670. Memorandum From Phyllis D. Bernau to the Secretary of State1
Mr. Secretary: Mr. Dean called and said that at Eban’s request he had breakfast with him and Mrs. Meir. They showed him a topographical map of the Canal and of Israel and primarily of the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. At the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba where the Arabs used to fire on the Israeli boats coming up through there, they apparently have some soldiers there now and in an effort to keep the Gulf open they have advised Hammarskjold that they want to keep those people there until there has been some overall UN policy with respect to the relations between Egypt and Israel. They say if they were to—since ships cannot go through the Suez and since it is closed to everyone now—if they couldn’t send ships through Aqaba they would be sunk. They have plans for building an 8-inch and subsequently a 30-inch pipeline starting at the Port where the Gulf of Aqaba touches on Israeli territory which [Page 1340] would carry oil from Iran and Kuwait up to Haifa. As AD2 told you they tried to retain him on it and he said no—also told Lazard3 no. Then they say on the Gaza Strip starting up on the northernmost part of that Strip immediately east of El Arish they want to stay there and either have the UN Force take over and make that a buffer state between Egypt and Israel or have some buffer state worked out in there or they want some system worked out so Egyptian troops won’t be poking their guns at the border and shooting and sending Fedayeens over. They hope that somehow or other in connection with this overall settlement that formal legalisms of restoring the status quo ante would not be enforced so that they would have to withdraw from the Gaza Strip which would mean an entirely unacceptable situation, as it was before they attacked, would be brought back and they hope something constructive would be brought out of it and they would be permitted to occupy the Strip until the UN has been able to do something.
On the Gulf of Aqaba they hope to be able to work out some international concordat making it an international waterway which might be patrolled by international force because if they are forced to withdraw from the narrow strip they occupy at the tip of that peninsula northeast of the Cape of Mohammed, if the Egyptians were to come back there and fire on them, public opinion in Israel is such that they should shoot their way through the Gulf. AHD said he thought they had done enough shooting but if they were going to try to get this worked out they ought to work out their formal legal plans and try to get support for it and tell the Secretary what they had in mind—if they expect support on it the Secretary should not wake up some morning and find the shooting had taken place. This will take a tremendous amount of thought and study to work out an international agreement. They would have to educate people in the UN on it and it would need a lot of drafting and would have to be tied in with some kind of thinking that would be going on for the long-term settlement of the Suez and that otherwise Nasser might insist that he would not permit the clearing vessels to proceed in the Suez until they had gotten out of Sinai and the Strip and then they would find themselves arrayed against northwest Europe who would say if it weren’t for Israel, they could get the Canal cleared. They might find themselves arrayed against the rest of the world and that should be avoided.
AHD thought it would be helpful for you to know this before your 4 p.m. meeting with Mrs. Meir.