204. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1056. Reference Embtel 1054.2 After handing me his reply to President’s March 2 letter Ben Gurion said he wished add few words to what [was] in letter.
On Straits of Tiran he said Government of Israel thought it reasonable withdraw after studying February 11 Aide-Mémoire, reports of Eban discussions with Secretary and declarations various states at United Nations although he had found Lodge statement “very disappointing”. Government of Israel now sees freedom of navigation in Straits and Gulf of Aqaba “more or less assured.” He indicated belief General Assembly Advisory Council must decide on question withdrawal UNEF from this area and implied he thought conditions permitting withdrawal unlikely prevail.
Regarding Gaza, Ben Gurion said Israel should not have evacuated area and that best solution to problem would have been joint Israel-United Nations Administration. He reviewed in familiar terms Egyptian violations of GAA and emphatically restated his view GAA now dead letter and no longer in force. In any case Egyptians must never return to Gaza …3 “We don’t accept Lodge view of this”. He added “I didn’t promise President to evacuate Gaza in my letter November 8” since Gaza not Egyptian territory. UNEF occupation of Gaza he said may be only “smoke screen” under cover of which Egyptians will return. Even if this not case UNEF alone cannot prevent border troubles since even Israel administration alone could not. Nevertheless Israel had had to evacuate Gaza and had arrived at this decision on strength of President’s letter March 2. In deciding on withdrawal he had taken upon himself and his colleagues great historical responsibility. He added firmly that if anything happens Israel has right defend itself and will do so … “If we drove Egyptians out once we can do it again”.
He emphasized at some length feeling of insecurity which now returned to Israel border settlements and said government and he personally had reassured settlers simply on basis of belief in word of United States. “While there is no clear undertaking still we feel President gave us assurances”.
[Page 384]Ben Gurion asked me particularly to convey to Department his conviction there must be no return of Egyptians to Gaza. Again he noted there no clear undertaking on this point by United States but he relied heavily on belief that United States would do what it could to prevent their return.
Turning away from security problems Ben Gurion then introduced subject of return to normal economic relations. He noted Exim Bank negotiations had come to a halt with Sinai campaign and expressed hope there would be early resumption these negotiations. He also said “we really expect American ships will come to Eilat as was promised by Lodge”. The arrival of ships including tankers would mean that Tiran in fact was free passage and that right of innocent passage had been established.
Speaking in broad terms Ben Gurion said he wanted soon to propose to Knesset deep water port at Eilat, construction of railroad through Negev as well as Roxos and if possible larger oil pipeline to Haifa or Wadi Sucreia. “I hope United States will take part in these projects”.
With regard Gaza border security problem I remarked it had once been proposed to erect patrolled double fence along border. In response Ben Gurion said this had once been proposed by Israel but rejected by Egypt. He had just met with general staff and told them to prepare plan for defense border settlements and he expected to have plan in about week or 2. He did not know whether such fence part their planning.
I told him I thought he had done statesmanlike job (in accepting our advice to withdraw in accordance with United Nations resolution) in face of his existing difficult domestic position. He had been able to convey effectively to his people confidence he enjoyed. I added that I sure he would find that his confidence well justified and his decision a proper and realistic one. Ben Gurion said “speaking personally” he had mixed feelings. He referred again to people living in Gaza border settlements as “best we have” and said he had acted against their feelings which he shared. But he only did so “because it had to be done.” Only history would tell whether his decision had been correct but he sure it would work out if President is right and Israel has no cause for regret. In conclusion Ben Gurion repeated as he has frequently before that he had met President “when he was only General” and that he took away impression that President is “man upon whom you can rely”.
Comment:Ben Gurion relaxed but showed real emotion when he spoke of insecurity of Gaza border settlers a point he underscored heavily as he evidenced his concern for them and his special responsibilities for their security. They so essential to his fundamental philosophy of Negev settlement and basic combined social-military program [Page 385] which bear his trade-mark that he probably more uneasy as to wisdom of withdrawal decision in that relation than in any other respect domestically. I noted he again returned emphatically to his insistence in connection with Gaza particularly that GAA with Egypt is dead … killed by Egyptian violations over long period of time … and Israel would no longer recognize its existence. He again underscored points contained in his letter i.e. Egypt must not return to Gaza and that Israel reserved right defend itself if threatened from Gaza. In making these points clear he firm but not emotionally emphatic. Throughout entire conversation he referred again and again to his confidence in President and very strong influence of encouraging phrases appearing in President’s letter. Although he may well have been greatly influenced by those factors it is not inconceivable that he also double underscoring them for the record and for politico-tactical reasons.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–857. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Received at 3:21 p.m. A copy of the telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series bears Eisenhower’s initials.↩
- Telegram 1054 transmitted Ben Gurion’s message to Eisenhower, Document 201.↩
- All ellipses in this document are in the source text.↩