198. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 855. Re: Palestine: (1) Israeli withdrawal; (2) interim arrangements for Canal. Further Delga 854:
- 1.
In subsequent conversation with SYG after Secretary had called him and personally conveyed US views,2SYG expressed gratification for clarity of situation as it developed in Washington, and for confirming in his mind agreement between US position and his own. He said he had that afternoon “rubbed it in” with Georges Picot (France) [Page 373] telling him he had had chance to cross-check situation in greatest detail with Washington, and there was no doubt of accuracy of his understanding of US position.
Hammarskjold then reported on hour’s talk he had had with Fawzi (Egypt) in early afternoon. Latter was in complete agreement with SYG’s intention to put out short report noting withdrawal and bringing out in some fashion that thing to do now was proceed with implementation ResII of Feb 2. Fawzi had asked him whether he really felt further res endorsing his report was necessary. Fawzi said moment there was further paper it invited people’s comment which would not be too helpful. From his talk with FawziSYG concluded all that was needed was to make clear in his report that nothing had superseded ResII; i.e., that what took place in Washington over last weekend could not be deemed to have modified Assembly’s previous stand. If this were case, then all that would happen in plenary would be debate on report, no res, and then recess.
We raised with Hammarskjold somewhat discouraging conversation with Crosthwaite (UK) this afternoon, in which latter had raised question of UNEF placement on Israel side of armistice line. He argued that since this had apparently not been raised in Washington, nor in Mrs. Meir’s speech, nor in speeches on Monday, February 2 ResII, particularly that part calling for stationing of UNEF in Israel, had been superseded. We informed SYG we could not accept such interpretation of erasing previous resolutions by omission of comment. Hammarskjold agreed with our interpretation, but explained that his having raised subject in general way with Dixon (UK) may have stimulated Crosthwaite’s thinking and he (Crosthwaite) had pushed idea so far in his thinking as to imagine all unfortunate consequences which might follow from bringing up this issue, and had therefore been arguing against it on this somewhat strange basis. Hammarskjold felt that Israel, however, might very likely argue that ResII had been superseded, so he intended to give slight push to idea of UNEF on both sides of line at this point, to avoid impression it was dead. If Israel objected, we would have to take another look at what to do, but he felt he could so state the matter as to avoid prompting negative Israeli stand in public. In this connection he thought it useful have statement from US supporting idea as being good from Israel’s own standpoint.
Returning to his conversation with Fawzi, SYG said he had “checked out” ideas on Fawzi that he had mentioned this morning to us. Fawzi not only had agreed 100 percent but had even elaborated on SYG’s line. Fawzi had said if SYG did not feel he had to “crack the nut” of talking with Egypt about administration in Gaza at this time, he believed it would not be necessary for SYG go to Cairo next week, and in fact it would be useful to have period of calm and quiet, with no [Page 374] border raids or incursions, so that Egypt could move into stage of serious talks. He suggested, and SYG agreed, that if SYG did not need go to Cairo next week, SYG should wait until after his trip to Tunisia to attend Independence Day celebration (March 20?) and after Cairo, Fawzi said, should go to Jerusalem. In this connection Fawzi expressed satisfaction at Ben Gurion speech to Knesset yesterday, not of course where it spoke of Israel returning to Gaza, but because it in effect recognized future possibility of Egypt going into Gaza. This took burden off Cairo.
- 2.
- Fawzi told SYG he would try within next three or four days to obtain from Cairo a unilateral declaration re interim arrangements for Suez which would make negotiations this regard unnecessary. It would not be bargaining position but would go “all the way”. SYG said if Fawzi succeeded, he felt we would get more through him out of Cairo than through anyone else negotiating for users’ interests. He felt it would be declaration to which no one could reasonably object although there would be some “screams” about it. He said it would probably provide for payment into account which Egypt would draw upon only up to about 50 percent for operating expenses. Remainder Egypt would not touch, and would hold for final settlement which should not be too long in following. Egypt’s scheme would apparently allow for “all kinds of reservations” so that US system of payments would be fully recognized.
. . . . . . .
If Fawzi did not succeed in getting above out of Cairo in three or four days, he thought in those circumstances Hammarskjöld would have to go to Cairo next week. That would be only condition on which SYG would, in Fawzi’s opinion, have go there, until after March 20.
In this general connection SYG returned to what he said before: that it would be folly for Israel to try to force issue of Israeli passage through Canal on opening day, or in immediate future. That could wreck everything. Moreover he said he felt if Israelis sent warships through Straits Tiran he would, as lawyer, feel Egypt justified in stopping Israeli commercial shipping in Canal, on grounds that warship in Egypt’s claimed territorial waters had obvious appearance of hostile act which would entitle Egypt to assert its belligerency by stopping enemy shipping through Canal. He therefore hoped US at appropriate time might use its influence to persuade Israelis of wisdom of not pushing this issue at this time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–657. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:17 p.m.↩
- See Document 196.↩