Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, February 17, 1957, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, February 17, 1957, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister
• The Secretary
• Francis O. Wilcox—IO
• Herman Phleger—L
• William M. Rountree—NEA

Ambassador Eban said that since the meeting of the previous day he had received a number of telegrams from Jerusalem, and had worked late the previous evening with the Foreign Minister in New York. The Prime Minister was anxious that the United States should understand his attitude. He was concerned with what his situation would be if he should withdraw from the two positions in question and later a situation should develop in which Israel was denied passage through the Straits and violence should again erupt from Gaza. Already there had been raids across the UNEF lines, with Egypt engaged in attacks and mine-laying. His questions in this regard would explain the tenacity of the Israelis and the feeling on their part that it was better to take more time now to prevent such a recurrence, than to make hasty arrangements without maximum precautions. The Prime Minister had expressed deep appreciation for the care with which the United States Government had set forth its position to Israel and explained what the United States was prepared to do in the United Nations.

The Ambassador said he had a number of points to raise concerning the American Aide-Mémoire of February 11. Regarding the first paragraph, the last sentence stated that Israeli forces “…² also occupy the Gaza strip which is territory specified by the Armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt”. That would overstate Egypt’s case, he said, since the Agreement specifies only that Gaza was not to be occupied by Israeli forces. There was nothing in the Agreement to prevent an Israeli civil administration so long as the area was not occupied by Israeli military forces. (The Secretary questioned this interpretation of the Agreement).

Regarding the second paragraph, the Ambassador said the Israeli position was not reflected with complete accuracy. It was properly stated in the Aide-Mémoire that Israel would withdraw from the Sharm el-Shaikh area if continued freedom of passage through the Straits was assured. Israel’s position on Gaza, as noted in its Aide-Mémoire of February 15, was that it was willing to evacuate forces from the Gaza strip but was opposed to the restoration of the Egyptian occupation, while being willing to discuss a suitable relationship between the United Nations and the Israeli administrative services. The Ambassador said that the Israeli position in this respect had been elaborated since the Prime Minister had first written to the President on the subject.

Regarding paragraph 3, the Ambassador again questioned the statement that the Armistice Agreement had given Egypt the “right and responsibility” of occupation. He thought that Egypt had no such duty and responsibility, and that the Armistice Agreement had been negative and not positive in this sense. Concerning the second sentence of that paragraph, stating the United States believes “that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional” he said the term “Israel forces” in this connection would be appropriate if it were agreed that a decision on the civil administration should be deferred pending further examination and discussion by the United Nations. He noted this was a question of political attitude and not merely of text. The Ambassador went to some length to rationalize this attitude and to demonstrate that the United States and the United Nations presumably intended some distinction between complete withdrawal and withdrawal of forces, citing as an example the President’s letter of February 3 which stated the belief that “Israeli forces” should be withdrawn from Gaza. He said he thought the concept of withdrawing forces before the civil administration was “not foreign to the United Nations or to the United States”.

At this point the Secretary observed that the Ambassador’s comments were interesting but were only of secondary importance. The main question was whether the Government of Israel accepted the basic thesis in the Aide-Mémoire of February 11.

The Ambassador commented that changes in the Aide-Mémoire might conceivably affect in some degree the Israeli attitude, recognizing that some of the changes suggested involved points of substance. Turning to paragraph 6 of the United States Aide-Mémoire, he said he would assume that the United States position regarding free and innocent passage through the Straits related to the conduct of vessels and not to the flag which the vessels flew or what was aboard. The Secretary observed that this would appear to be an academic question now since Israel could presumably not claim innocent passage if it was in military occupation of a part of Egypt and held the Gaza strip.

Regarding paragraph 8, stating that the United States was prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure the general recognition of this right, the Ambassador said the question arose on the basic point of how far the United States would go in this regard. Israel wondered whether we would show determination not to acquiesce in any interference with the right of free passage.

