take, obviously we will not do the things we could do if Egypt adopted a constructive attitude. In the latter case we could take such steps as: remove restrictions on tourist travel; release blocked Egyptian funds; resume economic assistance and technical aid, including PL 480 surplus agricultural products; resume the CARE program; terminate export licensing restrictions on goods destined to Egypt; and finance repair or replacement of Suez Canal equipment and assist in widening and improving the Canal. We know that our present policy of correct but unhelpful relations with Egypt has caused Nasser great concern, particularly in view of the deteriorating economic situation in Egypt. However, it is not likely that the continuation of this policy will have the desired effects in the short run.

B. Direct Approaches to the Egyptian Government

If Egypt fails to do what we would like, we would doubtless wish to make new high level approaches in order strongly to request constructive action. Any such approach probably should include an indication of what the United States might be prepared to do in response to favorable Egyptian action.

C. Recourse to the United Nations

If Egypt fails to cooperate on problems involving threats to world security, such as obstructing passage through the Straits of Tiran for Israel, and raids from the Gaza Strip or elsewhere into Israel, we would doubtless raise these matters urgently in the United Nations. We could bring them first before the Security Council, and if frustrated there by the Soviet veto, we could have recourse to a special session of the General Assembly. Measures which might be proposed in this process would depend upon the circumstances, but they might include an attempt to institute sanctions against Egypt, although as it has been pointed out above these would not likely be effective in the short run, nor is it certain that sufficient support for sanctions could be obtained. An important consideration in this connection is that Egypt has occupied a favorable position in the United Nations’ consideration of the problem of military action against Egypt, being portrayed as the relatively innocent victim of aggression. Egypt would be reluctant to be placed in the role of the villain and might assume a conciliatory attitude to avoid such a situation.

D. Mobilization of World Opinion

In the cases described in C above, we would doubtless seek to exert moral pressures against Egypt through the United Nations and by means of appropriate action taken in this country and abroad.

E. Administrative Return of Egypt to Gaza

If Egypt seeks to reassume the administration of Gaza, she would be exercising her rights under the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement, rights which we believe that Egypt is entitled to. We would seek to dissuade Egypt from taking this action in view of the threat to the peace of the area inherent in it. If, however, Egypt proceeded and did not bring her armed forces into Gaza or engage in any way in hostile action against Israel from there, a threat to the peace would not exist and we would seek to persuade Israel of this.

F. Canal Tolls

We should seek to create an arrangement whereby the nation members of the Suez Canal Users Association would agree to pay their tolls to the Association which would in turn pay to Egypt or to the agent designated by Egypt, pursuant to an interim arrangement, the sum necessary to obtain passage of the ships. We should also try to persuade as many additional nations as possible to become members of SCUA and follow the same procedure with respect to tolls, in order to avoid a situation whereby individual nations followed separate policies vis-à-vis Egypt.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Suez Canal Crisis. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on March 8. Herter transmitted the memorandum on March 9 to the White House with a copy of a memorandum of a March 9 conversation between Eban and Herter (see telegram 860, Document 208). In the covering memorandum, Herter described the memorandum as “a written summary of the oral briefing” Rountree gave on March 8 to the President (see Document 203). A marginal notation by Goodpaster on the covering memorandum indicates: “President informed of substance”.

   Copies of this memorandum are attached to the memorandum of conversation by Rountree of the White House conversation on March 8; see footnote 1, Document 203.