The 9th paragraph, the Ambassador said, was an extremely important problem since it involved the question of the degree of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza necessary to restore the right of free and innocent passage. If the paragraph meant that Israel would not have the right of passage through Aqaba (and the Suez Canal) even after withdrawing military forces from Gaza and the Straits, the value to Israel of this provision would be annulled until the question of the administration of Gaza was resolved. He did not think it right to link everything to every vestige of Israel’s rights in the administrative sphere in Gaza.

The Secretary inquired whether, if that point were resolved, Israel would withdraw its military force behind the Armistice lines. He remarked that from what the Ambassador had said, he assumed he was not authorized to say that would be the case.

The Ambassador responded that he would not be so authorized, since other matters were involved in the Israeli decision to withdraw. Perhaps, however, these other aspects were less “deadlocked” than this.

The Secretary commented that the United States had no authority or inclination to derogate the responsibility from the United Nations to decide questions of this nature. If Israel wished to put forth propositions of this character it should do so to the United Nations.

The Ambassador replied that his Government would undoubtedly do so at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, he would like to give the United States the complete picture of the Israeli thinking on the matter. Returning to the United States Aide-Mémoire, he said that in paragraph 10, regarding the UNEF, the belief was stated that the UNEF should move in after Israeli forces were withdrawn; however the Aide-Mémoire said nothing about the tenure of the functions of the UNEF. Ambassador Lodge had expressed himself in the General Assembly as to what the UNEF should do. The fact that this was not spelled out by the United Nations in its resolution constituted a difficulty. If it had been defined there would be greater hope of moving forward.

The Ambassador said he would like to discuss procedural subjects. He had gone as far as he could in clarifying the position of his Government regarding the American Aide-Mémoire. He believed that our two positions were not substantially different in their objectives, but there were differences in details. The two main points concerned American views on the future of Gaza and whether we felt nothing more could be done to obtain assurances regarding Aqaba. The Government of Israel had met that morning and had considered the matter thoroughly. It desired further clarification of American views and positions before making any final decision. The Foreign Minister and Ambassador Eban would like to leave for Israel tonight to explain the American view, after which the decision by the Government of Israel would be solemnly and gravely rendered. He could not say what effect their presence in Israel would have upon his Government’s position. An important question was whether the United Nations processes would continue in their absence and there would develop a situation which would rule out the benefits of the trip.

The Secretary was not sure about the United Nations time schedule. We had received assurances that the debate would not start until Tuesday, February 19. However there was some doubt that it could be postponed beyond that time. He asked what Mr. Wilcox thought about this. Mr. Wilcox thought it would be extremely difficult to obtain a longer postponement. There already was great pressure to resume the debate. The Secretariat had been helpful thus far, but he did not know whether it would be possible to delay much longer.

The Secretary observed that with hopes of Israeli acceptance of the American Aide-Mémoire as a basis for immediate withdrawal having been dissipated, he could not estimate the possibilities of a delay. We certainly had no desire to precipitate matters. The United Nations was faced with dealing with the matter further and he did not know what the attitude of the other delegations might be.

Mr. Phleger said that, as a lawyer, he would like to make an observation concerning the legal aspects of the Israeli position on its civil administration of Gaza. The Armistice Agreement had provided essentially that Israel would be on one side of the Gaza-issue boundary and Egypt on the other. That situation prevailed, subject to raids and counter raids and other difficulties, until the unilateral military action by Israel during which it seized by force the Gaza area. Under the protection of Israeli troops a civil administration had been set up in Gaza. The United Nations had called for the withdrawal of these forces. It was inherent that both be withdrawn, civil as well as military. The civil administration could not exist except by agreement between Israel and Egypt, or under protection of Israeli troops. Israel apparently asserted that there should be a revision of the Armistice Agreement under cover of armed protection by the occupation forces. That, he thought, was legally untenable.

The Ambassador had no convincing reply to Mr. Phleger’s observation, but again commented that the Israeli concept of the Armistice Agreement was that Egypt had been given no special rights or privileges in Gaza. Israel believed that a military withdrawal should be continued by discussions of the future of Gaza after the visit of a United Nations mission.

The Secretary observed that some thought was being given in the United Nations Secretariat to the future administration of Gaza. While we had not been consulted and had no details, he was aware that this matter was receiving some attention.

The Ambassador said that Israel had not been associated with any such planning and had not been consulted. He reverted to his trip to Jerusalem and expressed the hope that he could have a few days for consultation with his Government before any United Nations action.

The Secretary expressed the view that there had been a fairly thorough exchange between the Israeli Government and the United States, and that any further talks might best be between Israel and the United Nations. Many areas into which the Israeli Government was now getting in the bilateral talks could not properly be dealt with on a bilateral basis. We had gone as far as we could without encroaching upon the authority of the United Nations and the Secretary General. The basic questions now being raised by Israel were matters with which we could not deal since we had no United Nations mandate.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that the United States might in the United Nations adopt positions supporting Israel regarding further assurances on the Straits and regarding the administration of Gaza. He said that in any future General Assembly debate it was expected that Israel’s difficulties would become more understood and Israel would get wider support.

The Secretary observed that Israel no doubt would have another chance for debate in the General Assembly. He said he was sad about what the Ambassador had told him concerning the Israeli position. Great trouble was ahead. He had felt there was a real opportunity to work together, and had striven to do so. If the withdrawal did not take place, there would be a multiplicity of trouble affecting our relations officially with the Government of Israel and affecting the attitude of the American people toward Israel. Perhaps there would be divisions along racial and religious lines, which we would deeply deplore. A situation might arise which would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to inject itself in the area ostensibly to assist the United Nations. This would be an extremely dangerous disguise. He did not know the consequences of these grave developments. He gathered that the Government of Israel had weighed them in deciding its attitude. It was probably presumptuous of him to ask, he said, but he was curious to know how the Government of Israel might calculate that it would get the things that it wanted by assuming the attitude described by the Ambassador.

The Ambassador said that these matters had been weighed by the Government. He assumed that the main hope was that there would be a change in the attitude of the United Nations, which would accept conditions to the Israeli withdrawal.

The Secretary thought that Israel had gravely miscalculated if it thought that, as a result of its position, there would be a change in the United Nations regarding negotiation and settlement of these issues prior to Israeli withdrawal. Thus the Secretary did not see where the solution might lie. There might be a resumption of hostilities, but if this should take place it would be under conditions where Israel would be largely looked upon as the aggressor. He doubted that under these conditions Israel could indefinitely prevail. Israel might annex large territories of other countries and attempt to hold those territories by military might, but such a course would indeed be risky.

The Ambassador, obviously impressed by the Secretary’s remarks, said he did not feel that his government’s appreciation of the situation was the same as the Secretary’s. However, since the Secretary did feel so he thought it even more important that he should go to Jerusalem and carefully explain these views to the authorities.

The Secretary repeated that if Israel was gambling on the theory that it could break down the present United Nations position he felt that would be a vain hope. If so, there was nothing ahead except grave danger.

Mr. Shiloah interjected at this point that perhaps the Ambassador had understated the importance of his trip to Israel by describing it as “procedural”. It is because of the grave implications of the matter that the Israeli representatives had sat up most of the previous night in serious discussions, and it was thought that every nuance of the Secretary’s thinking should be brought to the attention of the Israeli Government.

Responding to the Secretary’s question, Ambassador Eban said it was planned that both he and the Foreign Minister would return to Israel. The only thing that might obstruct the trip was the possibility of immediate action in the United Nations which might involve the discussion of sanctions.

The Secretary concluded by saying that we would do what we could to gain time in the General Assembly but he did not think it possible to delay much if at all. The pressure for immediate debate was very great.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–1757. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. On Sunday, February 17, Dulles conducted Department of State business from his home in Northwest Washington. The Department of State transmitted a summary of this conversation on February 18 to the Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 800. (Ibid., 674.84A/2–1857)
2. Ellipsis in the source text.